

**SHOOTING THE MESSENGER: A CROSS-SECTIONAL TIME-SERIES
ANALYSIS OF MEDIA REPRESSION AROUND THE WORLD**

**A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department
of Political Science
University of Houston**

**In partial fulfillment
of the Requirements of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

**By
Nixon Karimi Kariithi**

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
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


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
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
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
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Abstract

This dissertation uses theoretical and empirical approaches to examine under what circumstances political regimes repress their own media. While numerous studies have recently examined the causal and associative nature of political repression in general, this dissertation focuses on media repression as a micro-level study of political repression. It conceptualizes general political repression as a multi-component construct and the constituent components as having shared variance.

The dissertation first establishes a theoretical explanation for media repression. Using political culture and critical media theories, I argue that mass media are repressed because political regimes perceive them as actual or potential sources of threat. This argument is premised upon media's pervasive role in modern societies, and their influence and control over the public sphere. Since media are not neutral contenders for control of the public sphere, contestations and negotiations characterize their relations with political regimes. Without these, repression takes root.

Next, I create a dataset to provide cross-national and time-series data on media repression around the world. The dataset provides data for 90 countries over 10 years. Raw data from multiple sources is coded into five hierarchical categories, and a scale of media repression is created that captures the most repressive strategy by a particular political regime in any given year.

Finally, using various strategies under cross-sectional time series analysis, I explore political, economic, and socio-cultural predictors of media repression. The results

indicate that democracy, regulation of participation and economic development are negatively associated with media repression. At the same time, revolutions, assassinations, population, exchange rate instability and media penetration are positively associated with media repression. Lagged media repression is positive associated with media repression, but its greatest impact is limited to one year. Assessing the relative contribution of the explanatory variables, it appears that political variables are more important in the short term, while economic/socio-cultural variables are important in the long term.

Acknowledgements

This is the one that almost got away. But God was on my side, and I thank Him that this is now a done dissertation. While “many things are impossible with men, with God all things are possible” (Matthew 19:26). So I sing David’s Psalm: “Jehovah Ngai nīwe Murīithi wakwa; ndirī kīindu ingīaga!”

This dissertation is dedicated to three people whose love and support I have so lavishly enjoyed during the course of my doctoral studies and the writing of this dissertation. First, it is dedicated to my wife, Emily, for her love, patience, and warmth. She was there for me even at the most difficult times when everything seemed to go wrong. It was only because she has always been there for me that I am able to finally write these conclusive words of a seven-year journey. Her steadfast love and friendship gave me a reason each day to hack away at this study, constantly renewing an old quote we once shared: “The love in your heart wasn’t put there to stay; love isn’t love till you give it away”. Our two sons, Brian and Daniel, showered me with love, joy and laughter, each in his own special way. To Brian, who had to share me with my studies for a lifetime, I say, “You’ve got a friend in me”. To Daniel, born in the latter days of this long-drawn excursion but never too young to know the need to learn more, I sing our favorite duet: “Daddy is Daniel’s friend!”

My family has always been the greatest source of my strength and confidence. I thank God for my loving parents, Timothy Karīithi Wamani and Margery Nyathogora Karīithi, for the special way they raised me and for teaching me how to pray. How I

wish you were here right now as I write this. May the Almighty God always bless you in special ways. To you, I say “Ngumo na ūgooci irogūcookerera, Mwathani!”

I thank my sisters and brothers - Peter and Akendo Kareithi, Tabitha and Sammy Gachiengu, Job and Mercy Kareithi, Sweet “Toons” Irene Kūng’ū, Maxwell and Anne Kareithi, Alex and Mary Kareithi, Samuel and Roselyn Kareithi, and Wangechi and Wachira Karite - for their contribution in making me who I am today. You are my best friends; and that you know. To you I say, “Rĩrĩ iruga nĩ riitũ!”

This intellectual excursion has been a long journey, one that began in the late 1970’s when I began developing clear sensibilities about the news media. I read many heroic stories by journalists but also read - with confused concern - many others about arrests, detention without trial, assaults and even murders. In 1985, I entered journalism aggressively but highly alert to the “land mines” that characterized a journalist’s terrain in repressive political systems like Kenya, my home country. Media repression was a daily occurrence; public pronouncements from the ruling elites, unwelcome visits by state agents, legal action and assaults. My moment of reckoning came on 21 April 1989, when the government of Kenya banned *The Financial Review*, an aggressive weekly magazine where I cut my teeth. While scuttling for cover from an irrational state security agency, I remember wondering whether one could ever make sense of the diabolical muzzling of the press in Kenya and around the world.

The answer came in April 1995 with a humble invitation to a meeting at the Freedom House, New York, to review the 1994 annual report on Press Freedom Around the World. Although many present at the meeting would recall my incessant interjections with questions and postulations, I guess few of them would believe that I am still grappling with the tough questions that the meeting could not answer. I hope this work sheds some light on that big question: why do governments repress their

media personnel and institutions? More importantly, I hope this work lays the foundation for answers to the even bigger question: how can media repression be minimized or ameliorated?

Yet a study as important as this almost got away! Initially, I lacked hard data with which to test my many subjective suppositions. After a lot of trying, raw data finally came along from many media organizations around the world. I wish to salute Prof. Leonard Sussman, founder of the Freedom House annual reports on Press Freedom Around the World. Prof. Sussman trusted me enough to give me raw data he had painstakingly collected over a 15-year period. This gesture remains the biggest break in my research, and for which I will forever be grateful. I still remember writing Prof. Sussman a thank-you note in which I hailed the opportunity that the data offered for studies in political culture and media studies. "I know," he quipped, "that's why I'm doing this."

The Sussman data brought with it more good tidings. Additional raw data from the Committee to Protect Journalists, Media Institute for Southern Africa, Hong Kong Journalists Association, International Federation of Journalists, African Union of Journalists, etc. I am grateful to the officials of at least 17 media organizations around the world for their assistance with raw data. I hope this study becomes a symbol of the media independence and integrity that we all seek.

Understanding the raw data and its full potential was another major task. Prof. Kathleen Knight saw the utility in the data and allowed me into her Media & Politics class in the fall of 1995, against departmental policy. She encouraged me to begin thinking seriously about media repression and related issues. With her help, I developed the coding sheet and coded the 1993 data for the final paper in her class. This first cut in data analysis greatly inspired me and culminated in a paper presented

at the annual conference of the Mid West Political Science Association in Chicago in April 1998. Prof. Knight's emphasis on simplicity and clarity in research design and analysis was indispensable throughout the period of this research.

The public sphere perspective to media repression was developed under the guidance of Prof. Les Switzer. His critical appreciation of media theories greatly assisted me in refining the model as well as in providing links to the political repression literature. Prof. Switzer's hawkish eye for detail was a constant reminder that even the best sentence could still be edited. While the responsibility for any errors and omissions remains mine, I am grateful to him for elevating the literary and stylistic quality of this dissertation.

I am especially indebted to Prof. James Gibson and Prof. Raymond Duch for the bulk of the conceptual and empirical work in this study. For two years, I studied quantitative research methods under Prof. Gibson. From him, I not only learnt to believe in my findings and to critically relate them to contemporaneous circumstances. His critical approach to all intellectual excursions inspired me to undertake this onerous project. His solemn voice, pointing out pitfalls in systematic research, still rings in my ears nearly seven years since my first research methods class. Most important, I will always be grateful for his trust, vision and encouragement during one of the toughest moments of my doctoral studies. You will always be Prof. Gibson to me.

Prof. Duch introduced me to time series analyses, formal theory and international political economy. To him I owe much of the econometric analyses in this study as well as knowledge of such statistical software as Limdep and Winrats. I am especially indebted to him for his emphasis on innovative and creative ways of doing empirical research. I must also confess that I inherited his enthusiasm for current literature.

I am indebted to many others who assisted in the course of my doctoral studies and particularly in this research. Prof. Gregory Weiher, a late addition to my dissertation committee, read several versions of the dissertation draft. Special thanks to Prof. Robert Erikson for shaping my intellectual appreciation of many aspects of this dissertation. Profs. Susan Scarrow, John T. Scott, Harell Rodgers and Kent Tedin played important roles during my first three years of graduate studies. I am indebted to Hellen Rūgoiyo for meticulously coding the raw data. I acknowledge the assistance and warm friendship of Pamela Moore, Vanessa Baird, Toshi Yuasa, Van Wiggington, Curtis Frazier, Leesa Boeger, Belinda Botha and Marika Litras. In different but very pertinent ways, I am also grateful to Jennie Loftis, Trenia Walker, Robert Seese, Susan Rosthal and Michelle Foss - each came into my life at critical moments and made an indelible imprint.

To conclude, I reflect again on this product I am calling “the one that almost got away”. It has been written over a seven-year period and in many takes. Portions of it were written in Houston, Texas; Grahamstown and Johannesburg, South Africa; Nairobi, Kenya; Norrköping, Sweden; and New York City, New York. Besides the media repression data, other data was gratefully received from Keith Jagers (Polity IV), Christian Davenport (Arthur Bank’s Time Series Dataset), the World Bank (World Tables), and Doug van Belle (Press Freedom dataset). My doctoral studies and this dissertation project have directly or otherwise - but always with humility - benefited from funding from the University of Houston’s (UH) Graduate Students Travel Grant; UH’s Shell International Scholarship; UH’s Energy Institute Research Fellowship; the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, New York, USA; Wisemann School of Arts and Sciences, Baruch College, New York, USA; Linnaeus Palmer Foundation, Stockholm,

Sweden; Ernest Oppenheimer Memorial Trust, Johannesburg, South Africa; and the African Economics Editors Network, Grahamstown, South Africa.

As I pen these conclusive words, I am again aware that this is yet a new beginning, a new quest for knowledge and the essence of life. To this I say:

Through many dangers, toils and snares;
I have already come
Twas' Grace that's brought me safe thus far;
And Grace will lead me on!

Nixon Karīmi Karīithi

May 2003

Macakaya ma Ūhotani

Andū aitū

Mūtikanariganīrwo ūhotani nīkītī

Kīrimū kīriragīria thūmbī;

Gīkariganīrwo atī

Mbere ya riri wayo

Nī mīnoga, ruo, kwīnyerekia, na gūtangīka kūingī

No ūrīa mūgī nīoī ūū:

Thūmbī ĩciaragwo nī ūhotani

Naguo ūhotani nī kīheo kīa ūrīa wīhotorete

Kwīhotora nakuo nī rūgendo rwa matukū maingī;

Nīamu gūtiri ūciaragwo arī mūhiki –

Ona gūtiri ūciaragwo ūmūthī,

Rūciū akaroka ūgwīmi, ūturi, ūthīnji,

Wandīki wa marūa, kībata, kana ūtuithania wa maciira

Ūhotani ūkaga thutha wa rūgendo; wee mūgī ririkana

O naguo mūkuha ndwarī mūgī – nī kūnoorwo wanoorirwo.

Nī hau!

Karīmi Karīithi Wamani
Grahamstown, South Africa
May, 2001

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated
to my parents, Karĩithi and Nyathogora,
my wife, Emily,
and to my sons, Brian and Daniel

Chapter 1

Introduction

Scholarly interest in human rights issues has grown considerably during the past two decades. In the sub-field of political repression, much of this scholarly interest is attributable to the development of databases that allowed social scientists to conduct empirical analyses of political repression. The databases were initially used to simply demonstrate correlation between repression and a variety of political, economic and sociocultural variables. Then came attempts to conduct cross-sectional causal analysis in single or multiple countries. The latest scholarly moves involve some fairly sophisticated analyses, for example, cross-sectional time series analyses of large numbers of countries over several decades. Since the unit of analysis in most studies is country-year, the result is large datasets that facilitate extensive statistical exploration.

In tandem with these developments, political repression research has been substantially influenced by general developments in comparative political research, particularly in the area of measurement theory. Political repression scholars, and indeed most human rights researchers, constantly endeavor to improve their data collection methods and the reliability/validity of their measures. This task has been daunting and while both aspects of research measurement have improved over the past two decades, many problems are still reported in some existing data sets. These include limited sources of data explicitness in coding, credibility of sources, and misuse of collection techniques (like expert surveys). Problems relating to reliability

and validity include failure to report reliability, high subjectivity levels among experts, and inconsistencies between stated concepts and what is actually measured. There is also a failure to look for systematic and random errors in these measures.

My dissertation makes a significant contribution in two ways. First, although media repression is one of the most common and most widely publicized forms of political repression, my literature review suggests that virtually nothing has been done in this area since Raymond Nixon's studies of the 1960s. The Nixon studies were however replete with measurement problems and only indicated correlation between media repression and socioeconomic and cultural variables. For comparison purposes, consider research in the area of political repression and US foreign aid: extensive research has evolved from some modest studies conducted in the late 1970s into a formidable school. Similarly, research into role of NGOs in minimizing political repression has developed considerably from seminal studies conducted in the early 1980s. Surprisingly, little systematic research exists in media repression. My dissertation will bring scholarship in media repression up to date.

The dearth of systematic scholarship in media repression is appreciated when one considers the dissertation's second contribution to the study of political repression. The limited work discernible today in media repression is bedeviled by measurement problems. A number of international media organizations have over the past two decades attempted to collect and report media violations around the world. The best known of these are Freedom House, Committee to Protect Journalists, Index on Censorship and the World Press Freedom Review (from the International Press Institute).

Except for Freedom House, the other organizations simply collect raw information on media repression for documentation and activist purposes. They do not attempt to

analyze the annual dockets of incidents beyond compiling some basis statistics, e.g. the number of journalists imprisoned, assaulted, killed, and so forth. Freedom House, however, attempts to compute a yearly rating of countries on a scale for “free”, “partly free” and “not free” media systems. This rating system, a pseudo-expert survey, lacks a scientifically sound methodology, among other shortcomings. As such, it is not accepted as a “real” measure of press freedom, even though it has existed for 20 years.

My dissertation comes to fill this apparent void. Specifically, it will provide the first truly systematic measure of press freedom in 129 countries for the period 1987 to 1997. The comprehensive dataset has been labeled the Media Repression Dataset, 1987-1997. Most of the shortcomings of the above annual compilations have been identified. The perennial problem of data collection sources was resolved by collecting data from multiple sources, particularly local and regional sources with no government links. The non-availability of such sources is the reason why some methodologists are recommending the use of carefully selected expert panels.

Data are collected from regional media organizations covering virtually every country in the world. A multiplicity of sources combined with the communication benefits of the Internet implies that virtually all overt cases (and many less explicit incidents) of media repression are captured. Succinct coding procedures have been developed (for the first time), facilitating empirical analyses as well as replication. One of the critical issues raised by methodologists is the use of magnitude scaling estimation techniques (i.e., the creation of variables that are close to interval levels of measurement). This point, an ideal situation in much of human rights and political repression research, has been successfully addressed.

The research problem

As already stated, little is known about why countries abuse their own media institutions. While a growing number of studies have focused on general political repression, little systematic research has been conducted that seeks to understand the causes of media repression. This dissertation is a first cut to such an inquiry. Using this new database of observations (as opposed to expert judgments), the dissertation will investigate the impact of variables identified in extant political repression and media literature on media repression.

Media repression is operationalized as “actions by governments or political regimes against media personalities and/or media organizations in response to perceived threat from media coverage of topical issues.” The raw data is coded into five indicators of media repression, namely, intimidation, prevention, legal, injury and elimination strategies. The indicators represent a continuum of possible government action, ranging from low-impact to high-impact repression strategies. To facilitate multivariate analysis, the five indicators are combined into a new six-point ordinal scale. The scale captures the most severe form of repression for the unit of analysis (country year).

The independent variables for this study are drawn from fairly large extant literature in political repression, and the very constrained studies of media repression. Two general categories of independent variables will be tested in keeping with the literature: political variables, economic and socio-cultural variables. These variables are all premised on extant literature. As expected, a number of hypotheses are generated from theoretical postulations to test relationships between media repression and the explanatory variables. These explanatory variables were derived

from general political repression studies. Their inclusion is preceded by a theoretical argument that media repression is indeed a component of the general political repression.

At the end of the day, the question of this study's efficacy looms. Yet the need for a deeper understanding and appreciation of the causes and predicates of media repression cannot be overemphasized. The past half-century has seen media emerge as one of the leading institutions in the contest to shape public opinion. At the same time - and arguably as a direct consequence of this development - media have found themselves under increasing pressure from political regimes wishing to curtail the media institutions' independence to inform and educate the public. As such, students of political culture must interrogate the relations between political elites and media institutions to develop critical understanding of the power dynamics in contemporary political cultures. This dissertation is one such contribution.

The objective of the empirical excursion is twofold. First, it is important to establish how these variables affect media repression. Second, the relationship between media repression and the exogenous variables within countries and across time is examined. It is hypothesized that the variables representing short-term, high-impact activities (for example, political instability) will be better predictors of media repression than those representing low-scale, protracted activities (for example, economic development). It is also expected that growth of mass media and their audiences (as reflected by population size, urbanization and media penetration) will be important explicators of media repression. Again, these hypotheses are premised upon extant literature.

Structure of the study

Chapter 2 begins with a detailed theoretical examination of political repression, the melting pot of all studies of the power struggles between political rulers and other individuals and institutions contending for that power. Next, it examines threat perception as the main antecedent of repression, and develops various theoretical perspectives through which to understand such threat. The chapter concludes with a critical examination of initiatives to measure political repression.

Chapter 3 is an excursion into the causes and correlates of political repression. Two models of political repression - the political model and the economic and socio-cultural model - are identified in extant literature. Their main components are delineated before the chapter concludes with a discussion of a new theory of political repression.

The insights gained in Chapter 3 are critical to the discussion set out in Chapter 4 on the underpinnings of a theory of media repression. The chapter opens with a critical examination of the role of mass media institutions in contemporary societies, and their relationships with political institutions. Borrowing theoretical perspectives developed in critical media theory and cultural studies, the chapter links media repression to the ranging contemporaneous contestations for the control of the public sphere. Besides recognizing the media's enhanced potential as custodians of the public sphere, this chapter also points out the roots of threat perception for other major contenders, especially political elites. The chapter then shifts attention to scant initiatives to systematically study media repression. It examines the current data collection initiatives by major global media advocacy groups. It concludes with a postulation on a normative model of media repression.

Chapter 5 is essentially the design and measurement section of this dissertation. It introduces the new media repression dataset and details the data sources and coding procedures. The dataset is subjected to rigorous preliminary analyses. The analyses include a preliminary investigation of patterns of media repression over time. Finally, a unidimensional scale of media repression operationalized and delineated. The scale is assessed for content validity before being preserved for use in the cross-sectional time series analysis of media repression around the world.¹

Chapter 6 is the main data analysis section. Prior to the analyses, the chapter first discusses the main estimation strategies for cross-sectional time series data or panel data. Next, the hypotheses of the study are outlined and logic examined. Multivariate data analyses are conducted with the media repression scale constructed in Chapter 5 as the dependent variable. The analyses include separate examination of the two models of media repression, and discussions of a combined model as well as a reduced model. Among the expected findings is that only a small number of the explanatory factors that predict general political repression have significant impact on media repression. The chapter offers critical interpretations of the results with regard to the theoretical positions assumed earlier in the study.

Finally, the dissertation concludes with a summary of findings. The theory of media repression is revisited, this time from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. Attempts are also made to link the new theory to the body of general political repression research.

¹ The predictors of media repression are discussed in Appendix C. The predictors are drawn from political repression and media repression. The appendix also examines the relationships between the independent variables themselves.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Perspectives to Political Repression

Introduction

This chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical foundation necessary for the development of a theory of political repression. First, it introduces the concept of political repression and summarizes contemporary research in the area. Next, an extensive discussion of the conceptual and methodological problems confounding political repression research is offered. Third, suggestions by researchers on resolving these issues are outlined. This chapter illustrates that political repression research, and human rights research in general, has been adversely affected by lack of strong databases, and it provides the benchmarks for further research in the area.

Defining political repression

Goldstein's (1978:xvi) definition of political repression has gained broad acceptance among social scientists. Under this definition, political repression is "government action, which grossly discriminates against persons, or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived political beliefs." This broad acceptance is attributable in part to the close links between Goldstein's definition and those developed by other scholars. For example, Duff and McCamant (1976:24-25) define repression as "the use of governmental coercion to control or eliminate actual or potential political opposition." Davenport (1995:683) defines political repression as

“government regulatory action directed against those challenging existing power relationships.” McCamant (1981:133) defines political repression as “the use of coercion or threat of coercion by authorities or their supporters against opponents or potential opponents in order to prevent or weaken their capacity to oppose the authorities and their policies.” To Stohl and Lopez (1984:7), political repression is “the use or threat of coercion in varying degrees by government against opponents or to weaken their resistance to the will of the authorities.” Poe and Tate (1994) define political repression as “coercive activities on the part of the government designed to induce compliance in others.”

Booth and Richard (1996:1205-6) add that the object of repression is to manage, reduce, or suppress the activities of political opponents, or shape or limit citizen demands upon the government. In other words, state repression is the “use of harsh, sustained force against perceived domestic opponents and its general population” (King 1998:191). Gurr (1986:149) points out that political repression is a persistent feature of political life in most of the contemporary world. Consequently, he argues, “repression is the price paid for political order, even in regimes that preserve democratic forms.”¹

Generally speaking, political authorities repress in response to dissenting action (reactive repression), or repress upon perceiving a potentially threatening action (pre-emptive repression) (Gurr 1986). Exclusionary or radical governments and other authorities may also permanently destroy whole groups of people - rather than merely repress - as a demonstration of power (proactive repression), for example, genocides and politicides (Harff 1984, 1992, 1994; Fein 1994). In each of these three scenarios,

there may be two dimensions of repression: formal or officially sanctioned coercion, and informal or spontaneous coercion undertaken by state agents on their own volition (White and White 1995; Stohl and Lopez 1984, Gurr 1986).

Davenport (1996, 1999) identifies three distinct traditions in extant political repression research: state terror, negative sanctions and human rights violations. He says state terror generally concerns violent state behavior. Negative sanctions mainly covers nonviolent restrictions on political and civil liberties. Human rights violations encompass violent state behavior from the legal and political deviance perspectives.

A link can be plausibly made between Davenport's typology and the rule of law: political regimes that respect rule of law but nevertheless want to repress citizens are most likely to opt for negative sanctions and mild human rights violations. In this way, they could achieve their objective of an acquiescent citizenry without being seen to violate rule of law. Governments have also argued that some repressive activities are justifiable under certain conditions. Regimes with no regard for the rule of law, on the other hand, are most likely to participate in the state terror and high-end human rights violations. Such governments are not accountable to their citizens or any other constituency, and have no motivation to minimize their citizens' woes. The reasons underlying these preliminary postulations will be discussed in the following sections.

Perspectives to studying threat perception

But why do governments or political authorities repress? An emerging scholarly consensus posits that repressive activities are generally in response to threats perceived by the ruling elites. Unfortunately, only a few of these studies (for example,

¹ In line with Davenport (1995), I use "challengers" and "dissenters" interchangeably to avoid redundancy. "Challenge" is interchanged with "dissent" and "political opposition." I also use

Cohen 1978, 1981; Gartner and Regan 1995) devote space to developing a deeper understanding of the roots and nature of the threat perception. In attempting to redress this oversight in extant literature, this section borrows insights from three perspectives of political culture: political psychological theory, sociological theory and formal theory. A hybrid of the formal and sociological theories (rationalist-structuralist theory) is considered at the end of this section. The political psychology approach is discussed first.² Formal theory, the analysis of rational choices and their aggregate consequences in non-market contexts, is offered next.³ Third, a perspective from sociological theory is discussed. Notably, while these three perspectives are

“governments” and “political regimes” interchangeably to avoid redundancy.

² The relationship between psychology and politics has been known to exist for centuries. There is evidence of psychological influences in early political thought, for example, the Greek city-states, Plato's *Republic*, Machiavelli's *The Prince*, and Hobbes's *Leviathan*. For sure, most early political philosophers, including Locke and Rousseau, made explicit references about psychological influences on politics. Three basic psychological concepts with indelible imprints in political science scholarship include the individual psychodynamic (personality) concept; attitude, belief and values concept; and the groups concept. The personality concept has spawned research in such areas as leadership theories (e.g. Lane 1962; Almond and Verba 1956; Pateman 1970; Putnam et al. 1993; Burns 1978; Barber 1964, 1985; Hermann 1986); and impact of personality on behavior (Laswell 1948; Ardono 1950, Maslow 1954, Rokeach 1960, Barber 1965, Knutson 1973, 1977, Barber 1985, etc.). The attitude, belief and values concept has revolutionized voting studies (e.g. Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964, 1970; Verba and Nie 1972; Markus et al 1979). The group concept has spawned critical research in pluralism and interest groups (e.g. Freeman 1965; Olson 1965; Dahl 1971; Garson 1978; Kingdon 1984; Ripley et al. 1991). Other influences of psychology on political psychology include public opinion research, consistency and ideology, racial conflict, political tolerance, political participation, political support systems, propaganda and persuasion, and agenda-setting. Indeed, the marriage of psychology and politics resulted in a new sub-discipline, political psychology. Iyengar (1993) talks of “a rich eclecticism” of theories, concepts and methods that make up the research of political psychology. Sears (1987) argues that political psychology is stimulated by urgent contemporaneous political problems, especially those with actual or potentially devastating human consequences.

³ Formal theory links political analysis to economic analysis via its fundamental premise that individuals are rational or consistent in behavior. Substantive political science areas that have broadly embraced rational choice approaches include voting, constitutional theory, coalitional stability, collective action, institutional analysis, public choice analysis, and political philosophy. Early political science research in the formal theoretic tradition include Downs 1957; Black 1958; Arrow 1963; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Olson 1965; Riker 1958, 1982; Shepsle & Weingast 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1984; and Ordeshook 1986. See Lalman et al. (1993:77-104) for a detailed treatment of formal theory.

reviewed separately, I do not rule out the possibility of overlaps, as has been highlighted by some studies. Consequently, I review a hybrid model of the formal (rationalist) and sociological (structuralist) theories.

So far, we know that many people are highly sensitive and responsive to potential threats. But exactly how should we conceptualize this threat or perceptions of threat? There is a general agreement in political psychology literature that threat refers to future potential harm or loss (Lazarus and Folkman 1984, Scholtz 2000). Scholtz (2000:24) develops an elaborate conceptual map of threat, summarized in Table 2.1, delineating its vital components. In a nutshell, the critical attributes of threat are potential, future orientation, negative cognitive perception, and negative affective emotions. Potential refers to a capability of being that is yet to be realized. Future orientation suggests that the threat best manifests itself in future losses and a looming vulnerability⁴, and that threat perceptions increase with anticipation time. Future anticipation breeds worry, fear and anxiety (Scholtz 2000:25). Negative cognitive perception makes an individual perceive and assign unique negative meanings to stimuli. The meanings are influenced by the individual's personality, sense of commitment, personal beliefs, coping mechanisms, and interpersonal relationships. Negative affective emotions relate to the individual's view of self and world, goals and goal-hierarchy, and one's future state of well-being.

[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]

⁴ See Riskind (1997, 1999) for excellent discussions of the looming vulnerability concept.

With regard to antecedents of threat, uncertainty about the unknown and lack of information about the stimuli and future trigger emotional arousal. However, this antecedent status is dependent upon the individual's ability to appraise the threat.⁵ Consequently, the individual develops negatively intoned emotional responses, characterized by worry, concern, distress, anxiety and fear. As the perceived threat draws closer to the individual, these negative responses intensify. Individuals also perceive threats to self-integrity, and respond through vigilance, disruption, enduring to live, suffering, and learning to live with the altered self. Vigilance is discernible through heightened sense of suspicion and attempts to maintain control. Ultimately, these negative affective and cognitive responses force the individual to focus all energies inward to maintain self-control and preservation.

The sequential nature of repression is also captured by Cohen (1978:93) in his definition of threat perception as "a decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in conflicts." Cohen argues that if no threat is perceived, even on the face of objective evidence, there can be no mobilization of defensive resources. Conversely, threat could be perceived and acted upon, even when opponents have no malicious intentions. Cohen's postulation is consistent with the general categories of political repression - reactive, pre-emptive and proactive repression - enunciated at the beginning of this chapter following arguments of Gurr (1986b), Harff (1994) and Fein (1994).

A second critical constituency is the observers of the violence itself. Gurr (1986:5) points out that it is the observers' fear that the perpetrators of repression intend to arouse or increase. Observers are often a general category of individuals rather than a

⁵ In the context of this study, appraise means to evaluate and define a specific cue as either threatening or benign (Cohen 1978:95).

specific set of people. Targeting is critical because observers must recognize themselves as potential future victims. Gurr argues that such recognition emanates from the observers' membership in a particular social group selected by the repressors (for example, class, community, profession, political movement, etc). Gurr (1986:5) emphasizes that the observers are targets because of their membership in a targeted group, rather than some personal issues. To this extent, repression may be *impersonal* but not arbitrary or indiscriminate. In this context, only members of the target group experience the indiscriminate nature of repression.

The rational choice perspective proceeds from the general premise that a political regime's choice to repress is a function of domestic and international costs and benefits (Gartner and Regan 1995). Put differently, the decision to repress is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of choosing a severely repressive strategy over a lightly repressive one, and vice versa. Davenport (1995, 2001) offers useful insights into the calculus of threat perception and repression. Political regimes perceive behavior against their policies or practices as threats to their authority; manifestation of such behavior could disrupt society and undermine the authority of the political regime (Davenport 1995: 685). When confronted by such threats, states often use repression as a means to control or eliminate the threats and to extend their tenure (Davenport 2000: 1). The inherent assumptions are that states must prevail upon the perceived threat, because concession could be interpreted as regime weakness and further pretext for challengers to seek additional gains (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000:684).

The cost-benefit calculus is well captured in Dahl's (1971:14-16) three axioms of suppression and toleration. Dahl argues that a major cost of democracy for incumbent political elites is the increased contestation from individuals and groups previously

excluded. In formal terms, democratization creates opportunities for such stakeholders to share in the benefits of policymaking and governing. As such, transformation reduces the benefits for incumbents while increasing the costs and possibilities of conflict with opponents. Above all, it raises the specter of threat perception in the minds of the incumbents. Dahl (1971:15) concludes that decisions to suppress or tolerate are premised upon three general axioms. One of these, and the most relevant to the study, is the likelihood that a political regime will tolerate increases as the expected costs of toleration decrease.

Decision-theoretic models generally assume that decision makers are unified, value-maximizing actors, and that they have complete information to make purposeful decisions (see Sheple and Bonchek 1997:15-34).⁶ Most and Starr (1989:127) argue that in studying repression, it is important to assume that political regimes perceive a certain degree of strength (S_t) and a certain degree of threat (T_t). They further assert

that regimes are motivated to establish and maintain the inequality $\frac{S_t}{T_t} \geq \frac{S_{t-1}}{T_{t-1}}$.

Securing this inequality ensures that with time, the political regime gains strength relative to the threat perceived. Conversely, increased threat perceptions have the effect of reducing the value of the S/T ratio, thereby putting the regime under pressure to intervene - via repressive activities - to reestablish the inequality.

Gartner and Regan (1995:275) extend the above argument by further postulating that the decision to opt for a repressive strategy emanates from the challenges posed

⁶ As Anderson, Regan and Ostergard (2002:441) point out, conceptualizing repression as a strategic choice implies that elites calculate the probability that citizens will detect repression and take steps to prevent it. In other words, people living in repressive societies actually recognize and interpret government's actions as repression. Strategic choice models of repression also assume that challengers (inceptors of threat) have the prerequisite information to act strategically in response to state actions (see, for example, DeNardo 1985, Lichbach 1994 and Moore 1998).

to the political regime and the reigning status quo. The regime has numerous options for response, and the decision to repress offers the greatest expected utility in a cost-benefit analysis of the different strategies. Expressed formally, the decision to repress is $f(D, R)$ where R is the amount of repression that maximizes expected payoffs, while D represents the demand or challenges placed on the regime. Gartner and Regan (1995: 275) argue that the more severe the challenge, the greater the concession for any given level of repression; conversely, the greater the repression, the lower the concession for any given set of demands.

It is important to note that only a credible challenge (threat) portending to alter the status quo warrants a response from the political regime. This is because any form of response by the regime carries domestic and international costs. Domestic costs may include loss of popular support, public protests, emergence of underground movements, or even a revolution.⁷ International costs may include loss of foreign aid assistance, economic and political sanctions, and other forms of international exclusion.⁸ Gartner and Regan (1995: 276-278) assert that these costs are political and institutional, and are only mitigated by the strength of existing institutions (for example, judiciary, economy, and civil society). As such, a regime's decision calculus involves assessing the costs of negative reputation, domestic unpopularity and other internal costs, and the consequences of conceding to challenge (political threat) - all weighed against the benefits of maintaining power.

⁷ See Dahl (1971), Gurr 1971 and Davenport (1998) for a thorough treatment of domestic costs.

⁸ See, for example, Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, McCormick and Mitchell 1988 and Poe 1992.

From the sociological or structuralist perspective, threat perception is best understood in the context of social structure and human agency.⁹ Giddens (1976: 75) defines agency as “actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing events-in-the-world.” The contemplative nature of human action is instructive because a person (agent) could act otherwise (Giddens 1976: 75). Social structure, on the other hand, refers to “any recurring pattern of social behavior” (Croteau and Hoynes 1997: 20). Students of sociological theory concur that structures, systems and institutions are closely linked to human action or agency.¹⁰ Croteau and Hoynes (1997:21) observe that structure constrains agency through regulations and norms. Human agency reproduces social structure through time, and in the process transform the world and its inherent structures. They argue, “while structure constrains agency, it is human agency that maintains and alters social structure” (Croteau and Hoynes 1997:21).¹¹

Giddens (1985) sees the modern nation-state as a “bordered power container.” In other words, the nation-state comprise a high degree of bureaucracy that is sustained

⁹ I owe this interpretation of threat perception to Giddens (1976, 1985), and to a brief yet critically important remark by Gurr (1986:4). For a detailed discussion of the concepts of structure and agency, see Giddens (1984, 1986).

¹⁰ As Haralambos and Holborn (1997:816) explain,

Structure and action [agency] are two sides of the same coin. Neither structure nor action can exist independently; both are intimately related. Social actions create structures, and it is through social actions that structures are produced and reproduced, so that they survive over time.

¹¹ Haralambos and Holborn (1997:816) argue that individuals do not just create society, and neither does society determine individual behavior:

Structure affects human behavior because of the knowledge that agents have about their own society. There is a large stock of ‘mutual knowledge’ on ‘how to go on’, or how to get things done ... Routine, mundane behavior is constantly carried out, and much of it requires little thought. This is because the agents involved are drawing upon their knowledge of the rules of society, which exist in the structure of society. [Also], having the ability to transform the world ... does not mean that agents necessarily transform society.

only by modern governments turning 'frontiers' into 'borders' within which the nation-state exercises full administrative power. In this context, surveillance, the ability of modern governments to have at their disposal a vast amount of knowledge about their citizens and to supervise innumerable activities going on within their borders, is critical to the nation-state's sociopolitical and economic stability, and long-term survival. According to Giddens, modern nation-states are more internally pacified than the traditional societies of the medieval age because their instruments of coercion and administration are institutionalized into everyday life, hence less obtrusive. He argues that modern states have strong penetrating administrative organizations that exercise 'surveillance' over citizens and most aspects of daily life in their respective societies. In other words, contemporary states are "purveyors of deadly violence and potent agencies of social control" (Giddens 1986, 27).

Duvall and Stohl (1983: 1820) support Giddens's thesis, arguing states utilize national institutions, social organs, laws, procedures and norms to induce fear or acquiescence, and through that agency to effect a desired outcome in a conflict situation. Here, the existing institutions, state organs, laws, procedures and culture encapsulate the social structure. However, such a structure does not preclude repressive action or agency by state actors, especially when such agency is preceded by threat. The elaborate surveillance machine that characterizes the operations of most contemporary states alerts the political regimes about actions with the potential to stall bureaucratic processes and, in effect, threaten political and social stability. The political regimes have a great deal of preemptive, reactive and proactive leeway - under national laws and other provisions - in what action they take to deal with the threat in question. The repressive action continues until the threat is diminished to at least previously unperturbing levels or until credibly challenged by internal or external

forces. If left unchallenged, repression is subsumed into the national social structure and reproduces whenever necessary. If credibly challenged, the national social structure will be forced to change to rid itself of repression and establish new ways of dealing with dissent and tolerance. Either way, human agency maintains and alters the social structure.

The fourth perspective is the hybrid rationalist-structuralist perspective. As the term suggests, this perspective brings together the rational choice and sociological theories reviewed above. Davenport (2002) argues that decision makers in political regimes consider diverse political-economic factors in their assessment of the costs and benefits of applying repression. He notes that repression involves one actor or group of actors (superordinates) holding power over another or group of actors (subordinates) whenever the former believe that they need to. Such belief may be precipitated by threat perception if the regime is subject to constraints or simple whims when the executive is not subject to any constraints. In this way, superordinates establish and maintain control over subordinates by exacting huge costs over them, "compelling them to lead anomic, depoliticized lives, flee or engage in some form of rebellion" (Davenport 2002). Additionally, Davenport reports that repression is used to elicit some desired future objective, most often social order, via the elimination of dissent. Repressive actions undertaken in this context are intended to create a new existence rather than maintain the existing or the status quo. This strand of the hybrid perspective is found in numerous works, especially state development in Western political systems, political performance (maintaining order and withstanding crises), and state terror.¹²

¹² See Davenport (2002) for a broader discussion on the application.

Components of political repression

Whatever the theoretical perspective pursued above, it is submitted here that political regimes will ultimately repress. A careful consideration of repressors' actions reveals four distinct components. The first component is derived from the primary objective of repression, namely, compellence and deterrence.¹³ Compellence forces targets to alter their behavior while deterrence prompts them to abandon potential behavioral activity.¹⁴ Gurr (1986:8) posits that repression invokes varying levels of fear on targets and forces them to consider altering their behavior in some manner desired by the actor (repressor). The critical issue here is the actor's *intention*, which is "to affect the emotional state of targets to such a degree that they change behavior" (Gurr 1986:8). The notion of intentionality is substantively interrogated later in this chapter.

The second component comprises what Gurr (1986:14) refers to as "the need for sufficient repression, targeted repression". The actors' stimuli (as demonstrated by the intention) must generate appropriate emotional responses among the targets and observers, lest the entire initiative to repress becomes ineffective. In the repressors' realm, success in a repression initiative is critically important, because failure could undermine the regime legitimacy. As such, 'sufficient' repression in this context implies getting the right mix of frequency and intensity of a repression initiative. At the same time, repressors must tailor the stimuli carefully to minimize effects on non-members of target group. In this regard, 'targeting' repression translates into a

¹³ See (Schelling 1966) for an excellent discussion of compellence and deterrence.

¹⁴ At this juncture, this study does not develop postulations on these continua. However, it is noteworthy that compellence and deterrence could be two opposite notions of a single continuum (unidimensional concept), or two distinct continua (multidimensional concepts).

process of fine-tuning responses: correct those emotions out of line while retaining status quo in the rest of society.

The third component is the severity of repression actions. As already noted, the actors' stimuli are intended to have varying levels of impact - fear and/or acquiescence - on the target population. Gurr (1986:9) argues that much of state activity involves affecting the population's behavior by making it afraid to do some things and afraid not to do other things.¹⁵ As such, the target population does not always experience the "most severe" or "extreme" repression, but some milder form. Gurr notes that this raises the possibility that repression targets often experience varying degrees of fear and anxiety, depending on the threat perceived by political actors:

The aims become to gauge and scale the intensity of the human emotional experience - a difference in degree indicated by our use of such terms as "fearful" and "terrorized" ... we recognize a great difference between a target population (or individual) being slightly worried, afraid, fearful, and terrified out of their wits by some government activity. However, it becomes more difficult, once the continuum has been established, to place even an arbitrary cutoff point somewhere near the high-intensity end of such a continuum (Gurr 1986:10).

He adds:

The intensity of the emotion experienced might be examined by asking the nature of the fear being experienced as a result of government activity. For of what, or fear for what? One can envisage some continuum of perceived threat that begins with the kind of milder fear - fear for one's job or one's livelihood, which can be a major deterrent or compellent if used systematically by a government - and ends with the fear for one's life and the lives of one's family ... The state employs information control, law enforcement techniques that go beyond normal legal limits, economic coercion, and finally life-threatening strategies ... The level of state coercion can intrude deeply into a person's life depending not only on the intention of the state but also the position of the targets. (Gurr 1986:10).

¹⁵ For example, crime prevention falls under the category of making people do some things, while payment of taxes exemplifies making people afraid not to do some things.

The fourth component - the primary and secondary objectives of repression - often appears in extant literature as a dichotomy (see, for example, Mitchell 1981, Lopez 1983 and Gurr 1986). Normatively, repressive activities serve a dual purpose: terminating impending perceptions of threat, and warnings to other eligible or potential challengers (threat inceptors) of the futility of any further action. In this context, the actual targets are the primary objective, and repressive actions are direct forms of conflict management by political regimes. The intended observers of repression - those targeted to be influenced by the repressive activities - make up the secondary objective. There is an indirect form of conflict behavior, intended to have a demonstrative element on this target population. Gurr (1984:4) argues that this indirect action is undertaken *pour encourager les autres*, or to discourage them if the repression inspired in the target is intended to elicit deterrence. As such, through their demonstration effects, repressive activities have instrumental value, namely, influencing behavior of the target group.

The above components have not only improved our understanding of the political repression concept. They have been critical in the development of various measures (operationalization) of political repression. The most common operationalizations of political repression are negative sanctions (Taylor and Jodice 1983), human rights violations (Carleton and Stohl 1985), integrity of the person (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985), state terrorism (Stohl and Lopez 1986), and genocide (Harff 1986, 1992, 1994). Human rights violations are violations to civil and political rights, or to social and economic rights. Negative sanctions are the nonviolent restrictions of political and civil liberties by political authorities using coercive agents of the state (Davenport 1999). Gurr (1986) defines state terrorism as a category of coercive activities on the part of the government designed to induce compliance in others.

“Integrity of the person” is a rights genre accorded against arbitrary arrests, disappearances, detention, torture and political killings (Henderson 1992). Genocide is mass murder, pre-meditated by some power-wielding group linked with state power, directed against any target group within the state however defined (Harff 1986).

Conceptualization and operationalization problems in political repression research

Yet political repression remains difficult to measure in spite of the components and operationalizations mentioned above. Numerous studies record the frustrations of researchers attempting to measure human rights (see, for example, McCamant 1981; Bollen 1986; McNitt 1986; Goldstein 1986, 1992; McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1997; Barsh 1993). Indeed, conceptualization and measurement are probably the biggest problems facing contemporary political repression research.

The importance of proper and accurate conceptualization measurement strategies in human rights research cannot be overemphasized. As Stohl et al. (1986:593) point out, systematic study of human rights (and its imputed components) “has been impeded thus far by the failure to develop a generally sound and acceptable means to measure human rights behavior, however defined.” These problems primarily arise from the intrinsic relationship between political repression and the larger field of human rights abuses.¹⁶ As such, it is important to understand the problems

¹⁶ Several points are noteworthy. First, much of human rights literature is shackled by ideological interpretations that make it difficult to develop a universally accepted definition of human rights (see Pollis and Schwab 1979; Howard 1984; McNitt 1986; Goldstein 1978; Jabine and Claude 1992; Andreassen and Swinehart 1992; Fraser 1994). Goldstein (1986:609-612) points out that there are endless debates about how to define such common human rights concepts as “torture,” “political killing,” “arbitrariness,” “legitimacy and illegality,” “literacy and illiteracy,” and “poverty.” He cautions against a rush to judgment as to what constitutes a repression incident, arguing that “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”. Indeed, as Ruthven (1978:178) points out, “what is torture for one generation may very well be a minor inconvenience for another.” Fraser (1994:3-4) argues that the dichotomization of human rights research (into political and civil rights, and social and economic rights) is one the most divisive

confounding human rights research in general before proceeding to study the political repression sub-field.

Conceptual problems emanate from the lack of an explicit definition of human rights. Conflicts over the definition of human rights are deeply rooted in ideology, and characterized by protracted debates over whether the concept should be limited to political and legal rights or extended to economic, social and cultural rights. There are also questions on whether or not human rights should be restricted to certain basic rights, or should include the entire spectrum of abuses and violations as captured in the components outlined in the previous section.

In the absence of a consensus, most studies have adopted holistic conceptions of human rights or simplistic delineation of components. For example, Gastil (1978-1998) has created two summated scales of human rights from holistic conceptualizations. The first scale, an annual political rights index, is a seven-point scale that measures the ability of people to take part or decide who and what laws or policies govern their country. The scale ranges from one (1), the lowest level of political rights violations, to seven (7), the highest level of political rights violations. The second scale, an annual index of civil rights, employs a seven-point scale to measure the practice of individual rights to free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom from arbitrary arrests.

Others use statistical techniques to delineate latent dimensions in the human rights concept (for example, see Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, Fraser 1994). Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) use empirical methods to operationalize human rights violations into two components, namely, civil and political rights and integrity of the

issue among human rights scholars and one that eliminates the development of more instruments for measuring human rights.

person. Fraser (1994) uses exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to develop a two-component scale of political repression from eight indicators of human rights violations. The two components are human rights promises and practice.

Yet, other analysts have isolated individual components of human rights abuses and postulated unidimensionality on the results (for example, Seymour 1979). Sometimes, the postulated single dimensions are scored on a subjective scale to capture the intensity of violations. For example, Nixon (1960, 1965) utilized definitions of press freedom from the International Press Institute and the Inter-American Press Association to develop a scale of press freedom violations. McCormick and Mitchell (1988) subjectively develop a two-dimensional scale of human rights violations; the first dimension is based upon the degree of arbitrary arrests, while the second is based upon the systematic use of killings and torture.

The aggregation of distinct components (or failure to disaggregate multiple components), however, poses serious problems for subsequent analyses. As Barsh (1993:97-98) argues, aggregation creates a horde of problems. First, it obscures interactions between different (and at times quite distinct) components, making explanation difficult. Second, indices created from these aggregations are erroneously assumed to represent some real phenomenon and not an arbitrary construct. Yet, the aggregation often lacks a proper weighting formula to model the relationships between the components. Third, aggregation creates heterogeneity problems -- the mixing of different levels of measurement. Barsh (1993:98) concludes that aggregating arbitrary measures does not remove arbitrariness: A composite of the arbitrary measure remains arbitrary. McCormick and Mitchell (1997:511) concur and assert that failure to disaggregate concepts results in loss of information and opportunities for rigorous analyses.

Analysis of variance theory amply illustrates the multiple component problem of political repression. Suppose we let Y represent the multi-component construct generally called political repression, and label its various postulated components as X_1 , X_2 , X_3 , ..., X_{n-1} , X_n . Then

$$V_Y = V_{X_1} + V_{X_2} + V_{X_3} + \dots + V_{X_{n-1}} + V_{X_n}$$

Where V_{X_i} is the variance of one component of political repression; and V_Y is the total variance of the multi-component construct Y. Standard analysis of variance presupposes that the components (and their constituent variables) have no shared variance. Consequently, the variance of Y is simply the sum of these separate and distinguishable portions (Cohen and Cohen 1983:139-140). The ballentine in Figure 2.1 captures the relationship between the distinct components postulated and the aggregated construct.¹⁷ Each component, X_i , is perceived as having some unique variance that it brings to the multi-component construct, Y. Deductively, each component has a unique set of independent variables that account for its variance. As such, to conceptualize such a component comprehensively, one must identify these unique predictors. Similarly, one must correctly identify each component and its respective independent variables in order to substantively conceptualize the aggregated concept.

The reality, however, is that substantial overlap exists between the components, X_{xi} . The overlap scenario is illustrated by Figure 2.2. Here, the components are less distinct because they share some variance either in their latent structure (e.g. factors

and clusters) or canonical structure (canonical correlation between latent variables). It is noteworthy that even with such complex relationships, the full explication of individual components is the key to understanding political repression. This is especially so where correlation between respective components is low. Considerably high correlation suggests that components postulated as distinct could, in reality, be the same component.

[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]

In sum, this dissertation assumes the position that political repression is an aggregation of numerous components. For example, suppose we repeat the above algebraic expression, but this time let Y have three components as in Figure 2.2. Then the overlapping aggregated variance (V_Y) is estimated as follows:

$$V_Y = [V_{X1} + V_{X2} + V_{X3}] - [V_{X1.X2} + V_{X2.X3} + V_{X1.X3}]$$

Where $[V_{X1.X2} + V_{X2.X3} + V_{X1.X3}]$ corrects for the shared variance, and each interaction term being greater than zero.

Conceptualizing political repression as a multi-component construct and the components as having shared variance will be critical in explicating media repression in later chapters.

¹⁷ See Cohen and Cohen (1983) and Kennedy (1994) for the background and applicability of the Ballantine. Note that the Ballantine is simply used here as a metaphoric device to illustrate analysis of variance between a multidimensional concept and its respective components.

Political repression datasets

Four datasets dominate systematic research in political repression. These are Taylor and Jodice's (1983) *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, Freedom House's annual *Freedom in the World Ratings* (compiled by Raymond Gastil between 1974 and 1998), Amnesty International and the United States Department of State Annual Country Reports. It is widely accepted that the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* is the most complete cross-national longitudinal dataset on political protest and violence. It is also a popular dataset among social science quantitative researchers.

In spite of its usefulness, critics such as Brockett (1992) charge that the *Handbook* lacks conceptual clarity; poorly delineates the dimension of state coercive behavior; and that its emphasis on the international legal perspective favors Western nations and penalizes developing countries. Indeed, while criticizing its conceptualization and measurement, Brockett (1992), concedes that the dataset was "an prodigious undertaking, ... an extraordinary undertaking and accomplishment."

Davenport (1995:694) recognizes the shortcomings of the dataset but contends "it is still heralded as the best measure available for representing attempts at behavioral control cross-nationally over time. This acceptability is also identified by the pervasive use of this data within numerous analyses of repression and political conflict." King (1998:196) also argues that the dataset is not problem-free but is the best currently available. Recent studies based on the database include Davis and Ward (1990), Alfatooni and Allen (1991), Davenport (1995, 1999), and King (1998).

Of late, most researchers utilizing the *Handbook* data have first made adjustments to improve reliability of the data. For example, Franklin (1997) uses the data after

making adjustments to coding procedures to improve reliability and validity. King (1998:196) rejects one of the dataset's key variables, "deaths from domestic violence," on the grounds that the variable represents a multi-component construct that needs to be disaggregated before it is used. Another group of scholars employs a technique suggested by Dixon, Muller and Seligson (1993) of imposing a ceiling point for suspect variables. Cases with occurrences above the ceiling are then generally considered outliers.¹⁸ A few studies still use the data without making any adjustments, for example, Davenport (1995) and Hwang (1997).

Raymond Gastil's *Freedom in the World* is another popular human rights dataset compiled under the auspices of Freedom House, a New York-based international, non-governmental organization. These reports were published annually from 1974 to 1998, and provided data on political and civil rights.¹⁹ Gastil's annual surveys also suffer from serious conceptual problems (see Salzberg 1979; McCamant 1981; Scoble and Wiseberg 1981; Stohl et al. 1986; Hartman and Hsiao 1988; Jodice and Claude 1992). McCamant (1981:129-133) argues that the surveys lack a clear definition of political and civil rights, and pay no attention to dimensionality considerations. Scoble and Wiseberg (1981:152-163) contend that the Gastil surveys implicitly endorse Western political systems and liberal philosophy on the rest of the world, and make no connection between conceptual postulations and the ratings given annually to countries. Their wide-ranging criticism concurs with McCamant that the annual surveys

¹⁸ The ceiling technique has been fine-tuned in subsequent studies, for example, Boswell and Dixon (1993). Its fundamental limitation is establishing a rationale for imposing a ceiling at a particular number. It also reduces the data from observations to judgments.

¹⁹ Since the mid-1990s, Freedom House has produced a second annual survey of economic liberties and continues to produce annual reports on political and civil rights.

are unreliable and lack replicability. Stohl et al. (1986: 598) charge that Gastil's scales are neither specified individually nor disaggregated.

The criticism notwithstanding, Gastil's surveys have been widely used (see, for example, Poe and Tate 1994). Indeed, Bollen (1993:1211) counted 35 citations of Gastil's data in the *Social Science Citation Index Annual*, 1990 alone. Bollen (1986, 1993) defends the Gastil surveys as having "good temporal and geographical coverage," and dismisses criticism as "anecdotal" because it is not based on systematic analysis. It is, however, worth noting that Bollen (1986: 585) also raises McCamant's (1981) question about how Gastil moves from the raw information collected to the measures.

The US State Department began preparing annual reports based on its own reports in 1979. Numerous studies have expressed concerns about the reliability and validity of State Department data. Stohl and Lopez (1986:22) argue that the department's annual reports on human rights are political documents designed to minimize the abuses of friends and aggressively pursue the violations of adversaries. McCamant (1981:126-128) concurs, noting that the State Department's reports only included countries being considered for aid, and therefore excluded Cuba, all Communist countries during the Cold War, and South Africa during the apartheid days. The omission, argues McCamant, makes it difficult to establish whether aid-recipient countries were better or worse in preserving human rights. McNitt (1986:75) also considers the State Department very subjective because "it must be frank enough to satisfy Congress, diplomatic enough not to overly offend American allies, and at the same time responsive to the President's wishes."

The Amnesty International and Freedom House data have similar problems. Many analysts perceive Amnesty International as having a left-wing bias, and its annual

dataset as an instrument for activism and advocacy than systematic inquiry. McCamant (1986: 128-129) observes that while the data is better sourced than that collected by the State Department, its indicators lack equivalence and validity. Scoble and Wiseberg (1986:148-152) point out that even though with best intentions, Amnesty International primarily focuses on “worst case” situations in societies to which it has access. Second, they further charge the organization with the “sin of disproportionality,” that is, the policy of seeking to score issues equitably between developed and developing countries ostensibly to avoid entanglement in the Cold War biases controversy. Third, because of its limited conceptualization of human rights, Amnesty International is unable to recognize “softer” forms of human rights abuses, even though repressive regimes are now opting techniques that are less directly visible to accomplish the same purpose of silencing political opponents (Scoble and Wiseberg 1981:150-151). Claude and Jabine (1986:551-566) argue that although data from international NGO’s and action groups like Amnesty International has high reliability, the data is often incomplete because such groups are constrained by their respective mandate, resources and ideological leaning.

Measurement in political repression literature

Measurement is probably the biggest problem identified in contemporary political repression research and human rights research in general.²⁰ Notably, measurement problems have been widely discussed in extant literature but poorly resolved. The problems include unreliable data sources, poor data collection procedures, and low

²⁰ See Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) for a discussion of the implications of poor measurement.

reliability and validity of measures. I will now discuss these problems with respect to political repression.

Goldstein (1986:612-3) notes that reliable and comprehensive data for human rights research are often unavailable due to poor collection or government-imposed barriers. He however adds that the availability of human rights data depends on type. Goldstein reports that historically "old" data (e.g., pre-World War I data) is less available and reliable than post-World War II data; and that social-economic data are more readily available than political, civil and personal security data. He also finds that data availability is inversely related to intensity of violations; and that developed world data are more readily available than data from the developing world (Goldstein 1986: 613).

Clearly, data for human rights research are scarce, and especially those about political repression. In Goldstein's words, "governments do not generally publish statistics on how repressive they are (much less in forms comparable across countries or time!)" (p. 617). In addition, many countries have perfected the art of obstructing information gathering on human rights abuses (Goldstein 1986:618-9). Indeed, Amnesty International has voiced concern that government secrecy and intimidation obstructed information flow from many countries and thwarted efforts to corroborate allegations (Amnesty International, 1984). As such, it is difficult to establish a reliable and consistent basis for comparison.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the major patterns in contemporary quantitative political repression research and in quantitative human rights research in general. Among other things, it has amply demonstrated that research in this field is severely

limited by lack of reliable statistical data. Conceptualization problems include ambiguous operational definitions and failure to correctly disaggregate multiple components. Methodological problems range from data collection problems to reliability and validity of data.

This chapter also raised the question of dimensionality of political repression. It presented arguments from extant theory that content that political repression comprises multiple overlapping components. This implies that the components have shared variance. As such, knowledge of the structure of some components is useful in understanding the structure of others.

These findings will serve as a useful benchmark in Chapter 3, which attempts to delineate media repression from the general political repression concept and develop a theory of media repression.

Table 2.1: Scholtz's map of components of threat²¹

1. Critical attributes	Potential Future-oriented Negative cognitive perception Negative affective emotion
2. Antecedents	Uncertainty Emotional arousal Inadequate information
3. Consequences	Negatively toned emotional responses Threat to self-integrity Immobilized coping Altered self-esteem

²¹ Adapted from Scholtz (2000:24)

Figure 2.2 Ballantine of distinct components and a multi-component construct





Figure 2.3 Ballantine of correlated components and a multi-component construct



Chapter 3

Causes and correlates of political repression

Introduction

Over the past two decades, many researchers have conducted systematic investigations into the causes and correlates of political repression. Unfortunately, few studies exist that try to review the scholarly terrain covered thus far. Davenport (2002) expresses concern that the growing body of research “is not viewed as a cohesive whole”, and argues that researchers tend to limit their inquiry to distinct dimensions of repression, such as degree, magnitude, scope, frequency and objectives of repression. He further argues that students of political repression utilize different explanations and premises for their arguments. Unfortunately, such disparate initiatives have slowed down the intellectual progress towards attaining a comprehensive view of repression. The omissions have also left many questions unanswered, thereby confounding even further research in this sub-genre of democracy and political culture (see Davenport 2002 for further discussion of the implications of slow progress towards a unified theory of political repression).

One exception is Regan’s (1995) retrospective survey that organizes the correlates of repression into three groups: societal, international, and ideological causes. Societal attributes are mainly political, economic, social and cultural factors. International factors relate to the influence of foreign aid assistance on political repression in poor recipient countries. The third typology, ideology, traces the links

between ideology, foreign aid and political instability in aid-recipient countries.¹

Regan however concedes that his is a “crude typology,” and calls for the development of sound theoretical logic to guide empirical testing of political repression.

My study categorizes the causes and correlates of political repression into two perspectives, namely, the political model, and the economic and socio-cultural models of political repression.² The models presuppose that threat perception (discussed earlier in this chapter) is exogenous to political repression. This implies that changes in threat perception and other exogenous variables make repression a more or less attractive policy option for political elites (Fordham 1998).

The political model of political repression

The political model enunciates the influence of political conditions on both the demand for repression and cost of use of repressive policies.³ In other words, it outlines the *demand* and *supply* effects of repression. This argument recognizes that particular exogenous conditions may have more than one effect on decisions to repress (a motivating effect and a contradictory constraining effect). Fordham (1998) argues that repression has declining utility because it is costly to implement. The costs include loss of public support (political casualties), risk of civil unrest or even civil war, high political costs of repeat implementation, and a drain or diversion of national resources. Fordham argues that the principal resource constraints affecting use of

¹ Regan (1995) points out that while he treats ideology as a distinct perspective, numerous studies have utilized it as a component in the decision-making process that results in repressive policies (see Pion-Berlin 1988 for an application of this postulation).

² In developing this typology, I hope the study contributes to better interpretation and prediction of political repression, as aptly suggested by Regan (1995) and Davenport (2002).

³ Numerous studies refer to the political economy model of political repression, for example, McCormick and Mitchell (1988), Davenport (1995), Fordham (1998) and Burkhart (2002).

repression are political rather than economic in nature. For example, repression often involves only a small fraction of the available national resources (for use by state security and intelligence agents), but their action could have considerably higher political costs, like unexpected escalation of violence or dissent, and international condemnation or isolation.

As stated earlier, most political conditions have both demand and supply effects on the attractiveness of repression as a policy instrument. On the demand side, repression is preferred if it keeps down political costs deemed critical at a particular time.⁴ For example, Frieden (1989, 1994) and Cox (1994) argue that repression is regularly used to safeguard the interests of powerful political and economic elites. Stoll (1984) and Davenport (1997) find evidence of electoral violence as unpopular incumbents fight to remain in power. Pion-Berlin (1984) and Davenport (1992) find military regimes to be more repressive than democracies, primarily because they frequently and disproportionately allocate resources to the military. Regan's (1995) analysis of causes of political repression concludes that militarization is generally associated with increased repression of dissenting voices.

Another demand effect is a country's coercive capacity, defined here as the amount of resources at a regime's disposal to repress its subjects. Davenport (1995) observes that coercive capacity may be a strategic or organizational issue. As a strategic issue, a high coercive capacity makes repression more attractive because more people could be subjected to control. As such, an increase in coercive capacity implies an increased likelihood that repression may be applied (Davenport 1995:691).

⁴ Repression is also preferred if it keeps down economic, social or cultural costs. James and Oneal (1991) report that repression is used to divert attention from poor economic performance. As such, the higher the need to meet an exogenous demand - such as maintaining economy in the hands of a few, maintaining political incumbency, divert attention from poor economic performance - the higher the potential for repression.

As an organizational issue, the coercive instruments seek to justify their continued existence as well as access to additional resources. Such endeavours are particularly successful where the ease and speed of responding to dissent is considered critical (Davenport 1995: 691).

It is worth noting that while the political costs of these demand effects may be high, they are nonetheless carried out because of their primacy in ensuring the regime's or government's survival in the short term. It can generally be concluded from the demand effects of the political model that a perceived increase in economic and political transaction costs raises the spectre of political repression. More specifically, poor economic performance, increased inflation, prospect of an incumbent's electoral failure, and low popular political support should increase repressive activity.

The transaction costs of repression discussed above comprise the supply effects of the political model. Expectedly, the creation and maintenance of a political elite has considerable domestic costs. So does poor economic performance, inflationary pressures, or even a decision by an incumbent to repress in order to win an election. The costs vary from across countries, but are known to be highest in societies with weak democratic processes and institutions. Why? Henderson (1991) argues that democratic processes and institutions inhibit "systematic abuse of the citizenry" because they are more responsive and perceptive to bargain and compromise.⁵ He argues that the institutions and processes limit a government's power while increasing its accountability to society. Further, limiting government power allows civil liberties to thrive (Henderson 1991:133). Regan and Henderson (2002) attribute the occurrence

⁵ This position will be revisited under the situational model of political repression.

that democracies are less repressive to the greater availability of official legitimate channels espousing and organizing dissent:

The availability of such channels acts as a brake on larger scale - especially violent - opposition and reduces the incentive for democratic leaders to pursue repression in order to stifle dissent. In addition, ... the greater degree of accountability of democratically elected leaders effectively limits their ability to use repression domestically, since citizens could turn out of office those heavy-handed leaders that they oppose. (Regan and Henderson 2002: 120-121)

A number of empirical studies confirm the supposition that strong democratic institutions minimize use of repression by governments. For example, Poe and Tate (1994) report democratic institutions to be strongly associated with improved annual human rights records. Pritchard (1988) also reports that independent judiciaries are associated with "more acceptable" human rights practices. Ziegenhagen (1986) that democracies have lower repression levels because they are more tolerant of dissident behavior.

A second component of democracy is the type of political system. McCormick and Mitchell (1988) contend that non-democracies are uncompromising and unreceptive to the observance of human rights principles. They argue that democracies, on the other hand, have the "substantive conception of human dignity" necessary to promote political tolerance and accommodation within the government ranks. Davenport (1995) demonstrated that democracy was associated with lower repression and autocracy with higher repression levels. Later, using a more elaborate methodology - one that operationalized threat as a multidimensional rather than a unidimensional concept - Davenport (1999) found a strong negative relationship between political repression and democracy.

Recently, Regan and Henderson (2002) have reported that a more complex relationship between democracy and repression is discernible, especially after controlling for non-linearity. Extending Fein's (1995) thesis of increased political repression among semi-democracies (that is, regimes exhibiting intermediate levels of democracy), Regan and Henderson demonstrate that democracies and autocracies experience more or less the same levels of repression, while semi-democracies experience considerably higher levels of repression. By confirming that different regime types are in fact associated with different levels of threat, Regan and Henderson (2002:130) further contend that "threats provide the fulcrum upon which the nonlinear relationship between regime type and repression rests".

Davenport (2002) finds political transformation that results in changes in societal mobilization outpaces changes in societal institutions - institutional underdevelopment - and exposes political regimes to ungovernable elements. This creates opportunities for repression. Davenport notes that an increase in population size may encourage use of repression as governments struggle to keep up with increasing societal needs and social order and stability. This latest finding confirms earlier results by Poe and Tate (1994) that rapid population growth is positively associated with repression because such growth in population places stress on limited national resources, and increases opportunities for dissent.

Economic and socio-cultural model of political repression

The second major set of exogenous variables fall under the economic and socio-cultural model of political repression. As Burkhart (2002) rightly points out, economics has for the past half-century been known to affect various aspects of political culture -

democracy, war, elections, repression, etc.⁶ Five variables form the general ambit of economics indicators: development, growth rate, dependency and economic system.

McCormick and Mitchell (1988:478) argue that economic development leads to political stability and increased respect for human rights (hence reduced repression). They argue that economic scarcity creates substantial social and political tension in poor countries, leaving them unstable and “most apt to use repression in order to maintain control”. In their view, the poorer the country the greater the chance that its government represses subjects to maintain some semblance of order.

Pritchard (1988) finds greater economic development to be associated with lower repression. His explanation is that higher economic development is associated with the attainment of higher levels of economic rights hence lower repression. Park (1987) also reports an association between higher economic development and lower repression levels. His thesis is that a more acceptable human rights situation is created by a greater provision of basic human needs.

Davenport (1995) reports similar findings and argues that economic development provides ample opportunities to meet basic human needs hence important elements of society are not called into question. He adds that development should have a negative effect on repression even in the presence of antisystemic behavior because political regimes would not wish to antagonize dissidents (Davenport 1995:692). More recently, Poe et al (1999) have argued that higher economic development is associated with lower repression because rich countries have a different view of the stakes threatened by domestic dissent than poor countries. According to them, economic development generates more goods to be valued and distributed in rich countries.

⁶ For a more complete discussion, see Stohl (1985), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), MacKeun et al (1992), Davenport (1999, 2000, 2002), Whitten and Palmer (1999), Anderson (2000), and Lewis-Beck (1988).

Most studies measure economic development using the gross national product per capita, procured from the World Tables compiled annually by the World Bank (for example, McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al 1999, and Zanger 2000). A second school operationalizes economic development as energy consumption per capita (for example, Summers and Heston 1988; and Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996). Quoting Summers and Heston (1988), Davenport numerously suggests that GNP per capita is an unreliable variable. Despite the caveat, GNP per capita is still widely used as an indicator of economic development, primarily because of lack of alternative data. Some analysts have also pointed to the improved collection of GNP data by such institutions as the World Bank as one of the reasons for the indicator's popularity. Others, like Burkhart (2002), use GNP per capita to maintain consistency with the now extensive political repression literature using the indicator.

Poe et al (1994) enunciate the import of economic growth for political repression. Poe and Tate argue that while rapid economic growth expands a country's resource base, a positive development for the regime and citizens, the reality is that such growth often has a destabilizing effect and results in regimes bring more repressive. This position is premised upon Olson's (1963) postulation that rapid economic growth exacerbated inequalities and was recipe for political instability and mass revolutions. Poe and Tate (1994:858) voice Olson's concern that rapid growth increases the proportions of déclassé individuals - people who have lost their identity amongst their own social groups - and who are most susceptible to instability. Alternatively, they argue, rapid growth occurs unevenly, creating an emergent bourgeois class, at times at the expense of the non-elite masses.

Recently, Poe et al (1999) find a weak negative association between economic growth and repression, indicating that only very rapid growth rates could have

tangible effects on repression.⁷ Burkhart (2002:158) also sees economic growth as “a destabilizing force on political life”, and points out that although the entire population contributes to this growth, people do not share equally in the fruits of the growth: “The losers can be expected to be dissatisfied with the situation, and possibly rebel against the winners, causing the winners to repress the losers (if the winners are also the governors, more than likely the case)” (Burkhart 2002:157). It is noteworthy that where utilized, economic growth is operationalized as annual changes in the level of GNP per capita.

Dependency has received considerable attention as an indicator of economic development (for example, Bollen 1983; Gonick and Rosh 1988; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Davenport 1995; and Burkhart 2002). Davenport (1995) argues that domestic penetration by the global economy increases the need for protection of certain political economy relationships with the state. Globalization raises the incidence of activism opportunities (acquired through interactions between local and global cultures), resulting in loss of production and extracted profits. Such situations raise the specter of repression as the ruling elite act to suppress dissent while at the same time ensuring the benefits of dependency remain. Several findings support the general hypothesis that increased economic dependency is associated with higher repression, albeit with varying degrees of statistical significance (see, for example, Davenport 1995 and Burkhart 2002).

⁷ Poe et al (1999) report that the negative relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1 level in a one-tailed test, implying that even annual economic growth rates as high as 10% would only have a minimal role in reducing political repression. They do however recognize the likelihood that economic growth “increases the size of the ‘pie’ which might in some instances satisfy those who want to rebel, thus decreasing instability and therefore repression” (Poe et al 1999:294).

Davenport (1995, 1996) notes that a number of possibilities exist for operationalizing dependency, for example, Snyder and Kick's (1979) model of combining trade flows, treaty memberships, military interventions and diplomatic relations. Owing to data availability and concerns about the strategy's validity, Davenport (1995:696) employs Taylor and Jodice's (1983) export specialization indicator, which operationalizes dependency as the degree to which export commodities fall within a comparatively small number of categories. According to this strategy, the smaller the number of categories, the higher a nation's dependency.

The fourth and final economic indicator, type of economic system, is amply elucidated by Burkhart (2002). Borrowing from studies that investigate the impact of capitalism on democracy, Burkhart argues that capitalism holds negative implications for democracy unless supported with appropriate social norms and values: "Societies dominated by free market capitalist principles alone, without an allowance for social norms such as redistribution of income in times of need, can hardly be considered to be open, making too much capitalism an enemy of democracy and possibly an enemy of human rights practices" (Burkhart 2002: 160). He measures capitalism using indices of government consumption, exchange rates, and transfers and subsidies.⁸ Burkhart reports a significant positive association between the government consumption and exchange rates with repression, and a negative association with the transfers and subsidies index.

Population and urbanization are the primary social and cultural variables in extant literature on repression. Henderson (1992) and Poe and Tate (1994) make the case that rapid population growth increases stress on national resources, leading to

⁸ Burkhart's measures were adapted from the Economic Freedom of the world 1975-1995 published by the Fraser Institute. For details, see Gwartney et al (1996).

increased repression. He argues that an increase in the number of people creates excessive needs and wants. This puts pressure on the government and could result in the adoption of authoritarian tendencies. Poe and Tate (1994) add that a large population invites repression because it increases the number of occasions on which coercion could mete out. Stress from population pressures increases domestic rebellion and magnifies the regime's perception of what the domestic threats place at stake. Henderson (1992), Poe et al (1999) and Burkhart (2002) find positive associations between repression and population size and annual growth rates. Population is normally measured as a natural log of reported annual population estimates, and the rate of change in population for one country over a successive number of years.

Urbanization has been utilized in various studies of repression (for example, Park 1987). The theoretical argument for its treatment as a predictor of political repression is its critical role in reducing the costs of dissent through bringing people together. Park (1987) reports a positive relation between urbanisation and political rights, implying that urbanization has the impact of reducing repression in democracies. Once again, it is expected that this variable will have interactive effects with other predictors in the model.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to restate the elements of a political repression as demonstrated by the foregoing literature review. A clear definition of the political repression is critical, particularly when we consider the difficulty in obtaining problem-free data. The problem is worse with regard to cross-national data, primarily because data collection remains a major handicap for social scientists in many

countries. One recognizes and appreciates advances in methodological sophistication, but data collection and measurement issues often overshadow the full benefits of such gains.

The literature reviewed in the past two chapters identifies a number of contextual and instrumental variables to be included in any parsimonious model of political repression. Political variables include regime type, regime's coercive capacity, type of threat or conflict, and institutional underdevelopment (degree of societal mobilization vis-à-vis changes in societal institutions). Economic variables should typically include economic development, economic growth, dependency and economic system. Socio-cultural variables should include population, urbanization, media penetration, and literacy. It is customary to include a pre-determined term of the endogenous variable on the right hand side of the equation to control for serial correlation.

Chapter 4

Toward a Theory of Media Repression

Introduction

What is media repression? What do mass media do that make them targets of repression? Is media repression the same as state repression of other institutions like opposition political parties, religious organizations or activist groups? This chapter seeks answers to these questions. The first section explores the media's place in what has been conceptualized as the public sphere of human activity. The second section offers a definition of media repression. The third section examines the literature in media repression, highlighting the dearth of substantive studies. The final section offers a model of media repression, with hypotheses that will be tested in subsequent chapters.

Media and the public sphere

What is the relationship between media institutions, government and the general populace? Do mass media have a specific role in social, economic and political development? Scholars in media studies have explored these questions in various ways. The dominant liberal press theory (Merrill 1990, Siebert 1952) has been widely criticized, and generally rejected, mainly on the grounds that it does not provide a framework for studying contemporary media institutions (for example, see Thompson

1990, 1995; Curran and Gurevitch 1992; Nerone 1994). In response to Curran's (1992:82) challenge that "new times call for new thinking," this study employs the public sphere approach.¹

The public sphere approach is rooted in Jürgen Habermas's (1989) *The structural transformation of the public sphere*.² In this seminal work, Habermas argues that the development of early modern capitalism - in Western Europe during the late 17th century to mid-18th century - created an autonomous arena for public debate.³ Crucial elements in the creation of new publics engaged in critical political discussion included economic independence brought about by private property; an increase in literacy; and the emergence of an independent, market-based press.⁴ The end result, Habermas argues, was a bourgeois public sphere, a public space between the public authority or the state, on the one hand, and the private realm of civil society and personal relations, on the other, in which public opinion was formed and popular supervision of the government was established. The public sphere consisted of private individuals coming together to debate among themselves the regulation of the civil

¹ There are other strategies, including those focusing on political economy and symbolic mediation. These are not mutually exclusive.

² This was an English translation of Habermas's German edition published in 1962. Some references to this work also use a 1984 Swedish translation. However, this study generally employs the 1989 edition. For critical discussions of Habermas's argument, see Seidman (1989), Calhoun (1992) and Thompson (1993).

³ While the public sphere theory was originally limited to the print press in the early modern capitalist systems of Western Europe, its application has been extended to other media. Reddy (1994) employs the approach in his study of print media in post-revolutionary France, while Nerone (1994) uses it to study the history of violence against US media. Hallin (1994), Dahlgren (1995) use the concept to study American television, while Curran (1991) uses it to study British television. Jakubowicz (1991) and Chalaby (1998) use the approach to study mass media in Poland, Ukraine and Moldova, respectively.

⁴ See Anderson (1993) for an excellent discussion of the founding of mass reading publics in Western Europe.

society and the conduct of the state. Notably, the public sphere was not part of the state, but a forum through which state activities could be scrutinized and criticized.

Habermas argues that all societies “need a democratic public sphere, a space of democratic exchange, based on procedures whereby those affected by social norms and collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption” (Benhabib 1992:87). Undergirding the emergence and sustenance of the public sphere was the periodical press, which began as forums of literary and cultural criticism but increasingly shifted towards social and political issues. The burgeoning bourgeois press was closely interwoven into the socialization patterns of the emerging coffeehouse culture sweeping across Western Europe. One socialization feature of the coffeehouse culture was the development of a sphere of private life autonomous from both the state and the public sphere itself. Habermas argues that only citizens meeting “certain entry qualifications could debate public issues freely and on an equal basis” (Goldsmiths Media Group 1999: 39).

Habermas’s thesis is that the growth of mass media expanded access to the existing public sphere, highlighting inequalities amongst people that were previously “bracketed out” (Goldsmiths Media Group 1999: 40). The public sphere ceased to be a space for debating on a ‘free and equal basis’ and instead transformed into a site for negotiations between different interest groups. Furthermore, the rational-critical debate that characterized interaction within the public sphere gave way to a preponderance of commercially driven consumption and private family discourse. The result was that

Matters of private good became absorbed in the state’s domain... the separation of the domestic and the public (which underlay the original bourgeois public sphere) collapsed, and the mass media became ... a secondary realm of intimacy, communicating direct to individuals in their home and

bypassing the original public sphere entirely. (Goldsmiths Media Group 1999: 40).

Habermas's theory has been widely criticized (see, for example, Dahlgren and Sparks 1991; Calhoun 1992; Hallin 1994; Thompson 1995). The criticisms fall into four general categories. First, the account of the early rise of the public sphere is too narrowly focused on the bourgeoisie, ignoring the contribution of other forces, for example, pre-bourgeois Reformation and other "counter-public spheres" that mushroomed parallel to the bourgeois (Benhabib 1992, Negt and Kluge 1993). Second, the connection between the 18th century salon culture and the mass culture of the 1950s is too simplistic. Indeed, Schudson (1992) argues that a fully participatory public sphere and unfettered debates in coffeehouses simply never happened, while Curran (1991) argues that growth of mass media did not have the deleterious effects that Habermas postulates. Third, Habermas assumes a unidimensional relationship between the ardent public discourse of the 18th century and the mass consumption culture of the mid-20th century. Numerous studies, however, suggest that the mass culture of the 1950s was preceded by a complex mix of cultures that is undoubtedly multidimensional (see for example Calhoun 1992). Fourth, feminists argue that the public sphere thesis excludes women and accuse Habermas of harboring an overly rationalistic view of human communication (Benhabib 1992, Fraser 1992).⁵

Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus among critical media and cultural studies students that Habermas's contribution is instrumental to understanding how mass media have evolved both as institutions in their own right and as components of the

⁵ It is noteworthy that Habermas (1992) concedes that the public sphere explications are problematic; he nevertheless stands by the public sphere principle as a valid and testable theoretical concept.

social, economic and political systems in which they operate.⁶ Hallin (1994:3) points out that the core of Harbemas's public sphere concept is "extremely useful, both as a standard of evaluation and as a empirical concept." Dahlgren (1995:9) also finds the concept valid, and argues that "it points to those institutional constellations of the media and other fora [forums] for information and opinion - and the social practices around them - which are relevant for political life. That these institutional constellations and practices may be anaemic does not *per se* mean they are irrelevant."

Curran (1992:102-111) reconceptualizes the public sphere as "a core surrounded by satellite networks and organized groups". The core public sphere - occupied by the mass media - stages a public dialogue informed by a diversity of values, viewpoints and perspectives. The primary objective is to achieve agreement or compromise on issues through repeated interaction. Curran's model perceives the media as the life force of society in which the universal representation function is clearly enunciated. The media's pluralistic commitment may be audience-based (by limiting the people's freedoms of expression) or media-based (by imposing fairness rules on media institutions). Either way anchors the media to the central social forces in society, and replaces societal agreement based on domination with a more equitable system of public dialogue in which issues are resolved in a democratic, non-violent way.

Working from the criticisms to Harbemas's thesis, Hallin (1994:11-23) develops a four-dimensional concept of the public sphere. Each of the four dimensions - media institutions, media representation, social structure and socio-cultural interaction -

⁶ One benefit of mass media is their role as neutral public zones that facilitate influence-free and cost-free discourse on pertinent social, economic and political issues. This is the basic premise of the liberal defense of press freedom, and one that is not considered in this study.

serves as an entry point to issues encompassed by the public sphere. All four dimensions are intrinsically interdependent: "no one dimension stands on its own; all four interlock with each other and constitute reciprocal conditions for one another" (p.11). The media institutions' dimension relates to the organization, financing, legal frameworks and regulation of media institutions. It includes such issues as ownership, control, procedures for licensing, rules for access, and freedoms and constraints on communication.

The representation dimension refers to journalistic output - what the media portray, how topics are presented, the modes of discourse at work, and the character of the debates. The social structures dimension encompasses a broad range of factors that define the historical and institutional contexts of the public sphere. They include social stratification, power alignments, and the state. Within this dimension is the interplay of economic, political and legal power, and the role of education in shaping mass attitudes and competencies. The final dimension, sociocultural interaction, refers to how audiences receive media output and what they do with this knowledge.

While the public sphere cannot operate in isolation from all other social, economic and political domains - because it is intrinsically linked to them - it also cannot operate efficiently when placed under undue pressure or influence by other domains. Hallin (1994:3) reiterates Harbemas's argument that the public sphere must be kept autonomous of all other domains because each has power that poses a threat to the independence (and stability) of the public realm. In Harbemas's words, such shifts in autonomy would result in media changing from a medium of dialogue to an instrument of power and profit. Dahlgren (1995:12) warns that weak democratic tendencies and

inegalitarianism threaten the health of the institutional structures of the public sphere:

Such structural features translate into mechanisms whereby the basic patterns of power and social hierarchy detrimentally shape the character of the public sphere. These mechanisms operate by institutionally *delimiting* the public sphere as such; for instance, the state, together with vested interests, can pursue media policies which hinder the flow of relevant information and constrict the range of opinion. Alternatively, such mechanisms may operate *through* the public sphere to hinder democratic development, for example, 'news plants,' disinformation, trivialization. (Dahlgren 1995:12)⁷

Elsewhere, he adds:

[The public sphere] is an historically contingent space, *negotiated* and *contested*, situated at the interface of an array of vectors. It is structured by macrosocietal factors and shaped by the mass media. Yet, it is also socioculturally constructed by the discursive practices of civil society. (Dahlgren 1995:23)⁸

A critical observation here is the apparent connection between the dominant individuals and institutions in the public sphere, and power. Power here is defined as the ability of "human agents, separated or together, in groups or organizations, significantly affecting the thoughts of others" (Lukes 1974:54). Dahlgren (1995) points to permanent attractiveness of the public sphere, resulting in contestations and negotiations between the "array of vectors" or players. Chalaby (1998:73) argues that the public sphere's traditional functions of dialogue and participation empowers social, economic or political groups by giving them "the possibility of existing on their own terms in the public space."

⁷ Emphasis from original.

⁸ Emphasis supplied.

When considered in tandem with mass media primacy in the public sphere, this observation implies that mass media give groups the empowerment and legitimacy necessary to participate in the decision-making process of the public sphere. The objectives these power struggles between the macrosocietal factors (leaving out the mass media for now) is then best understood as one over the domination of social, economic or political discourse.

But what about the mass media? So far, their role has been confined to simply being the forum through which the business of the public sphere - diverse voices offering divergent viewpoints and dialogue among themselves - is conducted. As such, the media provides a conduit for rational-critical debate (Curran's 1992:83), giving information and knowledge to participants in the public sphere to act rationally and to participate actively in social, economic and political life. Chalaby (1998:74) perceives mass media as "the place where the dimensions of [topical import] offer themselves to the comprehension of citizens, and where the citizens can have their views on the developments of their society represented." This perception of a timid media institution is especially apparent in media studies employing the traditional liberal theory approach, where mass media are neutral public zones that facilitate influence-free and cost-free discourse on pertinent social, economic and political issues.

The contemporary public sphere contradicts this view. Mass media are no longer simple purveyors of information - they now are among the most aggressive players jostling for power in the public sphere. For example, in their studies of television and the public sphere, Dahlgren (1995) and Hallin (1994) point to the changing character of broadcast media and how this change has affected people's perceptions of themselves and the world. Hallin (1994) argues persuasively that television, the most important

means of communication in the developed world today, has evolved from being a simple participant in the marketplace of ideas to being an enormously powerful institution in its own right.

Hallin identifies two contributory factors to the evolutionary process, namely, professionalization and differentiation. Professionalization of journalism developed in response to criticism that the media were private interests that threatened democracy - and the credibility morale of news organizations - if their owners used them as instruments of class or personal interest. It was also spurred by fears about pervasive propaganda from both private and public sources; and a realization of the contradiction between media as a economic entity and as a source of unfettered news and information (see Hallin 1994; Curran 1978, 1979; Horkheimer and Ardono, 1972). Differentiation involved the separation of mass media institutions from economic, political, social and cultural inhibitions. Differentiation typically involves separation of media from such entities as political parties, ethnic groupings, religious affiliations, and economic institutions (see Hallin 1994).

In spite of their good intentions, these factors now pose a threat to the public sphere. The culture of professionalism is largely hostile to politics, preferring technical and administrative expertise or cynical detachment to engagement in the public sphere.⁹ Differentiation, on the other hand, has resulted in large media corporations whose survival and development strategies contradict the traditional role of mass media in the public sphere. The crucial question, as Hallin (1994:15) rightly

⁹ Among the key changes is the reduction of "soundbites" of new sources, increased commentary from journalists, increased use of analysis by experts, and the incorporation of independently sourced text (e.g. graphics, file tapes). These changes are themselves attributable to technological advances; weakening of political consensus and authority,

points out, is whether mass media stand apart from or belong to civil society, and whether they themselves *are* in effect the public sphere, or the sphere exists somewhere outside.

Dahlgren (1995) makes a similar argument. He posits that the media professionalism and commercialization have pervaded the global television industry at the expense of the public sphere. Television promotes consumerism, which in turn exalts individualism at the expense of collective identities and actions. Consequently, a perennial conflict is apparent between consumer identity and citizen identity, and any gains in one are always at the expense of the other. He concludes:

Television operates as an incessant producer of audio-visual discourses, which have a central position in the semiotic environment [of consumer/citizen conflict]. As an industry, television has to follow the precepts of audience maximization and profits; moreover, it is the paramount vehicle of consumer culture. While television is the dominant medium of the public sphere, 'public sphering' is clearly not television's dominant purpose, and its institutional logic of course greatly conditions its role within the public sphere. (Dahlgren 1995: 148)

Nerone's (1994) postulation quintessentially spells out a "*media coup de-etat*" of the public sphere. He argues that over the past century, the media's social role of a marketplace of ideas has been transmuted from simply conveying public expressions to being the public sphere themselves. Mass media have redefined the setting of public discourse from the public sphere to the media themselves. Nerone notes that the limits of public discourse are defined by newsworthiness, and the rules of entry into public debate stipulate that making sense is secondary to making news:

necessitating increased "mediated" reporting; and economic pressures to utilize airtime most efficiently (see Hallin 1992).

The media are now thought to define and constitute the public sphere. Whereas [previously] a political meeting was thought of as a primary means of political communication, and reporting of it was secondary, now the political meeting is thought of as being simply a means of getting media attention. (Nerone 1994:207)¹⁰

The above analysis demonstrates that contemporary mass media are not neutral purveyors of public discourse in the public sphere; on the contrary, they themselves are the public sphere. One obvious implication of this postulation is that the mass media, in their 'sphering' capacity, wield power and influence over much of the discourse in society. What kind of power? Nerone (1994: 213-214) offers some answers to this question in his incisive discussion of whether media are intangible (information, opinion, images, discourse or truth) or tangible (material):

The media *are* material. They are produced industrially and marketed commercially (in most of the world) and cannot function without [material] things. Moreover, the power they exercise is not just a power of truth. ... The media exercise power *prior to* the power of truth. They empower groups by their very existence. ... They [are] instruments of political power. They police the boundaries of the public sphere. All these functions are material functions. [But] the media aren't things in themselves; they are networks of relationships. They're always embedded in their social world, and are carriers of powers other than the power of truth. (Nerone 1994:214)

Deconstructing media power:

It is clear from the above discussion that mass media have immense influence and control over the public sphere in civil society. This is apparent, given the media's

¹⁰ A rapidly expanding subfield of media-effects literature has been exploring the apparent substitution of media coverage for public action. While this scholarship is outside the scope of this study, it is noteworthy that the media have been found to simplify messages, persuade, and to frame, prime and cue issues (see Patterson and McClure 1976; Iyengar 1987, Iyengar and Kinder 1991; Ansolabehere et al. 1993; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; Neuman et al. 1992; McCombs 1994). These effects undergird the potency of mediated communications (see Shoemaker and Reese 1996).

domineering role in the production and dissemination of information and knowledge. For example, the media are held responsible for the public's widespread cynicism about politics (see Krebel 1995, Jamieson 1996), and the role of politics in daily life:

The mass media, by the way in which they structure and present political reality, may contribute to a widespread and chronic distrust of political life. Such distrust is not primarily a mark of sophistication, indicating that critical 'discount' is at work. It is of a projective character and constitutes a defensive reaction against the periodic political crises known to affect a person's destiny as well as against what are defined as deliberate efforts to mobilize political sentiment. (Lang and Lang 1966:466)

But what is the implication of this media *coup d'etat* for the relationship between media and political institutions? Gurevitch and Blumler (1979:270-290) offer a persuasive exposition on how media and political institutions interact in a given communication system.¹¹ Political institutions derive their power from their function as articulators of interest and mobilizers of social power for political purposes. Media power, on the other hand, is derived from three disparate sources. First, the media have structural power, which emanates from their unique capacity to deliver hitherto unavailable audiences (both in size and in composition). In other words, the media enlarge the receiver base to the point where the audiences for political communication become virtually identical with the membership of the society itself. Second, media have psychological power, derived from the control they wield over their audiences. In other words, people's attention and social knowledge is greatly influenced (and in some cases limited to) media content available to them (see Ginsberg (1986) on the thesis of captive audiences).

¹¹ Gurevitch and Blumler (1979) inform much of the discussion in this section.

The combined effect of structural and psychological power enable the mass media to effectively interpose themselves between the political realm and the public, and intervene in the political process itself. The intervention is performed in many ways, for example, restructuring the timing and character of political events, defining crisis situations requiring the attention of politicians, injecting new players into political debates, and stimulating the growth of peripheral communication agencies (e.g., opinion polling, political advertising, campaign consulting, etc.). This combined influence of the media draws strength from the media's normative power, that is, respect accorded to institutions that safeguard basic freedoms as well as watch against possible abuses of political authority. This respect for the media, the bedrock of liberal press theory, is a major source of conflict between media and political institutions because it legitimizes media independence from political control (Gurevitch and Blumler 1979:275).

Ultimately, relations between media and political regimes are characterized by perennial conflicts over media autonomy. For political regimes, curtailing media independence is an attractive option because they prefer an unfettered ability to control and influence the attitudes of citizens. For media institutions, autonomy is their only safeguard against loss of power. There is substantial discrepancy between what either side considers acceptable codes of conduct for media professionals. Conflicts also arise from the susceptibility to change of politicians and their regimes *vis-a-vis* the bureaucratic stability of media institutions. But whatever the source of conflict, political institutions inevitably resort to regulating media power:

Political systems generate principles derived from their political cultures for regulating the political role of mass media. Such organizing principles are vital,

since the contributions of the mass media to the political process are too important to be left to chance. Communication processes are involved in the legitimation of authority and serve functions of political articulation, mobilization and conflict-management. They set much of the agenda for political debate. They are partly responsible for determining which political demands in society will be aired, and which will be relatively muted. They affect the chances of governments and other political actors to secure essential support. In short, they are so closely intertwined with political process that they must be regulated. (Gurevitch and Blumler 1979:282)

The relationship between media and political institutions depends upon the media's level of autonomy, and to what extent and by what means the autonomy is constrained. Gurevitch and Blumler (1979:283) see media autonomy as a continuum that ranges from subordination to autonomy; the media's position along this continuum is fixed by a combination of political culture variables. The constraints subordinating media to political institutions may be direct or indirect. Direct controls include legal, normative and structural constraints.¹² Indirect controls of media power include economic constraints (use of financial leverage from potential advertising revenue or government subsidies), and technological constraints (control of acquisition of production inputs or capital).

To conclude, the public sphere is a meeting point between the state and its authority on the one hand, and civil society and the public on the other hand. In both the original and revised forms, contestation and negotiation characterize the operations of the sphere. With the mass media having transformed themselves from

¹² Legal constraints include rules and regulations defining rights and obligations of media institutions enforceable by the state. These constraints define the realm of freedom of expression and the reach of legal limitations like libel, privacy, and national security laws. Normative constraints refer to expectations of media participation in national development through dissemination of political information. This media service to political and public institutions is in addition to the normal operations of the media market mechanism. Structural constraints refer to participation of political institutions in media enterprises through

being neutral contenders in the public sphere to being the marketplace of ideas and a material power, the most critical contestation now happens between the state and the media themselves. Faced with the contestation prospect, political systems directly or indirectly force the media into subordination to political institutions. The extent of subordination or autonomy depends, among other factors, upon the political culture of a given system.¹³ Media now occupy the space once described as the public sphere, and have graduated from being one of the components of the sphere to being the sole components.

Defining media repression

Since most previous studies of media repression were premised on the widely criticized liberal press theory, most definitions adopted in such studies are considered inappropriate for this study.¹⁴ A new definition of media repression must satisfy two crucial conditions. First, it must remain within the framework of Goldstein's (1978) definition of political repression adopted in Chapter 2. Notably, this study recognizes political repression as a multidimensional concept with media repression as one of these dimensions. Second, any definition of media repression must embrace the spirit

ownership, financial contributions, or through editorial support of party goals and policies (see Seymour-Ure 1974).

¹³ The regulation of media influence depends upon "tenets" of political culture like popular perceptions of basic freedoms, impact of politico-cultural factors on public opinion, and the degree and nature of social differentiation and cleavage.

¹⁴ Lowenstein (1966) offers a typical example. He defines a "completely free press" as "one in which newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, books, radio and television have absolute independence and critical ability, except for minimal libel and obscenity laws. The press has no concentrated ownership, economic units or self-regulation." He also defines a "completely controlled press" as "one with no independence or critical ability. Under it, newspapers, periodicals, books, news agencies, radio and television are completely controlled directly and indirectly by government, self-regulatory bodies or concentrated ownership."

of the public sphere in its postulation of government-media relations. With these observations in mind, media repression is defined as "actions of governments or political institutions taken against media personalities or media institutions with a view to reducing media autonomy from the political system and increasing state domination of the mass media. Such actions are limited to those not developed through negotiation and arbitration between the media and political institutions."

Numerous government activities qualify as repressive actions under this definition. A number of recent studies have attempted to classify these actions and develop typologies of media repression. Chalaby (1998) identifies four types of media repression: legal, administrative, economic, and violent. Legal repression involves the design of regulatory frameworks by governments with a view to controlling mass media activities. Chalaby notes that such frameworks use vague and ambiguous wording to establish journalist rights and the grounds for prosecution. The more authoritarian the system, the more rights (over media operations) the framework apportions to the state. Administrative repression of mass media refers to the use of the state's bureaucratic machinery as a means of media control. Here, the government capitalizes on arbitrariness in its dealings with press issues. A typical example is the use of double standards in dealing with different media institutions - systematic bias in judicial rulings, denial of government news and information, or harassment of journalists from particular media institutions.

Economic repression involves the use of economic measures to punish media institutions perceived as "errant" from the government's viewpoint. Such measures include denial of the government's advertising business, control of production inputs (especially imported media inputs), and the use of arbitrary subsidy or taxation

regimes. Violent repression refers to the use or threat of physical force against journalists and media institutions. Typical examples include assaults, kidnappings, death threats and murders. Chalaby notes that this repression category is aimed at creating a sense of vulnerability among media professionals and institutions as the rule of law becomes more precarious and uncertain.

Nerone's (1994) exposition of violence against the press in the United States is more elaborate. He identifies two dimensions of media repression, namely an individual/institution dimension and an exclusionary/inclusionary dimension.¹⁵ The individual/institution dimension suggests that repressive activities are targeted at journalists and media institutions. Individual repression is especially common with claims of privacy violations rather than accusations based on public policy. Nerone (1994:10) refers to the tendency to attack individuals on privacy issues as "the privatization of reputation." Institutional repression, on the other hand, is directed at news organizations. This delineation of institutions is attributable to the emergence of multiple media institutions - embracing print, radio, television and other media - over the past half-century, and the role of technology in creating an impression of "immediate presence" through real-time transmission of sound and image.

The exclusionary/inclusionary dimension looks at the intended impact of repressive actions. Exclusionary attacks on media are meant to sway media attention from certain people, events or notions. Nerone (1994:202) notes that most exclusionary events on individuals often involve disputes over whether an event or issue is private or public. Exclusionary attacks on media institutions often revolve around ideology,

¹⁵ Nerone (1994) also discusses repression of media ideas and media groups. He, however, concedes that these are no longer common, especially because of the evolution of legal systems to perceive such "ideas" or "groups" as radicals.

class, religion and other “group” disputes. In such incidents, the media institution symbolizes an oppressive status quo. As Nerone (1994:204) argues, “mainstream media by definition stand at a distance from nonmainstream groups.”

Inclusionary violence is designed to force media attention towards people, events or issues considered underreported. The rise of inclusionary media attacks complements the development of new non-violent ways of getting media attention (for example, press conferences, press releases, mass meetings, protest demonstrations and publicity stunts). Nerone (1994:207) interprets such incidents as part of a struggle over editorial control of the media.

Extant literature in media repression:

Despite widespread popularization of media repression by international news organizations and a number of global media organizations, systematic research in media repression is scant.¹⁶ Nixon (1960, 1965) pioneered the study of correlates of media repression. Nixon (1960:13-28) investigated the relationship between media repression and economic and sociocultural factors. Using country data from United Nations agencies and media repression reports from the International Press Institute and the Inter-American Press Association, Nixon reported that per capita national income, literacy levels and newspaper circulation were positively correlated with press freedom.

¹⁶ It is noteworthy that while this study occasionally refers to research in press freedom, it avoids this concept as conceptualized in traditional liberal press theory. The press freedom concept is heavily loaded with ideological connotation. See Merrill (1990) for a discussion of the main tenets of the liberal press theory. In a nutshell, the theory espouses such notions as absolute press freedom; objectivity, neutrality and balance in media coverage; and depicts media as disinterested parties in societal discourse.

The press controls reported in the 85 countries were classified in seven categories. These were control through punitive legal or extra-legal action (civil and criminal court action, arrests, detention, jail terms, fines and deportations); control through institutional pressure (seizure of publications, restriction of newsprint and other inputs, imposition of conditionality for publishing); control of officials news (use of press releases, and limiting access to official sources); control of news personnel (through work permits and accreditation procedures); control of news content (through official censorship); control of content and format (through policies on periodic supervision and restraints on ideological scope); and control of periodic distribution.¹⁷

Per capita income showed the highest bivariate relationship with press freedom with a correlation coefficient of .64, while newspaper circulation and literacy correlated at .63 and .51, respectively. The correlation improved markedly when five European communist countries were excluded, leading Nixon to conclude that the nature and age of a political system also affected press freedom.¹⁸ However, his emphasis was not on the associations but on ranking the surveyed counties on a five-point scale of press freedom that ranged from "Free" to "Authoritarian." Communist press systems were lumped together with authoritarian press systems.

Nixon (1965) was inspired by improved information on global media systems following the publication of UNESCO's (1964) *World Communications*. In this second

¹⁷ Nixon's (1960) study suffers two fundamental problems. First, it bore strong links to the Cold War sensitivities. Second, the dependent variable had high systematic measurement error because it was based on interviews and reports from Western foreign correspondents on assignment abroad. Subsequent research has insisted that such interviews be balanced equally between local and foreign media representatives.

¹⁸ The five countries, Czechoslovakia East Germany, Poland, the USSR and Hungary were new converts to communism but each had either a strong economy, or high literacy or both.

take, Nixon increased the number of countries under review to 117 and reconceptualized the press freedom scale from five to nine points. He also abandoned a Guttman scaling technique employed in the 1960 study for expert appraisals. The findings of this second study were closely related to those of the first. Press freedom was found to be positively correlated with income per capita, literacy and newspaper circulation. Nixon (1965:7) was, however, quick to point out that his findings did not imply a "causal" relationship between press freedom and socioeconomic variables; they only indicated "a close relationship and interaction." The correlation coefficients increased markedly when communist countries were excluded.¹⁹ Finally, employing a typology developed by Banks and Textor's (1963) cross-national survey of polities, he reported 25 characteristics linking press freedom with capitalism, legislative competition, multi-party system, constitutional stability, economic development, industrialization, urbanization, Christianity, pluralistic tolerance, racial homogeneity, and private media ownership, among others.²⁰

Lowenstein's (1966a, 1966b, 1967) attempts to measure press freedom were more elaborate than the Nixon studies. Lowenstein combined American foreign correspondents and local media experts in a panel for his 94-country study of press freedom. He attempted to reach both native and non-native experts in each country - with mixed success - to improve the reliability of his findings. His Press Independence

¹⁹ Like the earlier study, Nixon's (1965) analyses were characterized by ideological overtones of the Cold War era. This systematic bias was accentuated by the fact that the studies relied on observations of media repression by American foreign correspondents. Nanda et al. (1981) provided a critical evaluation of media and communication studies inspired by the ideological tensions. Nerone (1995) summarizes the debate on the four theories of the press that formed the theoretical basis of Nixon's (1965) work.

²⁰ All reported relationships were simply correlational in nature, and no causal effects were postulated.

and Critical Ability (PICA) survey sought to measure press freedom based on 23 items in the mail questionnaire. The items tapped into such concepts as legal and extra-legal controls, libel laws, organized self-regulation, government influence over journalists' recruitment, certification and accreditation, double standards in government dissemination of news, virility of media criticism of government, economic and other constraints on media, and media ownership patterns (see Lowenstein 1966a, 1966b, 1967, 1976).²¹

Lowenstein's end product was an index of press freedom that ranked countries on a nine-item scale - free at high degree; free with moderate controls; free with many controls; transitional; controlled to a low degree; controlled to a medium degree; controlled to high degree; and unranked. Lowenstein noted that of the 115 countries considered, 55 were scored "free", while 29 were scored as having a "controlled" press in some aspect or another. Ten countries were scored in the "transitional" zone, while 21 countries were not ranked due to insufficient information. Lowenstein observed that PICA attempted to place countries on a scale ranging from "absolute control" to "absolute freedom", "although it expects no country to reach either extreme".

In his analysis, Lowenstein found patterns suggesting that democracy, ideology and political conflict played a critical role in determining just how free a country's media remained. Countries in Western hemisphere scored better on the press freedom scale

²¹ A number of problems, however, are evident in Lowenstein's studies. First, his definition of press freedom was problematic and forced him to eliminate data on ownership and government-control methods for countries that reported state ownership of media institutions. The 23 items themselves overlapped and were biased against media systems that were not built around the Western liberal press theory. Furthermore, Lowenstein's decision to drop native ratings that substantially differed from those of the US foreign correspondents implied that he

than all other regions in the world. No African country was ranked in the top two levels. With regard to ideology, Lowenstein found that all countries ranked "free at high degree" had liberal democratic systems, while those with Marxist or communist system generally coalesced at the bottom of the scale in the "controlled" category. Indeed, Lowenstein observed that ideological factors were responsible for the mixed ranking evident in Europe with 13 countries in the top two levels and 7 countries in the bottom category. The study further associated increased political conflict with lower levels of press freedom. However, Lowenstein recognized that press freedom abuse was highest at the intermediate levels of political conflict, suggesting that media in such countries were doing their best to counter rising political suppression. Many countries in the middle of the scale - transitional - displayed a mixture of characteristics, often making it difficult to predict which way press freedom would turn based on the observed parameters.

No studies of the stature and scope of Nixon and Lowenstein have appeared in mainstream social science literature since, for several reasons. First, the 'hypodermic needle' theory of mass communication, upon which the studies were premised, lost credibility during the 1970s and 1980s.²² Second, more persuasive approaches to the study of mass communication have emerged, particularly those from the political economy, cultural studies and political psychology traditions.²³ These new approaches

was more interested in interpretations of media systems within the Western liberal press tradition.

²² Among the works that substantively discuss the demise of the 'diffusion of innovation' model are Nerone (1994), Nerone and McChesney (1995), Thompson (1993, 1995), and Keane (1991).

²³ A rich literature exists in each of these three traditions. In the political economy tradition, they include Herman and Chomsky (1988), Murdock (1982, 1992), Smith (1980, 1991), Bagdikian (1992), Gerbner et al. (1996). For the cultural studies tradition, see Harbemas (1989), Agger (1992), Althusser (1971); Curran and Gurevitch (1992); and McNamara and Switzer (1997). For the political psychology tradition, see Iyengar (1987, 1991), McCombs and Shaw (1972),

also mark a less subtle shift in mass communication research from quantitative to qualitative techniques and, concomitantly, from macro-level to micro-level analyses.

There have been a number of other studies in media repression, albeit on a lesser scale. The Dimensionality of Nations Project conducted in 1950, 1955, 1960, 1963 and 1965 under Rudolph Rummel included a "censorship score," rating countries on a three-point scale according to the extent of government control of the media. Taylor and Hudson's (1971) *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators II (1948-1967)* reproduces Lowenstein's (1966, 1967) data on press freedom, scoring countries on a nine-point scale from -4 to +4. The U.S. Department of State *Annual Country Reports* report "freedom of speech and press" as a component of "Respect for Civil Rights" variable. However, these annual updates on human rights only offer brief narrative reports.²⁴ Kenneth Johnson (1976, 1982) created the *Survey of Latin American Political Democracy, 1945-1980* (with Russell Fitzgibbon), which include an indicator of freedom of the press, speech, assembly and radio. Duff and McCamant's (1976) *Violence and Repression in Latin America, 1950-1970* dataset includes a repression index that comprises media censorship and three other variables. These initiatives are summarized in Table 4.1 below.

Van Belle (1997, 2000) has recently published a series of longitudinal studies of press freedom, in an attempt to rekindle the debate on the impact of press freedom on democratic peace and democratic leadership. Van Belle created the Global Press Freedom 1948-1994 data set, which presents a categorical coding of media independence in 162 countries (see also Van Belle and Oneal 1998). He uses

Mackuen (1984), Ginsberg (1994). These approaches themselves are sub-fields of inquiry with multiple schools of thought.

descriptive annual summaries of press freedom published by the International Press Institute to rank countries as free, imperfectly free, restricted, or controlled.²⁵ A fifth category, missing, is reserved for countries where the press is non-existent or too limited to be coded.²⁶

Van Belle approaches press freedom from an international relations perspective, and finds that media control information flow, a critical element in domestic and international conflicts. He examines whether press freedom -- as an independent variable together with democracy, presence of free press in neighboring state (shared press freedom), and protracted conflict -reduces the likelihood that states would inflict casualties during international crises. Van Belle finds that press freedom in the acting state is associated with reduced likelihood of fatalities. However, his results

²⁴ The weaknesses of the *US State Department Country Reports* are discussed in Chapter 2.

²⁵ Free category is defined as "press is clearly free, and the news media is capable of functioning as an arena of political competition." Imperfectly free is defined as "press is somewhat compromised by corruption or unofficial influence, but the news media is still capable of functioning as an arena of political competition." Restricted is defined as "press is not directly controlled by the government, but is clearly not capable of functioning as an arena of political competition or debate." Controlled category is defined as "press is controlled by the government or so strictly censored that it is effectively controlled."

²⁶ An immediate problem in Van Belle's scale is how to ensure a clear delineation of his four-point scale. Exactly what is the difference between "imperfectly free" and "restricted" or "restricted" and "controlled?" Without a clear delineation, it is difficult to know how each country was accorded a particular score and, more important, how to replicate the data. Van Belle has already been confounded by the scale problem. In most studies, he has collapsed the "free" and "imperfectly free," and "restricted" and "controlled," into single categories. Unfortunately, this forces the press freedom variable into a dichotomy of "free press" and "restricted press," making it less amenable to statistical analysis using regular techniques. Dichotomization of data also results in unnecessary loss of variance. A second problem is the limitations imposed on the data set by the use of a single source for raw data. Van Belle (1999) suggests that the IPI's *World Press Freedom Review* is the best source of information on press freedom but does not explain, or even compare it to other well-known initiatives as Freedom House and Committee to Protect Journalists. He however contends that comparisons with Freedom House annual ranking of countries over an eight-year period shows that 94.1% of the cases were coded identically as free or restricted/ineffective.

from the other independent variables are mixed, with shared press freedom and democracy failing to produce statistically significant associations.

Extant data initiatives in media repression

Over the past two decades, two international media advocacy groups have aggressively publicized press freedom issues. Since 1982, Freedom House, a media organization based in New York and Washington, has compiled the *Annual Review of Press Freedom*. The review is an index of ratings on press freedom performance for between 100 to 130 countries. The ranking is conducted by a panel of expert judges and based on the degree to which a country's mass communication system permits free flow of information to and from the public. This annual study bases its analyses on four independent variables: laws and regulations affecting media, political pressures and control on the media, economic influences on the media, and repressive action on media affairs.

A description of the Freedom House data and methodology is outlined in Appendix A. Briefly, the survey's methodology may be described as follows: a preliminary assessment is conducted for all countries on the basis of four independent variables. Broadcast and print media are rated separately. The maximum score for a country is 100 points, that is 50 points for each type of media. Based on these scores, countries are finally ranked into three broad categories: free (0-30), partly free (31-60) and not free (61-100).

Attacks on the Press is an annual report on media repression by the New York-based media advocacy group, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). CPJ's research staff investigates cases of media repression and corroborates each account with more

than one source for accuracy. All incidents are subsequently coded as “attacked, ” “expelled,” “harassed,” “imprisoned,” “killed,” “censored,” “legal action,” and “threatened.” A description of the Freedom House data and methodology is outlined in Appendix A. It is however noteworthy that CPJ’s initiative is only an annual compilation of incidents, and does not attempt to rank countries. As such, Appendix A is more of a legend than a discussion of methodology.

The Freedom House survey has a number of shortcomings. First, there is a significantly high chance of overlap among the four measures of press freedom. For example, legal and administrative decisions and political influence as conceptualized as mutually exclusive, but there are many instances when the two overlap. Second, not all activities that influence media repression are captured in the four measures. Third, and probably most critical, the survey’s methodology has been revised several times between 1982 and 1997, making it difficult to make serial cross-national comparisons.

Conclusion: Toward a theory of media repression

This chapter explored mass media’s placement in economic, social and political systems, and identifies the roots of media repression by political authorities. The theoretical implications of the pervasive power of the media were also investigated. The main conclusion is that political authorities are threatened by the domination (or the threat of domination) of the public sphere by mass media. Consequently, they elect to constrain media power through exclusionary or inclusionary measures that are aimed at individual media professionals or media organizations.

The foregoing theoretical excursions outlined two broad and interdependent elements of media independence. First, media autonomy is not - and never can be - absolute. There is widespread recognition of both self- and externally-imposed restraint in the way the mass media cover issues. External restraint - especially from direct controls - implies that political systems have a legitimate function to define the limits of media autonomy or independence. Indeed as many media scholars point out, the main dispute over government limitations of media independence is not over the presence but the nature of such limitations. Disputes exist over issues like prior restraint, libel, right of reply, privacy, confidentiality of sources, shield laws, pornography, national security and cross-ownership of media organizations. While the legitimacy of these limitations is not in dispute, disagreements have arisen over the standards applicable in designing and administering controls.²⁷

Second, there is a broad consensus that media repression constitutes acts by governments to counter threats attributable to media coverage of particular issues. As argued by students of political repression, governments resort to repressive behavior to reduce the possibility of occurrences that threaten the state, e.g., disrupt social order or undermine governmental authority. Davenport (1995:685) argues that repressive behavior is intended to "neutralize political opponents and/or increase the costs of the [threat-producing] behavior to such a large extent that it is no longer deemed a worthwhile strategy". In a media context, repression is intended to increase the costs of covering a particular issue to the point where such coverage is deemed

²⁷ The main cause of concern for many observers, including the United States Supreme Court, is the introduction of value judgments in deciding what is acceptable or not.

prohibitive.²⁸ As such, media repression incidents are usually reactive, even though they are aimed at eliciting punitive and pre-emptive consequences. To the extent that governments aim at pre-empting further threat-producing behavior, it may be argued that governments ordinarily prefer *not* to repress.²⁹

Third, media repression, like other forms of political repression, occurs along a continuum of "light" to "serious" government action. Studies of political repression (for example, Hibbs 1973, Gupta et al. 1993, and Davenport 1995) have demonstrated that political repression is positively correlated with magnitude of perceived threat. If an increase in perceived threat produces an increase in repression, it is plausible that repressive action is "selected" from a range of alternatives.³⁰

Fourth, and most important, a critical connection between the causes and correlates of media repression and those of political repression discussed in Chapter 3 has also been made. Like political repression, media repression was found to be negatively associated with liberal democracy, free and competitive elections, casualties in domestic and regional conflicts, economic development, literacy, and

²⁸ The objectives of repressive action are easily discernible from the responses they elicit among "hard-headed" media professionals and organizations. For example, speaking after being released from a 10-year incarceration for his political commentary, Cameroonian journalist Pius Njawe said, "I want my jailers to know that no amount of torture or incarceration will silence the independent media." Fred M'membe of Zambia's *Weekly Post* has declared that his newspaper will continue publishing in spite of frequent attacks and closures by the government. But as Duvall and Shamir (1980:160) point out, the repressive character of governments increases with increased threat perception. They argue that the higher the threat perceived the higher a government's disposition to respond more coercively.

²⁹ Studies of global political systems over the past half-century have greatly improved our understanding of how governments elicit support and trust from their subjects. As Erikson and Tedin (1995:162) point out, political systems work better when they have the support of citizens than when subjects are "alienated."

³⁰ Davenport (1995:685) refers to this as "repressive propensity," that is, the degree to which a regime classifies behavior as threatening and responds with repression. However, he points out that regimes typically react to more than just the frequency of threat-generating events; they

newspaper readership. These observations call for a systematic investigation of media repression, particularly employing better data collection and empirical strategies.

It is also important to investigate associations between media repression and other exogenous variables found critical to political repression but not tested in the few studies that exist in media repression. In other words, a theory of media repression should, among other things, establish explicit empirical links to its postulated antecedent, political repression. This question will be pursued in subsequent chapters.

Finally, the chapter also demonstrated that media repression has failed to attract sustained scholarly interest, even though its importance is recognized. The few studies existing have conceptualization problems or unresolved issues relating to data collection. These shortcomings aside, the studies have offered useful starting points for systematic investigations into the causes and predicates of media repression. New initiatives to studying media repression must learn from these omissions. Of particular importance is the need to harness the new sources of data on media repression with the advent of the Internet and new media technologies. Another benefit to be reaped is advances in research methodology for scientific inquiry. The remaining chapters of this dissertation respond to some of these challenges.

identify the seriousness of the threat with a variety of coercive responses. As such, threat perception is a multidimensional concept.

Table 4.1 Summary of cross-national media repression data sets

Researcher(s)	Name of project	Time period	# of countries in sample	Raw data sources	Description of dependent variable or scale	Positive correlating independent variables	Published works
Raymond Nixon	Freedom in National Press Systems	1960	85	IPI, IAPA	Guttman scaling of expert appraisals into a 5-point ranking scale	Economic growth; Adult literacy; Newspaper circulation	Nixon 1960; Banks & Textor (1963); Bollen (1990);
Arthur Banks, Robert Textor	Cross-Polity Survey	1963	99	Associated Press annual censorship reports, 1961 & 1962	4-point scale of press freedom	n.a.	Lowenstein (1976)
Raymond Nixon	Freedom in National Press Systems	1965	117	UNESCO	9-point ranking of press freedom	Economic growth; Adult literacy; Newspaper circulation	
Ralph Lowenstein	Press Independence and Critical Ability Survey	1966	94	Foreign correspondents, native journalists	9-point ranking scale	---	Lowenstein (1966, 1967); Taylor et al. (1971)
Rudolph Rummel	Dimensionality of Nations Project	Various in 1950s and 1960s*	n.a.	Foreign correspondents, native journalists	3-point scale rating govt control of media	---	Rummel (1977)
Russell Fitzgibbon & Kenneth Johnson	The Image of Political Democracy in Latin America	1945 - 1975	n.a.	n.a.	Indicator of freedom of speech, assembly, radio	Free & competitive elections	Fitzgibbon & Johnson (1961)
Earnest Duff, John McCamant, & Waltraud Morales	Violence & Repression in Latin America	1950 - 1970	14	n.a.	Media censorship variable	n.a.	Duff et al. (1976)
US State Department	Annual country reports	ongoing	All	US diplomats abroad, intelligence sources	Brief country summaries		Davenport (1997)
Freedom House	Annual Review of Press Freedom	1982 - date	100-130	Field reports	Expert panel creating 4 media repression variables	---	Bollen (1993)
Committee to Protect Journalists	Attacks on the Press	1987 - date	75-95	Field reports	Brief summaries into 6 categories	---	---
Douglas Van Belle	Global Press Freedom Dataset	1948 - 1996	162	IPI's World Press Freedom in Review;	6-point scale of press freedom	---	Van Belle (1997, 2000)

* Rudolph Rummel carried out his studies in 1950, 1955, 1960, 1963 and 1965.

Chapter 5

Understanding the dependent variable

The Media Repression Data Project

The Media Repression Dataset is an ongoing project initiated in 1995 by Nixon Kariithi, Department of Political Science, University of Houston. The objective of the data set is to provide cross-sectional and time-series data on media repression around the world. This is the first data set to offer comprehensive empirical record of violations of media freedom by governments and political authorities around the world. Its broad-based sourcing, elaborate coding, and longitudinal nature are some of its strengths. Moreover, the data set addresses many questions raised by researchers on the limitations of quantitative data in cross-national time series research.¹ It is noteworthy that while this data set may not be a substitute for other primary sources of political repression data, the Media Repression Dataset offers opportunities for extensive analysis of media repression that is currently unavailable.

The Media Repression Dataset comprises data from 90 countries collected over the 10-year period between 1987 and 1996. Table 5.1 below shows the full list of countries and their regions.² In cases where a country's political boundaries were reconfigured during the period of study, the old case was discontinued and fresh one(s) introduced

¹ See Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for discussions of these limitations.

² Countries for whom no data was available were excluded from the data set. However, it must be pointed out that the data set still covers 90 of the 192 countries that are members of the United Nations.

to reflect the new political situation.³ With a change of country name (e.g., Burma to Myanmar, Zaire to Congo, or Ceylon to Sri Lanka), the new name is used from the year the change was effected, and a notation is made for subsequent reference. The start and end dates (1987 and 1996, respectively) for the dataset were chosen on the basis of data availability and project manageability. While some may consider the 10-year time period rather short, recent data analysis techniques are sophisticated enough to facilitate substantive investigation of the research question.⁴

[INSERT TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE]

Resolving conceptual and methodological problems

In light of the problems with political repression databases highlighted in Chapter 3, a number of normative solutions are offered. The most basic, it would appear, is by McCamant (1986) and Scoble and Wiseberg (1981) on the need to use multiple sources of information and data. McNitt (1986) proposes carefully combining information from disparate sources to create a single scale. He cautions researchers to avoid databases based on subjective estimates by “experts” because such information sources are highly vulnerable to systematic error from judges. McNitt also proposes the use of regional and local information sources to supplement the efforts of international NGOs and agencies. According to him, the local and regional bodies have access to information that the international organizations and agencies ignore.

³ Typical examples include Yugoslavia (now Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro); USSR (now Russia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, Ukraine); and Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovakia).

⁴ See subsequent chapters on data analyses, interpretation and discussion of results.

On conceptualization problems, Lopez and Stohl (1992) and Reiter et al. (1992) propose the adoption of succinct definitions to ensure effective delineation of dimensions and concepts. McCamant (1986) proposes conceptualizing repression along three principal dimensions, namely scope, arbitrariness, and severity. The disaggregation argument is supported by McCormick and Mitchell (1988), Brockett (1992), Lopez and Stohl (1992) and Davenport (1995b). Bollen (1986, 1993) and Fraser (1994) call for rigorous data collection methodology (including coding rules) to improve interpretation and resolve contradictions. They argue that structural equation techniques like confirmatory factor analysis could help resolve reliability and validity problems in data. Concerning scales, Bollen proposes the use of “scaling procedures that lead to variables that are closer to the interval level of measurement” (Bollen 1986:590).⁵ Such scales are favored because they make the data amenable to statistical analyses.

Raw data sources

This study uses raw data collected and reported annually by more than 20 international human rights groups and media organizations.⁶ Table 5.2 presents the full list of these organizations. Although these organizations did not have a standard system of data collection, they all published detailed descriptions of the media abuses they document. These descriptions were carefully examined to ascertain the nature of media repression as per my coding system below. The descriptions were often full

⁵ For an explication of detecting and minimizing bias in subjective measures, see Bollen and Paxton (1998).

⁶ The international organizations and/or their agencies do not bear any responsibility for the recoding, analysis and interpretation presented in this dissertation.

reports but, on some occasions, only a few lines.⁷ The study does not distinguish what data was collected by which media organization, partly because a number of these organizations document media repression internationally (for example, Committee to Protect Journalists, Freedom House, and Amnesty International). However, their methodologies are included in the Appendices.

[INSERT TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE]

There is considerable overlap in the recording of incidents, which may be good news or bad news depending on interpretation. On the one hand, the overlap may serve as evidence that media repression actually occurred in the stated frequency and severity. Overlap then reflects the thoroughness with which the international organizations collect information on violations. On the other hand, the overlap could probably signal duplication between these seemingly disparate organizations, or even worse, reliance on the same field sources of information. The danger in this case is that the reported violations of press freedom could be but only a small proportion of the total violations in many countries.

The latter is unlikely, considering that most international media organizations have offices on all continents of the world and representatives or agencies in many countries. Amnesty International, for instance, claims to have agents in every country of the world. As such, it is submitted that the overlap is confirmation of rigor and exhaustiveness in data collection on the part of the international organizations, placing them in positions of knowledge on media repression issues. While it is

⁷ Considerable effort was put to ensuring that judgments about what a particular primary observation became when transferred into this dataset remained as consistent as possible.

impossible to collect *all* media repression incidents in *all* countries (see Bollen's (1993) 'reducing rectangles' argument as well as Figure 5.1 below), the reports compiled by these international organizations comprise a considerably high proportion of *all* events occurring in *all* countries.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE]

The use of multiple sources of observations has some problems, too. First, there are conflicts in terminology used to describe the repression. For example, "detaining" when used in reference to "taking media personnel into custody for question before any legal charges are filed" is quite distinct from the practice of "incarceration without trial" observed some African and Asian countries.⁸ In resolving this conflict, all reported incidents of "short-term detention" that preceded legal charges, citation, fines, probation, warning from authorities, or even release with no charges, are generally classified as "arrest/detention." Other forms of certain but indeterminate incarceration are broadly classified as "jailed."

Where a number of violations were reported in one country at the same time, they were recorded as a single occurrence only if they were intimately linked, for example, closing one media organization that publishes several newspapers or closing one broadcasting entity that owns several radio and/or television stations. The same case applies to violations involving a single government action such as reversal of prevailing press law. Otherwise, violations are treated as separate incidents for each media organization involved.

⁸ In many countries where "detention for questioning" and "detention without trial" are possible recourses for governments bent on repressing media, different legal statutes are invoked.

Data coding procedures

As stated earlier, the raw data was normally in the form of brief descriptions of each repression incident. While the descriptions differed in length and scope, they all contained the crucial details sought in this investigation: name of journalist or media institution repressed and information about the incident itself. Some summaries also reported the circumstances leading up to the repression; however, these were not coded because of the potentially high proportion of missing data. I did all the coding with the help of one independent coder. The independent coder was trained and given trial runs with data from 1993. Inter-coder reliability on that data was .93. Also, each of us maintained a journal of unusual events requiring some value judgment; no major discrepancies emerged in these journals.

Operationalizing media repression

Media repression is operationalized as actions by governments or political authorities against media personalities and/or media organizations engaged in coverage of topical issues.⁹ In keeping with this definition, a deliberate effort was taken to configure the indicators of media repression as continuous scales, ranging from low-impact repression strategies to high-impact repression strategies. Low-impact media repression consists of intimidation strategies and prevention strategies. Medium-impact repression includes legal strategies and injury strategies. High-impact personal repression comprises elimination strategies. Table 5.3 summarizes the

⁹ An intuitive approach is to consider media repression as an attempt to frustrate the unfettered production of media products. The perpetrators of repression would choose which factors or combination of factors of production - land (space), labor, capital and technology - to target. They may target labor (journalists and other media personnel), capital, technology and land. Here, journalists are perceived as components of media organizations rather than as sources of threat distinct from media institutions.

descriptions of the five indicators of media repression. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of each indicator.

[INSERT TABLE 5.3 ABOUT HERE]

Intimidation strategies

Intimidation strategies include verbal harassment, public accusations, threats and kidnappings. "Verbal harassment or public accusations" comprise public utterances by political notables generally accusing media personnel or organizations of irresponsible journalism.¹⁰ It also includes public actions by political regimes and their agents to intimidate, embarrass media organizations for its journalistic output, and/or to discourage a news organization from pursuing topical issues.¹¹

"Death threats" includes all reported incidents of death threats to journalists and/or their kin. These encompass threats made by such entities as political authorities, rebel groups, organized political groups and security personnel.¹²

"Abductions" are coded using a similar logic. "Home attacked/journalist forced to

¹⁰ Some typical examples of verbal harassment: On May 17 1993, Judge Oscar Rodriguez of Paraguay called a press conference to denounce seven journalists as "corrupt." On August 1, 1993, a reporter from the *Daily Nation* in Kenya covering a police raid on a printing plant was told: "Disappear, or we [will] come for you!" In the Indian state of Kashmir on April 17, 1996, the local government threatened legal action against any newspaper editor who published statements or any other "inflammatory" material by separatist leaders. And on November 13, 1996, in Belarus, the prime minister threatened two Russian television journalists with expulsions, calling them "enemies of the state."

¹¹ Some cases in point: On March 22, 1996, the Indonesian government issued a stern warning to *Pelita* newspaper for publishing articles claiming that local girls were being sexually exploited by tourists. On May 30, 1996, several HDZ leaders in Croatia issued a public statement vowing to sue *Globus* newspaper for "speculation and lies." In December 1996, the Ecuadorian president verbally attacked *Hoy* newspaper for publishing articles critical of his policies.

¹² There is a question of what really amounts to a death threat, because it is often communicated discreetly to its intended victim and can rarely be confirmed. One way of establishing authenticity is to look at the journalist's professional endeavor that precipitated the threat. As such, only those threat claims accompanied by reasons attributable to journalistic practice are considered in this analysis.

exile” is a variable that captures probably the most serious intimidation technique on journalists before the authorities resort to actual bodily harm. Indeed, this variable is unique in that it extends beyond an individual journalist to family members and other relations. Expectedly, this “generalization” of liability is intended to force journalists to view the ramifications of their actions in a wider context, one that includes innocent victims.

Prevention strategies

Under prevention strategies, “bar from travel, exit or entry” includes violations relating to denying journalists access to geographical areas and events as well as denial of free movement to, from or within certain geographical areas. “Accreditation denial and withdrawal” includes denials for both short term and long term journalistic practice.¹³ Prevention also includes “denial and control of inputs,” defined as refusal political regimes to approve requests by media organizations to import newsprint, film and other media inputs and/or attempts by regimes to influence a third party to curtail the availability of inputs to media organizations.¹⁴ Finally, prevention includes “confiscation of production material,” that is, impoundment of such materials as photographers’ films, printing plates, and reporters’ tapes and notebooks.¹⁵

¹³ Short-term accreditation allows coverage of episodic or regular events running for several days, e.g. major conferences and assemblies. Long-term accreditation is essentially a license to practice journalism over a predetermined time period, e.g., one year. It is quite possible that accreditation may be of local or foreign media. This study does not distinguish between local and foreign media accreditation because most occurrences recorded affected both sides.

¹⁴ For example, Algeria’s *El Watan* newspaper suspended production in April 1996 after its printers, responding to orders from the ministry of interior, refused to print editions. The newspaper had published stories revealing details of state complicity in massacres.

¹⁵ Press photographers are common victims of confiscation of films by authorities, especially when they are covering armed conflicts. Confiscation of films includes damaging used film rolls by “exposing” the film.

Legal strategies

Legal strategies broadly encompasses such issues as legal suits against journalists and media organizations; summonses to journalists or their organizations to appear before judicial, police, political or other authorities; and searches of journalists' or media organization's private property, irrespective of production or non-production of legitimate search warrants.¹⁶ Legal strategies also include financial penalties or instituting of formal charges against a press organization by government officials or other authorities.¹⁷ Notably, it is necessary to exclude any charges or penalties resulting from bona fide private litigation.¹⁸ License withdrawal or denial broadly encompasses all observations of withdrawal or denial of necessary operational government licensing to media organizations; and/or the introduction of new, austere regulations to which some or all media organizations must adhere.¹⁹

Arrests and detention encompass the placing of journalists into temporary custody by political authorities or their agents. It is recognized here that authorities in many countries have legal mandates to hold persons for a number of days before formal

¹⁶ Typical examples of searches include houses, cars and personal effects as well as body searches.

¹⁷ For example, the proceedings initiated in a Belarus commercial court against *Svaboda* by the country's state committee for the press on October 26, 1996. Also, on November 18, 1996, Slovak Television was ordered to pay US\$8,000 for allegedly broadcasting false information during interviews with the son of a political leader.

¹⁸ The difficulty of systematically measuring the authenticity of repressive action via-a-vis bona fide litigation is conceded. All cases included in this indicator were reported as attempts by government or political authorities to intimidate media organizations. However, it must be borne in mind that media institutions, like other business, are likely to attract heavy incidence of legal action that could seriously contaminate this indicator.

¹⁹ Two typical incidents: On October 28, 1987, the Malaysian government withdrew permits for three newspapers because their operations were "prejudicial to public order and national security." On December 4, 1987, it announced that the Home Minister had "absolute discretion" to ban any media organization deemed "likely to harm public opinion." The government also declared that publications must apply for a licensing permit each year. The declaration further stated that anyone found to "maliciously publish false news" was subject to

charges are filed or a mandatory release requirement is effected. But instances abound where people are held without trial for periods beyond those stipulated by law. To distinguish between the two situations, this indicator only records custody confinements of up to 72 hours. Incarceration beyond 72 hours is considered a more serious form of repression and scored as “jailing.”²⁰ “Jail” includes all incidents of detention (with and without trial) for more than 72 hours.²¹

Injury strategies

Within the category of injury strategies, “dismissal from job” records occurrences of firing of journalists for executing journalistic duties.²² “Attack/injure” represents all incidents of physical bodily harm on journalists by such entities as political authorities, organized political groups and security or military agents. Here again, it is important to stress that all incidents must be related to the victim’s journalistic

finances and imprisonment. And in February 1990, in Fiji, the government announced plans to amend the penal code to make libel a criminal, rather than civil, offense.

²⁰ It is normal legal procedure to limit the period that a person may be held in custody without charge. While this period varies across countries, it ranges from one to five days, hence 72 hours is a reasonable period to expect incarcerated journalists to be formally charged or released. However, it must be noted that arbitrary arrests and detention are some of the most widely used forms of personal repression. The main objective for such erratic incarceration is most probably to instill fear in journalists, and to make them realize their vulnerability to state or political power. For example, in November 1987, Odhiambo Okite of Voice of Kenya was held by police for three weeks and then released without charge. Yet during the period of Okite’s incarceration, five foreign journalists were arrested and released after three hours without charge.

²¹ For instance, on August 4, 1987, Reuters’ Paul Amina was picked up by police while covering a court case embarrassing to the Kenya government. He was held for 17 days without trial, before an official detention order (an indefinite incarceration in a maximum-security prison under National Security statutes) was issued. He was released in February 1988. This incident was coded as an imprisonment. (See earlier operational definition of “arrest/detain” for distinction.) And on August 13, 1990 in Egypt, a journalist with Al-Haqiqa, an Islamic weekly newspaper, was detained without trial under state-of-emergency provisions; he was released on October 1, 1990.

²² There is an imminent danger of including bona fide dismissals in this category since most raw data provide very brief descriptions of the violations. It is assumed that all incidents in this dataset were unrelated to a journalist’s professional ability and standing.

endeavor. Attacks on a journalist's relatives attributable to his/her professional undertakings are included here.²³

Injury strategies also include cases of external pressure to eliminate portions of journalistic products such as news articles, radio programs or television news clips. Also included here are incidents in which authorities preemptively seize copies of a publication to prevent or curtail mass circulation; suspend the broadcast of a radio or TV program, or publication of an edition of a news publication, all because of the details such journalistic products are purported to contain.²⁴

Elimination strategies

Killing of journalists is the highest form of media repression and is operationalized as all reported murders of journalists attributable to the victims' professional endeavors. Incidents of forced closure, damage to and take over of media organizations by agents of political authorities are also considered to be acts of elimination. This is because such acts could be fatal if the affected media organization lacked recourse. Outright bans on media products is also eliminatory because the ultimate result is that the media organization is forced to permanently closed down or its ownership and operations are taken over by the government. Ban orders may be issued against past, present and future publications or broadcasts.²⁵

²³ A typical case in point was the police beating of the wife of a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent in Minsk, Russia, on June 22, 1996. Her assailants then told her to go tell her husband.

²⁴ For example, on August 14, 1987, Nepalese authorities confiscated all issues of the *Saptahik Jana Jyoti* newspaper. On April 1987, in Israeli occupied territories, issues of *Al-Shaab* and *Al-Nahar* newspapers were confiscated because their editorial material had not been submitted to military censors prior to publication.

²⁵ A typical case in point: On April 21, 1989, the Kenya government declared the *Financial Review* a "prohibited publication," and directed the public to ban all past copies of the weekly publication. Note: the author had worked with *Financial Review* for three years at the time it

It is noteworthy that different forms of media repression sometimes occur concurrently.²⁶ In such instances, only the most serious repression - as measured by this the personal or organizational scales - in a string of events is coded.²⁷ The logic behind such coding is that the multiple penalties were motivated by one "journalistic crime." The same argument is applied when considering low-impact violations on groups of journalists.²⁸ Some exceptions, however, are made for the killing of journalists because of the seriousness nature of this crime; each murder is consider a violation in its own right and therefore coded separately.²⁹

Media repression patterns over time

Table 5.4 and Figures 5.2 to 5.8 show the distribution of media repression in 90 countries around the world over the period 1987 to 1996. Figures 5.2 and 5.3, summarizing repression across all the countries in the study, show all indicators of repression being highly dynamic. The dynamism is especially discernible if one

was proscribed. Also, on September 4, 1990, Ecuadorian president closed *Radio Sucre* after the station failed to prove allegations that his brother was involved in corrupt activities.

²⁶ Authorities bent on violating press freedom use a wide variety of methods, at times in combination. Consider this striking example: On May 28, 1996, Albanian journalist Bardhok Lala was arrested, interrogated, beaten and eventually dumped in a lake; he was rescued from drowning by passers-by!

²⁷ For example, Magdi Hussein, editor-in-chief of *Al-Shaab* in Egypt received a one-year sentence and a fine on January 31, 1996, for allegedly libeling the son of a government official; the incident was coded under the "jailed" variable. Similarly, Norvey Diaz, a program director for Radio Colina in Colombia, was killed on October 18 1996 after frequent death threats; the incident was coded under the "kill journalist" variable.

²⁸ For instance, on September 28, 1993, Russian police barred journalists from entering parliament buildings in Moscow in an effort to limit public access to information on the legislative assembly. Similarly, security personnel harassed a group of journalists on June 1, 1993, during anti-government demonstrations in Serbia. Both incidents were coded as single occurrences.

²⁹ The gruesome murders of five foreign journalists in Somalia on July 12, 1993, were treated as separate incidents. The killing of three journalists in a car bomb explosion outside their offices in Algiers, Algeria, on February 11, 1996, is treated as three separate killings, primarily because of the serious nature of the violation.

examines the repression data with the questions that inform the decision-making calculus discussed in Chapter 2. The questions are: To repress or not to repress? How severe the repressive action? What repression method to use? What frequency to administer the chosen method?³⁰

[INSERT TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE]

On whether or not to repress, Figures 5.2 shows a general rise in the incidence of media abuse during the 10-year period under review. Repression peaked in 1992 when nearly 1,200 incidents were reported. Notably, these annual incidents are more than one and a half times more than what was reported in 1987. A general decline is discernible in both forms of repression between 1992 and 1996, although both rose slightly between 1995 and 1996. One explanation for the seemingly lower levels of media repression in 1987 and 1988 is poor data collection techniques.³¹ Most of the international media organizations involved in fighting media repression began collecting data substantively after 1988.³² That the trend in sum appears constant over the 11-year period is a major disappointment for proponents of democratic reform who argue that the world has become democratic since the end of the cold war in

³⁰ These questions, while contextual, are mainly used to elicit some general patterns in the data. A complete analysis of the data and underlying patterns is carried out in Chapter 7.

³¹ Poe et al (1999:301-302) raise a similar argument in their analysis of data on human rights abuses collected by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency and Amnesty international.

³² The Committee to Protect Journalists began their annual series, *Attacks on the Press*, in 1987. The survey, however, adopted its current in-depth reporting of repressive incidents in 1990. Many local and regional media organizations in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America were founded in the early 1990s as byproducts of the global democratic overtures and the advent of electronic communication. In sum, there has been increased awareness and publicizing of media repression incidents during the 1990s.

1989. Indeed, the period 1990-93 was the worst for media repression over the period under review. One possible explanation already imputed by the hypotheses generated in earlier chapters is that increase in political conflicts results in increased media repression.

It is apparent that recorded incidents of media repression grew sharply between 1987 and 1990. One explanation, consistent with extant literature, is that the “wind of democracy” sweeping across much of the world during this period may have precipitated attacks on the media, (see, for example, M’Mbayo (2000) on Africa’s democratization). A second explanation is the increased recording and reporting of media repression events across the world as noted earlier. The repression incidents drop slightly between 1990 and 1991, before rising sharply again in 1992, another year of tumultuous political clamor around the world. There is slight drop in 1993, before repression “bottoms out” in 1995.

Legal and injury strategies are the most common methods of media repression, accounting for 31% and 28% of the total repression cases, respectively. Conversely, prevention strategies account for fewer than 7% of all the cases. Indeed, legal, injury and elimination strategies account for more than 80% of all repression. Injury and elimination strategies - the most severe options - together account for half of the cases. The implication here is that political regimes are generally twice as likely to use extremely punitive measures of media repression than light or cautionary measures. The apparent heavy-handedness is disconcerting, especially considering the gains recorded in democratization around the world during the period under review. These preliminary findings confirm the fears of media freedom lobby groups - for example, Committee to Protect Journalists and Freedom House - that which increased democracy around the world has not necessarily meant reduction in media repression.

The reduced utilization of low-impact strategies - intimidation and prevention strategies - requires further discussion. The two strategies account for less than 20% of all media repression incidents. While literature review asserts their primacy as indicators of media repression, political authorities appear to use them infrequently, a sharp contrast to the high penchant to arrest, attack and jail journalists, or impound, raid and ban media organizations.³³

One plausible explanation premised in extant literature is that media threat is considered extremely dangerous to the authorities' political survival, hence the need to quash such threat decisively and effectively. Another explanation is that some political regimes may be more predisposed to repress their media more severely than others. For sure, political authorities do not seem to respond in the same fashion to perceived media threat. This question, and others, is dealt with in subsequent sections.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE]

Figure 5.3 shows the cumulative count of media repression by region during the period under review. The incidence of media repression is greatest in Asia and Africa, and lowest in Europe. This is partly because there are proportionately more Asian and African countries in the dataset (see Table 5.6 for full listing). The relative use of strategies is similar for Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. Legal, injury and elimination strategies dominate for all regions except Latin America where intimidation strategies nearly match injury strategies as the preferred methods. These observations further

³³ It would be interesting to compare these observations with equivalent ones from such institutions as political parties, religious organizations and other interest groups that pose threats to political authorities. However, such excursions are outside the scope of this study.

reinforce my earlier preliminary observation that political regimes prefer medium to high-impact repression strategies.

Figures 5.4 to 5.8 illustrate the patterns of media repression across five major global regions - Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Western democracies.³⁴ Figure 5.4 shows a general increase in the annual media repression levels in Africa. Repression activities intensified between 1989 and 1992, before falling sharply in 1993. They increased marginally between 1994 and 1996. The figure also shows that African governments extensively employed legal and injury strategies in suppressing media. Elimination strategies are the third most preferred repression method, and often account for more than the intimidation and prevention strategies, the light-impact options - combined.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.4 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.5 ABOUT HERE]

Among Asian countries, media repression rises steadily between 1987 and 1990, as shown in Figure 5.5. The repressive activities drop in 1991 before peaking in 1992. They finally settle at below 1987 levels during the period 1993 to 1996. Legal and injury strategies emerge as the most preferred methods of repression, with elimination as the third choice. It is however important to note that elimination appears to decline after 1992.

Figure 5.6 shows a cyclical pattern in media repression in Latin America during the decade under review. Repression incidents rose sharply between 1987 and 1989,

³⁴ These regions are set out in general terms. See Table 5.6 for the full list of regions and their countries.

before falling in 1990. The incidents rise again between 1991 and 1993, and then gradually decline between 1994 and 1996. Unlike other regions, Latin America shows a considerable preference for intimidation strategies. Use of intimidation strategies appears to match that of legal strategies.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.6 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.7 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.8 ABOUT HERE]

A similar pattern is evident with the East European region. As Figure 5.7 shows, media repression activity was cyclical during the ten-year period. After falling slightly between 1987 and 1988, repression incidents rose sharply in 1989 and stayed up until 1992 when it fell nearly threefold. There is a sharp but short-lived surge in 1993. The main repression strategies appear to be injury, legal and elimination.

Figure 5.8 shows media repression patterns among Western democracies. Here, little repression is observed across the period under review. Although there is a general increase in reported cases between 1987 and 1992, the incidents appear to die out from 1993 to 1996. Notably, legal and injury appear to be the preferred methods of repression.

A final investigation examines the statistical correlation between the five indicators of media repression. Table 5.5 reports the Pearson correlations of the five indicators. All correlations are positive and between low and medium size. Legal, injury and elimination strategies show the strongest correlations, reinforcing my earlier argument that political regimes appear to favor combinations of these three repression strategies. The smallest correlations are observed between intimidation and

elimination strategies, suggesting that these two do not necessarily work in tandem. These observations support theoretical arguments that these indicators should be combined into a unidimensional scale.

[INSERT TABLE 5.5 ABOUT HERE]

In sum, this preliminary investigation shows that media repression happens in almost all areas of the world. During the 10-year period under study, political regimes were seen to prefer medium- and high-impact repression strategies to low-impact strategies. This is clearly evident in the high incidence of legal, injury and elimination strategies. It is noteworthy that elimination strategies, the worst form of media repression, appear to decline during the last three years of the period (1994 - 1996). Prevention and injury strategies rose initially and later settled back to their opening levels. Intimidation and legal strategies showed a general upward trend across the 10 years.

This preliminary investigation further demonstrates the importance of Media Repression Dataset, as a contribution to the political culture and media studies scholarship and as a new resource for empirical data analysis. The large number of repression incidents documented here and their broad character gives the dataset its *raison d'etre*. In the next section, I construct a scale of media repression from this raw data. The scale is important in preparing the data for use in subsequent empirical analysis.

Scaling media repression

So far in this chapter, media repression has been represented by five indicators. Considering the inter-relationships between these indicators highlighted above, it is

critical that I employ data reduction methods that would combine these indicators in a manner consistent with extant theory and retains the basic character of the dataset. Following the arguments made in Chapter 3 about the nature of media repression, I adopt an ordinal hierarchical scale that is a variant of Gibson (1997) and Barnes and Kaase (1979).³⁵ An ordinal scale is also preferred because it creates a single dependent variable that will be used in subsequent statistical analyses.³⁶

The strategy employed in creating the ordinal scale was to emulate a number of recent studies that use the democracy variable in the Polity IV dataset.³⁷ In my case, I created a new variable of media repression that combined the five indicators into a new six-point scale. The scale captures the most severe form of repression for the unit of analysis (country year), and is coded as shown in Table 5.6.

[INSERT TABLE 5.6 ABOUT HERE]

This operationalization was based on a number of assumptions. First, I assume that a hierarchy existed among the five indicators of both dimensions, whereby intimidation had the lowest ranking and elimination enjoyed the highest. The full

³⁵ The primary thesis of these arguments, captured by Lopez (1986:75), is that while governments' repression policies unfold in circumstances far more complex than simple challenges to their rule, the repressive action often "appears to be full decision in that it occurs as a choice within a particular setting and one weighted in light of other available choices." Other possibilities include Muller and Seligson's (1994) where a average country rankings are converted into a percentage scale and a mean score taken for two ten-year periods. Another suitable method is in Benson and Kugler (1998). Here, data is scored on a five-point scale and then squared to create a 25-point scale. Benson and Kugler argue that the squaring, while atheoretical, enhances linearity and isolates outlier observations.

³⁶ This study also investigated the use of a factor analysis in scaling media repression. The results were not sufficiently robust for inclusion.

³⁷ Polity IV has a democracy and autocracy variable, each measured on a 10-point scale. The democracy variable purports to measure the general openness of political institutions. The autocracy score purports to measure the general closedness of political institutions. Many researchers, following Jagers and Gurr (1995), often compute a new democracy measure by combining the two variables to create a 21-point dummy variable (-10 to +10). The autocracy values would then be -10 to -1, while the democracy values are +1 to 10.

ranking - from low to high repression - is intimidation, prevention, legal action, injury and elimination. Second, I assume that political regimes could use any of the five repression options depending on the threat perceived. This supposes that regimes do not repress media if no threat is perceived.

Several points are worth noting at this juncture. First, the new scale captures the element of severity of repressive actions. Hence, the scale moves from no repression (0) to high repression (5). This is important, given this study's emphasis on exploring under what circumstances political regimes repress media. Second, the new scale only captures the highest level of media repression recorded in a particular year.

Table 5.7 shows distribution of the new scale across the data set over the full ten-year period. The incidents are reported against the six-point scale of the new measure of media repression. The table reconfirms my earlier observations that most of the incidents were in the medium- to high-impact repression methods.

[INSERT TABLE 5.7 ABOUT HERE]

Validity analysis of media repression

Validity refers to whether and how well an item actually measures what it purports to measure, and the extent to which it measures some other trait (see Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). A measure is said to be contaminated with measurement error if it is tapping a trait it does not purport to measure. The dependent variable operationalized above from the media repression dataset appears to have a high face validity. Face or content validity refers to the use of concept operationalizations to determine if one is really measuring the concept one purports to measure. As constructed, media repression is a unidimensional concept that broadly

captures the full spectrum of repression from low-impact to high-impact repressive activities.

One useful approach to understanding the validity of the dependent variable is to compare it to popular measures of political repression. The data sets selected for this comparison were the Amnesty International annual human rights index, the Freedom House's political and civil rights, the U.S. State Department's annual country reports, and the Van Belle's annual press freedom data set. Although the four have some measurement problems as noted in Chapter 3, they all claim to measure political repression.³⁸

[INSERT TABLE 5.8 ABOUT HERE]

Bivariate correlation coefficients between my ordinal media repression scale and four repression indices for 1987 and 1994 are reported in Table 5.8. The high correlations between Van Belle's dataset and the Freedom House Press Freedom Dataset is attributable to the fact that the two datasets have a very similar coding system. Van Belle and Oneal (1998) point out that for the period 1980-1989, the two data sets were identical for in 94.1% of the cases. The high correlation between the US State Department and the Amnesty International data has been noted in Chapter 2 and attributed to similarities in construction of their repression scale.

It is observed that my new media repression variable shows moderate but statistically significant correlations with the four datasets. Considering that each of these five scales include some items to measure media repression, the significant and

³⁸ Taylor and Jodice's *World Handbook of Social Indicators* was not used because it is only available through 1983. The Freedom House was coded for the 10-year period, while the State Department and Amnesty International data were available from 1987 and 1994. These data

positive correlation coefficients suggest that the new media repression measure is tapping well into some aspect of repression. This is evidence of good convergent validity. It is also noteworthy that these coefficients are moderate in size, hence the shared variance between my variable and the other scales is limited. This points to discriminant validity, because it shows that the new variable is tapping into variance not tapped by other political repression scales. In all, these findings confirm that my unidimensional measure of media repression is valid.

Conclusion

This chapter introduces the Media Repression Dataset. It discusses the dataset's basic design as well as the operationalization of its five indicators. This discussion is considered pertinent because the dataset's creation was a major component of this dissertation's research. A preliminary analysis of the indicators reveals that media repression was most commonly observed on the medium- and high-impact repression methods, namely, legal, injury and elimination strategies. The analysis also showed that use of elimination strategies was generally declining while the use of intimidation and legal strategies was on the increase.

This pattern was repeated when I created a unidimensional scale that capture the most severe repressive actions taken by political regimes during any given year. The new scale displayed high content validity when compared to two common political repression scales and two press freedom scales. Against this, I save the new variable as the dependent variable of the study and reserve it for analysis in subsequent chapters.

were coded in accordance with measurement methods developed in Poe and Tate (1994). Van Belle's data was available for the period 1948-1994.

Table 5.1: List of countries in the Media Repression dataset

<p>Africa Algeria Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Congo Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Ivory Coast Kenya Lebanon Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe</p>	<p>Western Democracies Australia Austria Belgium Canada France Greece Ireland Japan Spain United Kingdom USA</p> <p>Latin America Argentina Bolivia Botswana Chile Colombia Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela</p>	<p>Eastern Europe Albania Azerbaijan Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania Poland Romania Russia Tajikistan</p> <p>Asia Bangladesh China Egypt India Indonesia Israel Jordan Lebanon Malaysia Nepal Pakistan Philippines Republic of Korea Saudi Arabia Singapore Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand Turkey</p>
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Table 5.2 Media organizations documenting media repression around the world

Organization	Region of operation
Article 19	Global
Asociación para la Defensa del Periodismo Independiente	Argentina
Burkinabe Movement of Human Rights and Peoples	Burkina Faso
Canadian Committee to Protect Journalists	Canada
Committee to Protect Journalists	Global
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights	Egypt
Federacao Nacional Dos Journalistas Profesionais	Brazil
Freedom House Press Freedom Project	Global
Freedom of Expression Institute	Global
Hong Kong Journalists Association	Asia
Human Rights Watch	Global
Index on Censorship	Global
International Federation of Journalists	Global
International Federation of Newspaper Publishers	Global
International Freedom of Expression Exchange	Global
International Journalism Center	Nigeria
International Press Institute	Global
Media Foundation for West Africa	West Africa
Media Institute of Kenya	Kenya
Media Institute of South Africa	Southern Africa
Médias Pour La Paix	West Africa
PEN American Center	United States
PEN Canada	Canada
Reporters sans Frontières	Global
The West African Journalists Association	West Africa
UNESCO	Global
World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters	Global

Table 5.3 Indicators of media repression

Indicator	Description
Intimidation strategies	Verbal harassment, public accusations against journalist or media organization; abductions, kidnappings, disappearances of journalists; death threats, and home attacks on journalist or forcing journalist into exile.
Prevention Strategies	Journalist barred from travel or exit/entry of geographical area; denial/withdrawal of journalist's accreditation; denial/control of media production inputs; confiscation of production material
Legal strategies	Legal charges, summonses against journalists; house searches, arrests, detention, jailing of journalists; legal charges, fine, searches of media organizations; Withdrawal or denial of business license; new regulations against media operations
Injury strategies	Journalist dismissed from work, attacked, injured; publication or program censored, suspended, impounded
Elimination strategies	Journalist killed; media organization's offices shut, raided, damaged; medium banned, taken over

Figure 5.1: Bollen's 'reducing rectangle' theory




Table 5.4 Summary of media repression, 1987-1997

	Intimidation strategies	Prevention strategies	Legal strategies	Injury strategies	Elimination strategies	Total
1987	58	68	221	198	200	745
1988	75	57	246	234	208	820
1989	122	71	370	292	193	1048
1990	107	78	373	311	261	1130
1991	143	68	327	250	228	1016
1992	123	76	294	410	296	1199
1993	143	40	238	227	219	867
1994	94	47	239	253	181	814
1995	84	47	254	206	160	751
1996	104	55	246	210	155	770
	1053	607	2808	2591	2101	9160

Figure 5.2: Media repression in 90 countries, 1987-96




Figure 5.3: Media repression in 90 countries by region, 1987-96




Figure 5.4: Media repression in African countries, 1987-96




Figure 5.5: Media repression in Asian countries, 1987-96




Figure 5.6: Media repression in Latin American countries, 1987-96




Figure 5.7: Media repression in East European countries, 1987-96




Figure 5.8: Media repression in Western Democracies, 1987-96




Table 5.5: Bivariate correlations between the indicators of media repression

	Intimidation	Prevention	Legal	Injury	Elimination
Intimidation	1.00				
Prevention	.41***	1.00			
Legal	.35***	.57***	1.00		
Injury	.37***	.46***	.41***	1.00	
Elimination	.32***	.37***	.61***	.58***	1.00

N = 900

*** p < .001 (one-tailed)

** p < .01 (one-tailed)

Table 5.6: Coding of hierarchical single dimension dependent variable

Repressive action	Scale
No repression reported	0
Most severe repressive action is intimidation	1
Most severe repressive action prevention	2
Most severe repressive action is legal	3
Most severe repressive action is injury	4
Most severe repressive action is elimination	5

Table 5.7: Distribution of media repression by score across 90 countries, 1987-96

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	Total
0	26	27	18	16	15	11	17	21	12	19	182
1	3	2	0	0	1	1	2	2	0	1	12
2	4	0	1	2	0	1	2	1	1	2	14
3	6	6	9	11	13	12	13	8	9	10	97
4	18	22	23	21	26	21	17	20	27	20	215
5	33	33	39	40	35	44	39	38	41	38	380
Total	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	900

Table 5.8: Bivariate correlation between human rights datasets

	1	2	3	4	5
Amnesty International (1)	1.00				
Freedom House (2)	.42*** (599)	1.00			
US State Dept. (3)	.84*** (599)	.47*** (599)	1.00		
Van Belle (4)	.40** (604)	.81** (604)	.47*** (599)	1.00	
Media Repression (5)	.37*** (599)	.45*** (900)	.33*** (599)	.33*** (604)	1.00

N in parenthesis

*** p < 0.001 (one-tailed)

** p < 0.01 (one-tailed)

Chapter 6

Data Analysis

Introduction

The preceding chapters discussed the design and measurement of the variables used in this study. This chapter collates and discusses the results from a wide range of data analyses that test the hypotheses of the study. Generally, the hypotheses are that factors promoting perceptions of threat are the principal causes of media repression. Such factors may be direct (themselves contributing to the threat perception) or indirect (contributing primarily to the creation of circumstances that stoke threat). The factors are presented in two categories, namely, political variables and economic/socio-cultural variables. Each of these categories is expected to shed unique light into the causal and associative nature of media repression.

This chapter opens with a discussion of the estimation strategies to be employed. It uses the classical regression theory as its main point of departure to establish the case for use of cross sectional time series estimation techniques. In making this case, I also outline a strategy developed by Beck and Katz (1995) to eliminate autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in cross-sectional time series data. Using theory and research reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4, I generate the hypotheses of the study and specify the models to be estimated. Thereafter, I conduct extensive analyses and discussion of the results from the estimation of media repression models.

Data preparation was done in Microsoft Excel (Office 2000 edition), SPSS (Version 7.5 for Windows) and Stata 7. However, the bulk of data analyses was done in Stata 7.

Estimation strategies

As already noted, the statistical models of this study are estimated with cross sectional time-series data. Allison (1990, 1994) Beck and Katz (1995), Greene (1997, 2000), Hanushek and Jackson (1977), Judge et al (1988), Kennedy (1994), Markus et al. (1979), Sayrs (1989), and Stimson (1985) offer detailed discussions of the development and efficacy of pooled time series data. Essentially, time series analysis is an extension of Gauss-Markov models and ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques.¹ It comprises analyses of one unit observed at several time points, usually at some regular intervals. When time series for several units are combined, a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set is the result.² Pooled data allows analysts to examine the cross-sectional and cross-temporal variations in the dependent variable, while still maintaining asymptotic properties.³ In this context, independent variables are used to explain differences between observations as well as changes within one observation over time.

¹ As Markus (1979:18) points out, while Gaussian-Markov models are good in explaining dynamic process, they do not explain why individuals change over time. They also have a limited ability to deal with measurement error. See Berry (1993) and Lewis-Beck (1980) for detailed discussion of OLS assumptions.

² In a pooled time series, variables in each of the n units are observed in the same t time periods. Also, data are organized so each unit has t_i records, where t_j is the number of waves of individual i , so that the total number of records in the analysis is $\sum t_i$. All observations may have the same number of t points, yielding a balanced time series. Balanced and unbalanced time series demand different estimation methods.

³ See Kennedy (1994:9-41) for a discussion of the asymptotic properties: asymptotic efficiency and asymptotic consistency. Generally speaking, when $\text{plim } \hat{\beta} = \beta$, then $\hat{\beta}$, as number of cross-section units and/or time periods approach infinity, is said to be consistent.

Beck and Katz (1995) and Greene (1997) detail the strengths and weaknesses of pooled time series. Needless to say, pooled analyses must satisfy OLS assumptions of error terms with constant variance and that are not correlated. Beck and Katz (1995), Greene (1997) and Stimson (1985) discuss the effects of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation on panel data. They propose the use of generalized least squares (GLS) estimators, primarily because of their sound asymptotic properties when dealing with large samples. With small samples, however, GLS procedures have been found to underestimate the standard errors of coefficients and could yield misleading inferences.⁴ In such circumstances, Beck and Katz recommend the use of OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) because these remain robust even in the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. In data sets where the time periods are less than observations ($T < N$), Greene (1997: 667) argues that it is preferable to use pooled OLS and make appropriate correction of the asymptotic covariance matrix. Greene (1997:648-698) and Whitten and Harvey (1999) extend the Beck-Katz technique of panel-robust standard errors by correcting for any possible misspecification.⁵

Hypothesis of the study

From the discussions in Chapter 3 and 4, it is clear that both contemporaneous and lagged explanations have been used to account for political repression and related forms of human rights violations. Several causes and correlates of media repression exist in extant literature (for example, Nixon 1960, 1965; Lowenstein 1966a, 1966b,

⁴ Indeed, in small samples Beck and Katz (1995) prefer OLS standard errors to those produced by FGLS.

1967, 1976). Others may be found in the broad human rights literature, because media repression is generally treated as part of the broad political repression phenomena. This section discusses the specific nature of these explanatory variables and the logic of their relationship to media repression. The section also generates the hypotheses of the study.

It should be emphasized that the explanations being considered here have been found significant in various general studies of political repression but have never been tested for their impact on media repression. After extensive literature searches, no systematic studies of media repression were found. As such, I include as many of the explanatory variables from the general repression studies as allowed by availability of data as independent variables. The inclusion is premised on the well-supported position adopted in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 that media repression is indeed a component of the general political repression.

In keeping with a number of previous studies (for example, Regan 1995; Davenport 1995, 1996), I organize my hypotheses and their respective explanatory variables into four categories, namely, (1) political processes and institutions, (2) political conflict, (3) economic, (4) and socio-cultural variables. For expediency, I estimate only one political model, and one economic and socio-cultural model. After the first multivariate estimates, I retain all statistically significant variables and combine the two models. I then conduct multivariate tests on the combined model. I again retain the significant variables from the combined model and estimate finally them as a final parsimonious model of media repression.

⁵ See Appendix F for an algebraic exposition of the Beck-Katz, Green and Harvey-Gabel approaches.

As stated above, the first set of explanatory variables is the political variables. As discussed in Chapter 3, democratic processes and institutions inhibit systematic abuse of citizens, primarily because they are responsive and receptive to bargain and compromise (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Regan 1995). Democratic institutions provide officially legitimate channels of espousing and organizing dissent, and reduce the incentives for democratic leaders to stifle dissent. Democratic processes and institutions also limit a regime's ability to use repression because citizens may use elections to punish heavy-handed leaders (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1999). From these theoretical expositions, I generate the following hypotheses to test the relationship between democratic processes and institutions and media repression.

H₁: Degree of democratization is negatively associated with media repression.

H₂: Openness of executive recruitment is negatively associated with media repression.

H₃: Degree of regulation of political participation is negatively associated with media repression.

The second set of explanatory variables relate to the use of media repression and other forms of political repression to keep down political and economic costs. As enunciated in Chapter 2, a perceived increase in political costs raises the specter of repression (Davenport 1997; Regan and Henderson 2002). Governments and political regimes will repress to stamp out activities with high political costs, for example, widespread violence, riots, strikes and anti-government demonstrations. Economic transactions costs also have negative consequences for political repression (see

below). Governments and political regimes are also expected to repress when they perceive actions that threaten their immediate survival, for example, revolutions, assassinations and guerilla activities (Davenport, 1997, 1999; Ghate et al. 2002). From this extant theory, I generate the following hypotheses:

H₄: Riots are positively associated with media repression

H₅: General strikes are positively associated with media repression

H₆: Anti-government demonstrations are positively associated with media repression

H₇: Assassinations are positively associated with media repression

H₈: Guerilla warfare is positively associated with media repression

H₉: Revolutions are positively associated with media repression

H₁₀: Governmental crises are positively associated with media repression

The third set of explanatory variables is the economic variables. As already explained in Chapter 2, governments and political regimes will repress to keep down economic transactions costs (James and Oneal 1991). Typical ways in which higher economic transaction costs manifest themselves include poor economic performance, governmental crises, increased inflation, and currency instability. These are expected to have a positive association with repression. A number of studies have also found a negative association between economic development and political repression (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Pritchard 1988; Burkhart 2002). The logic of this relationship is that increased economic development provides for basic human needs, creating a more acceptable human rights situation (Park 1987; Davenport 1995; Poe et al. 1999). Consequently, I generate the following hypotheses:

H₁₁: Inflation is positively associated with media repression

H₁₂: Exchange rate stability is negatively associated with media repression

H₁₃: Economic growth is negatively associated with media repression

H₁₄: Economic development is negatively associated with media repression

Socio-cultural variables are the fourth and final set of explanatory variables. As earlier stated, rapid population growth increases stress on national resources, leading to increased repression (Henderson 1992; Poe and Tate 1994). Increased urbanization brings people together, thereby reducing the costs of dissent. To this extent, urbanization increases the specter of repression (Park 1987). Also raising the specter of repression are media penetration and literacy. These two lower the costs of dissent by improving the efficiency of information distribution (Kurzman et al. 2002). To capture these relationships, I generate the following hypotheses:

H₁₅: Population is positively associated with media repression

H₁₆: Population growth is positively associated with media repression

H₁₇: Urbanization is positively associated with media repression

H₁₈: Media penetration is positively associated with media repression

H₁₉: Literacy is positively associated with media repression

Testing the determinants of media repression

This section discusses the findings from the estimation of three equations. The first equation examines the impact of political institutions and political conflict variables

on media repression. The second equation investigates the impact of economic and sociocultural variables on media repression. The third is a combined model of media repression that examines the effect of all the variables considered in the first two equations.

Table 6.1 presents the general cross-sectional time series model and the equations of the first two models. The equations of the third model, derived after the first two are analyzed, will be presented together with that analysis. I employ a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of each model to eliminate serial correlation of the errors. The 10-year series thus becomes a nine-year series to accommodate the lag variable. Due to the nature of the data for both the dependent and independent variables, the data are not balanced.⁶

[INSERT TABLE 6.1 ABOUT HERE]

Political model of media repression

Table 6.2 presents the cross-sectional OLS results with panel-corrected standard errors for the 11 political variables and the lagged media repression variable. The results are generally consistent with previous research and the variables together explain 26% of the total variance. All coefficients are in the anticipated directions, and seven variables are statistically significant. These are lagged media repression, democracy, regulation of participation, revolutions, riots, anti-government demonstrations and assassinations.

[INSERT TABLE 6.2 ABOUT HERE]

Lagged media repression has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. This suggests that contemporaneous repression includes a component of previous repressive activities. This lag effect is investigated further in subsequent sections of this chapter.

The democracy coefficient is in the anticipated direction and statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The negative coefficient suggests that improvements in democracy are important in reducing media repression. This finding is consistent with previous research (for example, Davenport 1999) suggesting that democracy leads to the removal of negative sanctions and more facilitative governance.

Open executive recruitment has no statistically significant effect on the repression of journalists. While this is bad news for the media, it is in line with topical observations that the development of political leadership does not necessarily mean an end to media repression.

Regulation of participation - the development of institutional structures for political expression - has a negative coefficient, significant at the $p < .05$ level. This is consistent with extant political repression theory that the development of institutional structures for political expression reduces media repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Regan 1995; Davenport 1996).

Revolutions have a positive coefficient that is significant at the $p < .001$ level. This finding suggests that revolutions (comprising successful or failed armed rebellions and *coup d'etats*) have a detrimental effect on media independence. As Gurr (1986)

⁶ A number of tests were conducted to determine whether there was need to control for region. These tests showed that region was not a significant determinant of changes in media repression.

argues, political regimes struggling to hold on to power, or to re-establish control, will be more likely to repress social institutions, including the media.

Three political conflict variables - riots, anti-government demonstrations and assassinations - report small positive coefficients that are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The direction of the coefficients is consistent with previous research that suggests political regimes are more repressive when confronted by credible challenge (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Davenport 1995; Regan 1995)

One explanation for this finding relates to the variables' role in accentuating threat perception by political regimes. All three variables can be characterized as posing credible challenges to governments. Considering the variables' high potential to undermine political legitimacy of incumbents, one can expect that regime responses to challenge increase as the challenge intensifies. Reports of such activities can amplify the voices of dissent and illustrate the weakness of the political regime, thereby providing incentives to repress the media directly.

The failure of general strikes, government crises and guerilla warfare to have a significant impact in the model implies that while the three variables may be pertinent in predicting other types of political repression, they do not specifically media repression once other political variables are taken into account. The hypotheses of positive association between media repression and these three variables (H_5 , H_8 and H_{10}) are rejected and they are excluded from subsequent analyses. The remaining six variables - democracy, regulation of participation, riots, anti-government demonstrations, assassinations and revolutions - are retained for further analyses in subsequent sections.

The economic and sociocultural model of media repression

Table 6.3 presents the results of the OLS regression (with panel corrected standard errors) of media repression on economic and sociocultural variables. The multivariate regression model presented here tests the nine hypotheses about the relationship between media repression and economic and socio-cultural variables. All the coefficients are in the expected theoretical direction and the model explains 24.7% of the total variance. Lagged media repression, economic development, population, urbanization, media penetration and exchange rate stability are the main explicators of media repression.

[INSERT TABLE 6.3 ABOUT HERE]

As in the previous model, lagged repression has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. My previous explanation about past repression applies here, too. Contemporaneous repression appears to include elements of past repressive activities. Concomitantly, elements of contemporaneous repression also appear to persist into the future. I investigate this persistence and other features of lagged media repression in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Economic development has a negatively signed coefficient that is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. Expanding a country's economic development appears to reduce media repression. The finding is consistent with recent studies that report a statistically significant negative association between economic development and human rights violations (for example, Burkhart 2002). It may also be the case that economic development enhances other conditions not included here - like people's

attitudes towards government and their country - leading to reduced media repression.

Media penetration is another pertinent explanatory variable in the model, emerging with a positive association with media repression. This is consistent with my expectations that, other things constant, an increase in media penetration could lead to higher media repression as political regimes perceive the reduced costs of dissent as threat. A simpler explanation for this finding is that an increase in media penetration generally implies that there are more media personnel and institutions to be repressed. The finding on media penetration is accorded further attention in the next section.

Population and urbanization post consistently small positive coefficients with high statistical significance (at the $p < .001$ level). This finding makes numbers of people an issue in the discussion of media repression. Considering arguments made in preceding chapters, it is clear that increased number of people put pressure on available national resources, create multiple critical masses with the potential of challenging political regimes in many new ways. This, in turn, raises the specter of increased popular participation, and forms the basis of a formidable public sphere in which political and social discourse happens (Henderson 1992; Poe and Tate 1994). Increased population and urbanization increase the media's chances of repression by political regimes.

Exchange rate stability reported a small negative coefficient with a weak statistical significance (at the $p < .05$ level). This finding is consistent with my expectations that increases in exchange rate stability will signal dampening of media repression. The size of this effect will be considered later.

Four explanatory variables - literacy, inflation, annual GDP growth rate and annual population growth rate - have coefficients that are not statistically significant when other variables are taken into account. As with the non-significant political variables, an explanation for this may be found in revisiting my earlier conceptualization of political repression as an aggregation of various types of repression. It is possible that these four variables could be significant for political repression more generally, but not media repression specifically.

I reject the hypotheses associated with these variables - H_{11} , H_{13} , H_{16} and H_{19} - and remove them from subsequent analyses. I retain five variables - economic development, population, exchange rate, urbanization and media penetration - for further analyses in the next section.

A combined model of media repression

In this section, I combine the political and economic models to create a single model of media repression. From the foregoing multivariate analysis, six political variables and five economic and socio-cultural variables emerged as statistically significant predictors of media repression. I also include a lagged media repression term. I re-estimate the new combined model with these variables and summarize the results in Table 6.4.

[INSERT TABLE 6.4 ABOUT HERE]

Of the 12 variables entered, nine are statistically significant and in the right direction. The combined model explains 30% of the total variance. Lagged media repression, democracy, regulation of participation, assassinations, revolutions,

population, economic development, exchange rate levels and media penetration are the main explicators in the model, with coefficients that are statistically significant.

Riots, anti-government demonstrations and urbanization have coefficients that are not statistically significant and will be excluded from further analyses. The fact that they were significant in the separate political and economic models, but not in the combined model, suggests that they share common variance.⁷

Looking at the remaining explanatory variables, a decrease in media repression is associated with increases in economic development, levels of democracy and regulation of participation. On the other hand, increases in media repression are associated with increases in revolutions, assassinations, population, exchange rate levels, and media penetration.

A general pattern is also discernible on the relative importance of political variables vis-à-vis the economic and socio-cultural variables. Three of the four political variables - democracy, regulation of participation and revolutions - in the combined model are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. In contrast, only one economic variable - media penetration - is significant at the $p < .001$ level. This observation suggests that political variables are relatively more important in predicting media repression. A plausible explanation is that political variables are more important in predicting media repression in the short-term than the long term. Conversely, economic and socio-cultural variables appear to be better predictors in the long-term than in the short term.

⁷ Riots and anti-government demonstrations had a high inter-correlation (.66). Both remained statistically insignificant even after the other variable excluded from the model.

A parsimonious model of media repression

The final set of equations investigates the combined effects of lagged repression, political variables and economic and socio-cultural variables on media repression. Since parsimony is a goal of this study, I only examine those nine explanatory variables that were statistically significant in the combined model discussed above. The general equation of the parsimonious model appears as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Media repression} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Lagged media repression}_{(t-1),i} + \beta_2 \text{Democracy}_{it} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Regulation of participation}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Assassinations}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Revolutions}_{it} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{Population}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Economic development}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Exchange rate}_{it} \\ & + \beta_9 \text{Media penetration}_{it} + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Table 6.5 summarizes the results of the parsimonious model.⁸ All explanatory variables are significant and in the expected direction. The model explains 30% of the total variance, which is the same as the variance explained by the combined model above. However, the parsimonious model reports lower standard errors for nearly all its variables. This implies that the parsimonious model achieves better results than the combined model while employing fewer exogenous variables. In the remainder of this chapter, I provide a more detailed examination of this model.

[INSERT TABLE 6.5 ABOUT HERE]

Understanding lagged media repression

As expected, past repression is still an important explicator, primarily because political regimes may be predisposed to use mechanisms of political control that they

⁸ The beta coefficients are: lagged media repression (.28), democracy (-.18), regulation of participation (-.16), assassinations (.05), revolutions (.12), population (.15), economic development (-.08), exchange rate instability (-.08), and media penetration (.16).

have employed before. Knowledge gained from previous political repression as well as general econometrics research suggests that my lagged media repression variable does not dominate the parsimonious model.⁹ This finding suggests that the model has adequate flexibility that allows media repression to remain a function of contemporaneous factors and not just the lagged effect. The reported lagged repression coefficient of .26 implies that about one quarter of the impact of contemporaneous exogenous shocks would carry over to next year.

(INSERT TABLE 6.6 ABOUT HERE]

I also estimated the effects of accumulated lags. Table 6.6 summarizes the impact of distributed lag terms on media repression.¹⁰ The lag terms are statistically significant for the first two years only. For the second year, the coefficient is small, suggesting that the impact of media repression diminished rapidly. That the third and fourth year lag terms are not statistically significant implies that the lag effect on media repression is fairly short-lived.

The distributed lag effect is reconfirmed in Table 6.7, which summarizes the results of the full parsimonious model estimated together with the lag terms. The parameter estimates remain at just about their previous levels (as in Table 6.5), and the new model also explains 29% of the total variance, slightly lower than the previous

⁹ In a number of recent studies (for example, Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Zanger 2000), the value of the lagged repression coefficient ranged between .60 and .73, indicating that a unit change in past repression would have a major change in contemporaneous repression, all other things being held constant. The size of the lagged media coefficient in my study is moderate and consistent with that reported by Davenport (1995) and Burkhart (2002). It suggests that a unit change in past media repression has only a moderate impact on contemporaneous media repression.

estimation. Notably, only the first year lag term attains statistical significance. This finding reconfirms my earlier observation that the effect of lagged media repression is short-lived.

(INSERT TABLE 6.7 ABOUT HERE]

It is noteworthy that lack of strong effects for further lags is evidence that measurement error is not a serious problem in the model, assuming that the correct model is such that current values are a function of values at time $t-1$, but not earlier values as long as values at time $t-1$ are adequately controlled. With a great deal of measurement error in lag scores at time $t-1$, there would be an artifactually significant coefficient for earlier values. As shown in Table 6.6, I observe a significant coefficient for time $t-2$, which is small, and lag values for earlier years are not significant. This confirms that measurement error in the lagged dependent variable is not a serious problem.

Assessing magnitude and independent effects of explanatory variables

The magnitude and independent effects of the other explanatory variables offer insights into the nature of media repression. While no direct comparisons of the unstandardized regression coefficients may be made, a discussion of the independent effect of each explanatory variable, holding other things constant, is useful. Such discussion must be done within the context of how each explanatory variable is conceptualized and measured.¹¹

¹⁰ While the equation estimating the distributed lags excludes other explanatory variables in the model, it is nevertheless important in illustrating the impact of the distributed lag.

¹¹ See Appendix C for a full discussion of the independent variables.

- Democracy is negatively associated with media repression, suggesting that more democracy will lead to reductions in media repression.¹² Considering this relationship and the -.04 coefficient reported in the parsimonious model, it appears that a maximum possible change in democracy during a single year (from 0 to 20) would result in .80 reduction in media repression for that year, other things being held constant.¹³
- Regulation of participation - the development of institutional structures for political expression - is measured on a five-point scale from 0 to 5. The variable has a negative statistically significant association with media repression. Considering the reported coefficient of -.24, it appears that a maximum change in regulation of participation would result in a 1.2 unit reduction in media repression, other things remaining constant.
- Revolutions represent actual or abortive rebellions to change top political elite, and are measured by a continuous variable with a minimum and maximum of 0 and 3, respectively. The variable has a positive and statistically significant association

¹² Democracy is a 21-point scale ranging from -10 to +10 created from subtracting autocracy from democracy in the Polity IV dataset (See Appendix C for further details). I followed Regan and Henderson (2002) and recoded the democracy scores to zero by adding 10 to each score, thereby eliminating the negative values. The new scale created ranges from 0 to 20, as opposed to -10 to +10 on the old scale.

¹³ I tested this variable for nonlinear relationship with media repression, in keeping with arguments by Fein (1995) Regan and Henderson (2002) that the relationship between repression and democracy is curvilinear. Following Regan and Henderson (2002) I created a new variable that was the square of democracy ($democracy^2$) to capture the democracy's two extremes, very low democracy (autocracy) and very high democracy (full democracy). Upon re-estimating the model, the coefficient for the basic democracy variable (democracy) turned positive while that of quadratic term ($democracy^2$) took a negative sign. Both terms remained statistically significant. The rest of the model was only affected marginally, except for regulation of participation, which lost statistical significance. The explanation for these findings is that both democracies and autocracies experience low levels of media repression while semi-democracies experience high media repression levels. A cautionary about this particular procedure is that it introduces multicollinearity into the model because the basic and quadratic democracy terms are highly correlated. I also followed Davenport (1995) and created separate

with media repression. With other things constant, one coup attempt, for example, will result in a .41 unit increase in media repression.

- Assassinations are measured on a continuous scale, with a minimum and maximum of 0 and 15, respectively. The variable has a statistically significant positive relationship with media repression. The coefficient of .08 suggests that it would take about 13 assassinations in a given year to increase media repression by one unit, *ceteris paribus*.
- Population, measured using a natural log transformation, has positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The reported coefficient of .02 in the parsimonious model suggests that the difference between the smallest (log value is 6.6) and the largest populations (log value is 14) of countries in my sample would increase media repression by 1.7 units.
- Media penetration is a scale created through a factor analysis of four media variables. The parsimonious model reports a coefficient of .34 between media penetration and media repression. This suggests that over the maximum range of scores observed (-2.3 to 2.6), penetration of media would be associated with an increase of 1.5 units in media repression.¹⁴

sub-datasets for countries with low and high democracy rankings. The findings did not support nonlinearity as democracy as a small negative coefficient that is not statistically significant.

¹⁴ Considering that there is an overrepresentation of African countries in the model, all of which have low media penetration levels, I conducted additional tests on the effect of media penetration on media repression. First, I tested the variable for a non-linear association with media repression. To do this, I followed Regan and Henderson (2002) and created a new variable that was the square of media penetration (media penetration²) to capture the variable's low and high values separately. As stated above, one disadvantage of such an interactive estimation is the preponderance of multicollinearity. While the results were not unequivocal, they indicated that low media penetration was positively associated with media repression, while high media penetration was negatively associated with media repression. Second, following Davenport (1995), I divided the dataset into African and non-African countries and re-estimated the equation. For the African sub-dataset, media penetration was positively associated with media repression with a coefficient of .37 (statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level). This suggested that a maximum change in media penetration would increase

- Economic development is measured using a natural log transformation with a minimum and maximum value of 5.4 and 15.8, respectively. The coefficient of $-.09$ for economic development suggests that the difference between the least and the most developed observation is worth only one-unit reduction in media repression, *ceteris paribus*.¹⁵
- Exchange rate stability is also measured using a natural transformation that ranges from 1 to 15. The variable is negatively correlated with media repression, suggesting that increases in economic instability are associated with increases in media repression. The coefficient of $-.01$ reported in the parsimonious model suggests that a maximum change in instability while holding other things constant would be associated with just about a one tenth unit increase in media repression.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the relationship between media repression and the theorized predictors. First, I separately investigated the multivariate relationship between media repression and the explanatory variables through two models, namely the political model and the economic and socio-cultural model. Thereafter, I dropped

media repression by 1.7 units, all other things held constant. With the non-African sub-dataset, the media penetration coefficient of $.08$ did not attain statistical significance, suggesting that the variable had no impact on media repression for those countries. Details of these tests are not included in the study.

¹⁵ The economic development variable loses its explanatory power considerably in the reduced model as compared to economic model discussed earlier. One explanation for the lower statistical significance relates to the rather large correlation between economic development and regulation of participation ($.54$). In the reduced model, regulation of participation maintains a highly statistically significant effect on media repression, while that of economic development weakens to the $p < .05$ level.

It should further be noted that I also tested economic development for nonlinear effects on media repression. The quadratic term (economic development²) emerged negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient for the basic term turned positive and statistically insignificant. My previous cautionary about multicollinearity applies here as well.

all statistically insignificant variables, grouped the two models and re-estimated the combined model. Finally, I estimated a parsimonious model that comprised all the variables that remained statistically significant in the combined model.

The predictors of media repression appear to be lagged media repression, and four explanatory variables from each of the political and economic/socio-cultural models. The variables from the political model are democracy, regulation of participation, revolutions, and assassinations. The variables from the economic/socio-cultural model are population, economic development, exchange rate levels, and media penetration. Some 11 variables taken from extant theory - open executive recruitment, general strikes, guerilla warfare, government crises, riots, antigovernment demonstrations, urbanization, literacy, annual population growth rate, annual economic growth rate - were dropped from the analysis after they failed to show significant effects on media repression.

Besides upholding the hypotheses associated with the eight explanatory variables above, this chapter also investigated lagged media repression, and tested for the existence of alternative explanations to some of the theories. On lagged repression, it appears that past media repression is a short-lived phenomenon, generally fading out after one year. In the event of exogenous shocks, the lagged effect is corrected in the subsequent year and then fades away. The analyses further showed that lagged media repression allows considerable flexibility in the model, such that the model remains a function of contemporaneous effects rather than the lagged effects.

On the explanatory variables, I investigated alternative explanations for democracy, media repression and economic development. All three appear to have some nonlinear associations with media repression. Low and high democracy appears to be associated with low levels of media repression, while the "middle" (semi-

democracies) may be associated with high repression. Media penetration also appears to work in a nonlinear fashion. Countries with low penetration appear to be associated with increasing media repression, with the effect being insignificant for countries with rich media penetration. For economic development, a negative relationship appears to exist with media repression for the more developed countries and no effect for the poor countries. While these findings are not unequivocal, it would appear that alternative explanations may exist for these explanatory variables.

Considering the final models estimated in this chapter, it is apparent that political variables have a relative importance over economic/socio-cultural variables in explaining media repression. First, it appears that political factors are more important in the shorter-term, most probably because they are more susceptible to change. For example, a country's democracy rating may be improved within a short period of time through compromise and negotiation (as happened in South Africa or in some Eastern European countries) but the same cannot be said of economic development, urbanization, literacy, or media penetration. The short-term nature of political variables therefore gives them primacy in determining the magnitude of media repression. This discussion will be pursued further in the next chapter.

It is noteworthy that the above findings do not substantially replicate any single past research. Rather, my findings report a unique combination of explanatory variables that are associated with media repression. While the logic explaining associations between the explanatory variables and media repression may not be different from that observed with general political repression, the observed combined effect of these variables on media repression demonstrates that this component of general political repression deserves independent investigation. This is an important observation that confirms arguments by students of political repression (for example,

Gurr 1986a; Harff 1994) who suggest that different components of political repression are associated with different causal and associative circumstances.

In the next and final chapter, I consider these results in light of the theoretical conclusions adopted in the early parts of this dissertation. I also use the opportunity to point to feasible areas of future research within the subject of media repression.

Table 6.1: Equations of the models of media repression

General cross-sectional time series model

$$Y_{t,i} = \alpha + \beta_1 Y_{(t-1),i} + \beta_2 X_{1it} + \beta_3 X_{2it} + \beta_4 X_{3it} + \dots + \varepsilon$$

Equation 1: Lagged Media repression, political institutions and conflict variables

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Media repression} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Lagged media repression}_{(t-1),i} + \beta_2 \text{Democracy}_{it} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Open executive recruitment}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Regulation of participation}_{it} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{Assassinations}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{General strikes}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Guerilla warfare}_{it} \\ & + \beta_8 \text{Government crises}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Riots}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Revolutions}_{it} \\ & + \beta_{11} \text{Antigovernment demonstrations}_{it} + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Equation 2: Media repression, economic and sociocultural variables

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Media repression} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Lagged media repression}_{(t-1),i} + \beta_2 \text{Inflation}_{it} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Population}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Economic development}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Exchange rate}_{it} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{Urbanization}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Media penetration}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Literacy}_{it} \\ & + \beta_9 \text{Annual economic growth rate}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Annual population growth rate}_{it} + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Table 6.2: Political model of media repression

Independent variables	Coefficients
Lagged repression	.33*** (.10)
Democracy	-.096* (.045)
Open executive recruitment	-.029 (.043)
Regulation of participation	-.16* (.065)
Riots	.096* (.049)
General strikes	.088 (.047)
Antigovernment	.076* (.031)
Assassinations	.082* (.035)
Guerrilla warfare	.15 (.12)
Revolutions	.34*** (.10)
Government crises	.15 (.11)
Intercept	2.79*** (.54)
Wald χ^2	378.87***
R ²	.26
Average N	90
Average T	8.57

Note: Regression coefficients are unstandardized coefficients estimated by OLS with error-correction specification. Panel-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Table 6.3: Economic and socio-cultural model of media repression

Independent variables	Coefficients
Lagged repression	.35*** (.11)
Inflation	-.047 (.048)
Population	.022*** (.005)
Economic development	-.33*** (.086)
Exchange rate	-.064* (.032)
Urbanization	.01*** (.003)
Literacy	-.000 (.003)
Annual GNP growth rate	-.005 (.004)
Annual population growth rate	.023 (.076)
Media penetration	.27* (.12)
Intercept	3.67*** (.77)
Wald χ^2	812.53***
R ²	.25
Average N	86
Average T	8.55

Note: Regression coefficients are unstandardized coefficients estimated by OLS with error-correction specification. Panel-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Table 6.4: The combined model of media repression

Independent variables	Coefficients
Lagged repression	.27* (.10)
Democracy	-.040** (.013)
Regulation of participation	-.22** (.080)
Riots	.051 (.029)
Antigovernment demonstrations	.053 (.037)
Assassinations	.076* (.034)
Revolutions	.41*** (.087)
Population	.023* (.011)
Economic Development	-.093* (.053)
Exchange rate	-.052* (.032)
Urbanization	-.004 (.004)
Media penetration	.34*** (.094)
Intercept	2.89*** (.72)
Wald χ^2	514.20***
R ²	.30
N	89
Average T	9

Note: Regression coefficients are unstandardized coefficients estimated by OLS with error-correction specification. Panel-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Table 6.5: A parsimonious model of media repression

Independent variables	Coefficients
Lagged repression	.26** (.11)
Democracy	-.040*** (.013)
Regulation of participation	-.24*** (.081)
Assassinations	.075* (.034)
Revolutions	.41*** (.089)
Population	.023* (.011)
Economic Development	-.093* (.053)
Exchange rate	-.008* (.004)
Media penetration	.34*** (.099)
Intercept	2.68*** (.71)
Wald χ^2	479.93***
R ²	.30
N	88
Average T	9

Note: Regression coefficients are unstandardized coefficients estimated by OLS with error-correction specification. Panel-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Table 6.6: Impact of distributed lag of media repression

Lag term	Coefficients
Lagged repression _{t-1}	.45*** (.097)
Lagged repression _{t-2}	.01** (.004)
Lagged repression _{t-3}	.001 (.004)
Lagged repression _{t-4}	.004 (.003)
Intercept	-.18* .010
Wald χ^2	54.36***
R ²	.24
N	788
Average T	8.4

Note: Regression coefficients are unstandardized coefficients estimated by OLS with error-correction specification. Panel-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Table 6.7: A parsimonious model of media repression with accumulated lag effects

Independent variables	Coefficients
Lagged repression _{t-1}	.27** (.11)
Democracy	-.037*** (.013)
Regulation of participation	-.23*** (.08)
Assassinations	.076* (.034)
Revolutions	.42*** (.089)
Population	.020* (.075)
Economic Development	-.093* (.053)
Exchange rate	-.057* (.032)
Media penetration	.31*** (.090)
Lagged repression _{t-2}	.047 (.032)
Lagged repression _{t-3}	-.000 (.039)
Lagged repression _{t-4}	.032 (.027)
Intercept	2.75*** (.63)
Wald χ^2	487.98***
R ²	.29
N	86
Average T	9

Note: Regression coefficients are unstandardized coefficients estimated by OLS with error-correction specification. Panel-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The fundamental research question tackled in this dissertation is: Under what circumstances do political regimes repress their own media? Both theoretical and empirical perspectives were utilized in the search for answers to this question. The theoretical perspectives included a critical examination of theories undergirding political regimes' decisions to repress, and a specific framework for understanding the circumstances within which the repression happens. The empirical perspectives involved the creation of a new event-based dataset for media repression, the construction of a scale to measure media repression, and the estimation of a cross-sectional time series model of media repression. Each of these perspectives was preceded by a review of extant literature in the various aspects of scholarship being tackled.

To get to the central research question, this dissertation poses another question as preamble: Why do political regimes repress? The answer is offered in Chapter 2, where I argue that political regimes repress in response to actual or perceived threats. At the most basic level, these responses may be traced to personal attributes, for example, cognitive perception, belief systems and interpersonal relationships. Scholtz (2000) develops a sequential theory of repression: a stimulus with an indeterminate future orientation breeds worry, fear and anxiety. The result is often negative affective and

cognitive responses and the mobilization of defensive controls to maintain self-control and preservation.

Subsequent decisions and actions may follow several strategies. According to Scholtz (2000), the first strategy involves a cost-benefit appraisal of responses to perceived credible threat (the rational choice approach). Moreover, non-action is itself considered a cost in that it could serve as further pretext for increased threatening-generating action. The second strategy involves the use of established structures -- national institutions, law, procedures and norms - to "contain" perceived threat. The third strategy examines the impact of threat on the target group and observer group. Here, we recognize that targeting responses to a specific set of people is as critical as deciding when and how to repress. A fourth strategy combines the rational choice and the structuralist strategies, creating a hybrid strategy that perceives political repression as a product of both cost-benefit analysis and diverse political-economic and socio-cultural factors.

These strategies are critical in the operationalization of political repression. This dissertation conceptualizes political repression as an umbrella construct with multiple components. As discussed in Chapter 3, the components have distinct variance as well as shared variance. As such, understanding the causes and correlates of general political repression helps in understanding the structure of the components. There is a large and growing body of contemporary systematic research into general political repression, much of it hinged upon the seminal works of Ted Gurr and Michael Stohl. The development of quantitative methodology for social research and the creation of political repression datasets have re-ignited scholarly interest in this area of political culture.

Against the foregoing, the dissertation focuses on its *raison d'être* - media repression. Here again, I first explore some theoretical explanations to a probing question: What about mass media makes them targets of repression by political regimes? Critical media theory is useful in formulating a response to this question. Mass media are understood to dominate the public sphere within which public discourse takes place. Their participation in the public sphere facilitates the development of an equitable system of public dialogue that celebrates pluralism and diversity of opinion in popular discourse. The stability, strength and durability of the public sphere are premised upon maintaining media autonomy. A loss of autonomy transforms media from being the realm of public dialogue into instruments of power and profit.

But are media just the forum for public dialogue? In other words, are media simply purveyors of information, providing value-free and cost-free discourse on critical societal matters? No, according to extant media theory. As reported in Chapter 4, recent studies show that mass media have changed their character considerably, to become major influences of how people perceive themselves and the world. The changes are attributable to the evolving character of news product and news organizations. The evolution has resulted in large media conglomerates that command immense political, economic and social power, even though they may be adequately differentiated from mainstream political, economic and socio-cultural institutions.

Dahlgren and Nerone separately argue that the contemporary profile of mass media depicts institutions that not only dominate the public sphere but are in essence the public sphere themselves. Moreover, the mass media are the primary definers of the boundaries of the public sphere, through such avenues as economics (maximization of

profits, media products and outlets), ideology and power (news agenda, newsworthiness and news sources). With influence and power, mass media routinely intervene in all aspects of political and social life. In doing so, they spur tensions, suspicions and conflict in their relations with other societal institutions, the most intense contestations being with political regimes. It is within these conflicts that political regimes get adequately motivated to directly or indirectly constrain media autonomy. The extent to which constraints are enacted and enforced depends upon, among other things, the political culture prevailing in the system. In reality, these constraints represent the nascent beginnings of media repression.

The development of a media repression dataset, discussed in Chapter 5, was an important step towards rekindling research interest in this oft-forgotten component of political repression. The initiative involved the identification of a broad range of sources of raw data, and the construction of a coding strategy consistent with systematic research. A five-category coding scheme was created in line with Gurr's principle of intentionality. The five categories - intimidation strategies, prevention strategies, legal strategies, injury strategies and elimination strategies - form the basis for the empirical analysis of media repression. Some critical findings from a preliminary analysis of the 10-year data highlight the dominant use of medium- and high-impact repression strategies by political regimes in repressing media. While a small decline in elimination strategies is discernible, the data also shows an increase in use of legal and injury strategies. These early findings point to the gravity of media repression around the world.

Since no systematic studies of media repression were found in extant literature, this dissertation utilizes general studies of political repression as its main point of

departure. The rationale for this approach lies in the well-accepted notion that political repression is a multi-component construct, and that media repression is one such component. As such, empirical explanations considered here were borrowed from various general studies of political repression. From the data analysis, the following plausible scenario is proposed for the process through which media repression manifests itself.

Changes in four broad categories of explanatory variables will influence the political regime's likelihood to repress media. The four categories are strength of political institutions, presence of political conflict, economic circumstances, and the socio-cultural context. These categories were organized into two models of media repression: the political model and the economic and socio-cultural model.

Political processes and institutions that influence media repression are mainly those that result in high levels of public political empowerment. As enunciated in Chapters 3 and 4, the general openness of political institutions and development of political expression provide a broader realm for public discourse, and reduce incentives and opportunities for leaders to stifle dissent. Factors offering relatively lower empowerment are unlikely to affect media repression in the same way; for example, increasing opportunities for non-elites to attain executive office does not have a significant effect on reducing repression of media. It would appear here public expression is the underlying principle of political process and institutions that safeguards media independence.

The presence of political conflict may be captured in numerous ways. Here, conflict intensity scale appears to drive political regimes' decisions to repress media. At the basic level, low-scale conflict (for example, general strikes) and protracted conflict

activities (for example, guerilla warfare) do not appear to cause media repression. However, short-term activities like riots, anti-government demonstrations, and assassinations and revolutions will spur higher levels of threat perception and precipitate repression of media. In a more general setting, where other categories of factors are included, only activities signifying the highest levels of conflict - revolutions and assassinations - emerge as strong predictors of media repression.

Economic circumstances and the socio-cultural contexts offer another useful insight into the calculus of media repression. The concentration of people as well as increased availability of media products and outlets creates opportunities for repression. The rationale for increased number of people is intuitive: more people means greater demand for resources and a higher propensity for dissent due to lower costs. At the basic level, media penetration displays similar effects, because it also reduces the costs of dissent. Annual changes do not have the same effect, probably because they are not enduring.

The finding on economic development is also intuitive. Better economic times diffuse dissent and generally usher in better relations between governments and citizens. The role for economic instability is, however, less clear. Changes in cost of living have no significant effect on media repression, probably because of their general intrinsic nature. But economic instability directly related to government policy - for instance, exchange rate instabilities - have a small impact.

The finding that lagged media repression is a short-lived phenomenon - with a significant impact across only one year - bears important implications for political repression theory. For repression scholarship, the finding contrasts the argument from general body of literature that country characteristics relating to media repression are

fairly entrenched and only change gradually (Poe and Tate 1994). While this difference may be attributed to the specific nature of media repression in the general ambit of political repression, the finding calls for further investigation of past repression and how it manifests itself.

The data analyses in preceding chapters also speak to the difference between political and economic/socio-cultural variables in explaining media repression. As Davenport (1999) suggests, there appear to be explanatory variables that predict political repression in the short term while others have an impact in the long term. For media repression, the political model appears to assume the short-term role while the economic/socio-cultural model takes the long-term role. Three of the four pertinent political variables - democracy, revolutions and assassinations - are factors that often manifest themselves in the short term. On the other hand, three of the four economic/socio-cultural variables - economic development, population and media penetration - change gradually over time. On this, the preceding analyses suggest that political variables enjoy a higher relative importance over economic/socio-cultural variables.

The model developed here explains only 30% of the total variance. While this is encouraging for a pioneering excursion such as this one, it is a challenge to students of political repression to deepen society's understanding of the decision-making calculus that leads political regimes to repress. For media repression, the way forward is clear given the availability now of a dataset that offers considerable opportunities for empirical research into the nature of media repression. However, the efficacy of the dataset lies in the availability of multiple, continuous and credible sources of new raw data.

Having charted the course for systematic studies into media repression, what does this study make of the relationship between media repression and the general field of political repression? With reference to the discussion in Chapter 2, media repression is a component of political repression, and has common variance with some of the other components of general political repression. This study's findings highlight the links between media repression and the general body of repression studies. But this is only a first cut into a subject that is expected to occupy scholars for years to come. This study opens the doors to new thinking and deeper understanding of the media and society, and their interplay with political culture.

Future researchers into media repression may consider examining two aspects not dealt with in this dissertation. First, as pointed out in Chapter 4, this study covers only the overt types of media repression. The covert types of media repression - self-restraint or self-censorship - are difficult to document for empirical analysis and were therefore not considered in this study. Investigating the nature of these less visible forms of media repression is an important step towards understanding the evolving relationships between media institutions and state. This is especially so in developed societies where close relations between media and state have resulted in media institutions being seen as co-opted institutions of government (see, for example, McChesney 1997; Cook 1998; Bagdikian 2000; Alterman 2003).

A second point relates to more intensive use of the data available in the Media Repression Dataset. As previously stated, the dataset offers critically useful insights into media repression across countries and time. Possibilities abound to expand the 10-year and 90-country time series analyzed in this dissertation. In addition, the dataset could be disaggregated to allow for research into a wide range of new areas, including

the examination of effects of different types of repression and preferences for different strategies among countries, regions or cultures.

In sum, the above findings have pertinent implications for the theory of media repression developed earlier in this dissertation. First, these findings set out a systematic framework of causes for media repression. Second, they provide a vital link between the general body of political repression and the specific area of media repression, thereby broadening our understanding of the repression phenomenon. Explicating these findings provides opportunities for the formulation of effective policies at the national and global level to curb media repression. Finally, they provide yet another opportunity for society to understand itself by examining its own actions.

Appendix A

The Freedom House Model

The Annual Review of Press Freedom around the World is the annual survey by the Freedom House, a media organization based in New York and Washington. Since 1979, Freedom House has compiled an annual press freedom rating of 185 countries. This annual study bases evaluates country performance on four variables:

- A. Laws and regulations affecting media
- B. Political pressures and control on the media
- C. Economic influences on the media
- D. Specific violations of press freedom during the past calendar year

Laws and administrative decisions comprise such actions as restrictive media laws, government licensing and accreditation of journalists, licensing of media organizations, and the issuance of general legal and/or administrative guidelines on media operations from time to time. **Political pressures and controls** include such features as favoring friendly journalists, penalizing critics or threatening them with physical harm or loss of employment, leaking of information to selected news carriers, limiting journalists' access to government information, dissemination of false information, denunciation of journalists by officials with a view to reducing the writers' credibility, and restrictions on the size of print or broadcast audience.

Economic influences refer to pressure exerted on the media by the government or the private sector. This influence may result from government control of newsprint or broadcast materials, official advertising, taxation, price-fixing and other relationships. The private sector could also influence media content through advertising, special interest group activity (e.g., labor unions) or informal pressure through corporate ownership lines. **Specific oppression** comprises all observed incidences of physical interference with journalists or their news organizations. A wide range of issues are lumped together in this category, for example, murder, physical attacks, detention and harassment of journalists; banning and confiscation of media products; and attacks or closure of media premises. (See Sussman, 1989:192-196).

A preliminary assessment is conducted for all countries on the basis of the four variables. Observations of the first three categories are placed on a 10-point scale, while those of the fourth are placed on a 20-point scale. The survey assesses and recorded influences on the electronic and print media separately. The maximum points that a country can score is 100 which is a combination of the scores from the two types of media. Based on these scores, the countries are finally ranked into three broad categories: Free (0-30), Partly Free (31-60) and Not Free (61-100).

Appendix B

Press Freedom Model of the Committee to Protect Journalists

Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) investigates and verifies cases of press freedom violations around the world. Each account was corroborated by more than one source for factual accuracy, confirmation that the victims were journalists or news organizations, and verification that intimidation was the probable motive. CPJ defines journalists as people who cover news or write commentary on a regular basis. CPJ classifies the cases in this report according to the following definitions:

Attacked: In the case of journalists, wounded or assaulted. In the case of news facilities, damaged, raided, or searched; non-journalist employees attacked because of news coverage or commentary.

Censored: Officially suppressed or banned; editions confiscated; news outlet closed.

Expelled: Forced to leave a country because of news coverage or commentary.

Harassed: Access denied or limited; materials confiscated or damaged; entry or exit denied; family members attacked or threatened; dismissed or demoted (when it is clearly the result of political or outside pressure); freedom of movement impeded.

Imprisoned: Arrested or held against one's will; held for no less than 48 hours.

Killed: Murdered, or missing and presumed dead, with evidence that the motive was retribution for news coverage or commentary. Includes accidental deaths of journalists in the line of duty.

Legal Action: Credentials denied or suspended; fined; sentenced to prison; visas denied or canceled; passage of a restrictive law; libel suit intended to inhibit coverage.

Missing: No group or government agency takes responsibility for the journalist's disappearance; in some instances, feared dead.

Threatened: Menaced with physical harm or some other type of retribution.

Appendix C

Predictors of media repression

As discussed in the preceding chapters, extant literature identifies four broad categories of independent variables as predictors of political repression and media repression: political variables, economic variables, and socio-cultural variables. This chapter begins with a summary of the exogenous variables identified earlier in the literature. Next, I operationalize the variables as well as discuss the data set in which they are found. The chapter concludes with an analysis of correlations and other relationships between these exogenous variables.

Understanding the independent variables

This study conceptualizes media repression as a component of political repression; as such, I hypothesize that the predictors of political repression will also predict media repression.¹ The specific hypotheses are set out in Chapter 6. The political variables identified include democracy, open executive recruitment, regulation of participation, assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government, purges, riots, revolutions and antigovernment. Democracy has been widely found to have a negative

¹ Expectedly, some exogenous variables will have indirect or even insignificant effect on media repression. As such, I include all possible hypothesized predictors in the models to assess their general effect on media repression. Later, I develop parsimonious models of media repression that exclude any variables found to be statistically insignificant in the earlier first wave of estimations.

correlation with political repression; increased levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of repression (Regan and Henderson 2002).

The most common measure of democracy in systematic analysis is the difference between democracy and autocracy scores in the Polity IV dataset.² Regan and Henderson (2002: 125) observe that the measure is particularly useful in political repression research because it does not incorporate a human rights dimension in its construction. As such, they argue, “it is unlikely that I are conflating elements of one of our predictor variables (level of democracy) with those of our outcome variable (level of political repression)”. In Polity IV, democracy and autocracy are scored on a 10-point scale, each with 0 as low and 10 as high. To create a new democracy score, I subtract autocracy from democracy, resulting in a new 21-point scale (-20 to 20) (see Jagers and Gurr (1995) for details on this manipulation).

Two other variables - open executive recruitment and regulation of participation - are also derived from Polity IV. Open recruitment of the main political executive is operationalized as the opportunity for non-elites to attain executive office, and is measured on a five-point scale (1=closed; 4=open; and 0=unregulated). Similarly, the regulation of participation is operationalized as the development of institutional structures for political expression. It is measured on a five-point scale (1=unregulated; 2=factional/transitional; 3=factional/restricted; 4=restricted; 5=institutionalized). In extant literature, increased levels of either open recruitment regulation of participation promotes accommodation of dissenting opinion and reduces opportunities

² The dataset, originally designed by Ted R. Gurr, is maintained by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, College Park, USA. The data are available online at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity>. The principal investigators are Keith Jagers and Monty Marshall. Descriptions of the components of Polity IV are available in Appendix 3C.

for repression. As such, I expect the two variables to be negatively associated with media repression.

The indicators of political conflict are assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations.³ These measures are derived from the Arthur Banks Cross-National Times Series Database.⁴ All are measured by the number of events counted during the year. It is hypothesized that these political conflict variables are positively associated with repression: increases in one or more of these variables are associated with increases in media repression.

Economic variables and sociocultural variables have for a long time been postulated to affect political repression (Apter, 1987; Dahl, 1971; Deutsch, 1961; Pennock, 1979; Lipset, 1959; Diamond, 1994, etc). The arguments linking socioeconomic variables to quality of democratic rule are based on modernization theory, which states that economic development brings general societal changes that in turn aid in the promotion of democratic rule because of increased political participation, higher political tolerance and consensus, and increased legitimacy of the political system (Hadenius, 1994:75-77).

³ There are two systemic conflict variables, namely frequency of political conflict and political elimination. Frequency of political conflict is the sum general strikes (strikes by over 1,000 industrial or service workers over national government policies or authority); major governmental crises (any rapidly developing situation that threatens the present regime with downfall but excluding armed revolts); riots (violent demonstrations or clashes with more than 100 citizens involving the use of force); and anti-government demonstrations (peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority). Political elimination is the sum of political assassinations (politically motivated murders or attempted murders of senior government official or politician) and purges (systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or opposition).

⁴ The data are available online at <http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net/>. Descriptions of the components of Polity IV are available in Appendix 4.

Hadenius' views are similar to those of Huntington (1968), and Mitchell and McCormick (1988) that economic modernization leads to political stability and subsequently into increased observance of human rights. Mitchell and McCormick (1988:47) assert that economic scarcity in poorest countries creates substantial social and political tensions, leaving them unstable and most apt to use repression in order to maintain control. This argument is consistent with Robert McNamara's "simple poverty thesis" that violence and economic backwardness are inextricably linked.⁵ Introducing a new dimension of a curvilinear relationship between economic development and political repression, Huntington (1968:41) argues that human rights violations are highest among "modernizing" states as opposed to "modern" or "poor" states. He argues that social and economic changes increase political participation, which in turn increases people's demands on the government. According to Huntington, traditional sources of political authority are challenged, creating an urgent need for new political institutions to moderate and channel the demands of the newly mobilized citizenry. Ultimately, lack of adequate institutional support results in political instability, disorder and subsequently political repression.

The traditional measure of economic development is the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.⁶ Dogan (1994:44-45) reports that the GDP per capita is a good measure in economic comparisons but a poor one in comparative political analysis because it loses its validity in the latter. The validity loss is attributable to valuation problems in the subsistence (non-cash) economies and distortions introduced by conversion of monetary statistics into US dollar terms, among others.

⁵ Quoted in Huntington (1968:41) and Mitchell and McCormick (1988:478).

⁶ Gross National Product is simply defined as the market value of all goods and services produced in the economy during the year (Dogan, 1994:44).

There are also questions about the indicator's reliability. Summers and Heston (1988) found it unreliable in their longitudinal study of real product and price level estimates. Common substitutes include energy consumption per capita (e.g. Henderson, 1991; Davenport, 1995), physical-quality-of-life (e.g. Morris, 1979), and the human development index (e.g. UNDP, 1990, 1991). However, as Poe and Tate (1994:858) report, data on these alternatives is often unavailable for most years and for a significant number of countries.

Cognizant of these observations, this study employs GDP per capita strictly as a measure of economic development, and percentage annual growth in GDP per capita as the measure of economic growth. This decision is consistent with Poe and Tate's (1994:858) decision to keep the two variables on the grounds of availability and that when their combined use brings their deficiencies closer to those reported by alternative measures of economic development. Nixon (1960, 1965) reported that GDP per capita correlated with press freedom at .64 and .70 in his 1960 and 1965 studies, respectively. Poe and Tate (1994:862-863) report a tenuous correlation of .07 between GDP per capita (measuring economic standing) and integrity of the person (their conceptualization of human rights violations). However, correlation between annual growth in GDP per capita (measuring economic growth) and personal integrity was not statistically significant. Considering some of the measurement and conceptualization problems apparent in Poe and Tate's data (see discussion of Mitchell and McCormick's (1997) in Chapter 3), these two variables are retained. They are expected to show stronger relationships because of better measurement and design of the dependent variable.

Urbanization, the third socioeconomic variable, is measured by the percentage of the total national population living in cities of 10,000 or more inhabitants. Urbanization is assumed to indirectly indicate the distribution of economic and organizational power resources (Vanhanen, 1994:43). As such, the higher the urban population, the more diversified economic activities and economic interest groups there are. Vanhanen (1994:43-44) argues that urbanization creates new interest groups and cleavages that are conducive to establishment of pluralistic politics. Vanhanen (1994), however, cautions that this variable may be contaminated in recent years by idiosyncratic social migration phenomena that have transformed major urban centers into "symbols of poverty and social collapse" (Kennedy 1994:26). Another problem Vanhanen (1994) points out is the multiplicity of definitions of urban population across countries; he argues that this attenuates the reliability of data collected from such traditional sources as the World Bank and the United Nations.

A number of social and demographic variables are also included. Population represents annual estimates of national populations of all countries conducted by a number of agencies, including the World Bank. Illiteracy is the percentage of the national population over 15 years of age that is unable to read and write. Consequently, the higher the percentage, the larger the population that is disenfranchised by inability to read. The media use variables are per capita number of radio receivers, per capita number of television sets, and per capita daily newspaper circulation figures. Nixon (1960, 1965) reported correlations above .63 between per capita radio receivers and per capita daily newspaper circulation, and press freedom.

Extant literature and field observations also suggest there are strong reciprocal relationships between media-use variables and media repression. There are

disagreements about whether these variables should be incorporated into the model separately or they should be indexed into a single scale. For example, Dogan (1994:48-49) argues that communication development in many countries has followed a non-linear path, hence no one single communication indicator can account for a country's entire communication network.⁷ He recommends the compounding of various indicators of communication development (e.g. number of radio receivers, television sets and daily newspaper circulation) into an index to enhance the statistical significance of the data. However, he cautions that the composite indicators (indices) must be evaluated to ensure that they do not obscure more than illuminate. This study recognizes the large disparities in the consumption of radio, television and print media in many developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, and retains the variables as distinct predictors to maintain their explanatory power.

[INSERT TABLE C.1 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT TABLE C.2 ABOUT HERE]

Preliminary analysis of independent variables

Table C.1 summarizes the independent variables and their sources. Table C.2 tabulates descriptive information on the independent variables. The fall in number of observations for some variables is as a result of missing data. Missing data is however not expected to be a serious problem because it is between 3% and 5% for almost all variables. The maximum number of observations is 900, considering that dataset

⁷ Dogan (1994:48) observes that the use of many isolated indicators may have been valid several decades ago, but it now outmoded. He suggests, for example, that use of the radio sets as an indicator of development in the communication sector is invalid because many states have fairly well-developed radio broadcasting systems.

comprises 90 countries and is across a 10-year period. To operationalize the effects of GDP, population, and currency exchange rate on media repression, I employ two variables for each predictor: a natural logarithm and an average percentage increase from year to year. The variables were logged to eliminate skewness in their distribution, a condition necessary if they were to meet the statistical assumptions of study.⁸

A correlational analysis of the four media penetration variables also reveals high Pearson correlation coefficients of between .71 and .85. To circumvent problems of multicollinearity and biased estimates resultant from using highly correlated items, I combined the four variables into a scale of media penetration using factor analysis techniques. In an analysis employing principal component factors, one factor was retained with an eigenvalue of 3.359 and accounting for 85% of the variance. The scree test also showed that only one factor was significant. The new factor was saved and retained for further analysis.

[INSERT TABLE C.3 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, I investigated the possibility that some correlations between the independent variables. Such association is critical to estimation of direct and indirect effects in the model. Table C.3 summarizes the correlation matrix of the independent variables. The findings are as expected: none of the independent variables has consistently high and statistically significant correlations with other variables. Also, most correlations are in the anticipated direction. A number of large correlations were expected, for example, media penetration correlates at levels above .5 with

⁸ This is common practice in econometric modeling. See for example Poe and Tate (1994) and Davenport (1995, 1997).

literacy, economic development and urbanization. This is consistent with previous research noted earlier that media expansion is aided by the economy, literacy and geographical concentration of people (urbanization). Democracy also appears to correlate at moderate levels with open executive recruitment, urbanization, economic development, media penetration and literacy. These patterns are also expected especially in the light of recent research that links democratic stability to economic development and social progress (for example, Kurzman et al. 2002).

Table C.1 Summary of independent variables and their sources

Category	Variable name	Source
Political process and institutions variables:	Democracy score Open executive recruitment Regulation of participation	Polity IV Update ^b
Political conflict variables	Riots with use of force General strikes Anti-government demonstrations Assassinations Guerilla warfare Revolutions Governmental crises	CNTS
Economic and socio-cultural variables	Consumer price index (Inflation) Annual percent change in consumer price index (Inflation) Literacy rate Currency exchange rate Annual change in currency exchange rate GDP per capita Annual percent change in GDP per capita Population size Annual change in population size Urbanization (cities with over 10,000) Media penetration (ownership of radio receivers, TV sets and newspaper circulation)	CNTS ^a / World Bank World Bank/ UNESCO

^a = Cross-National Time Series Data Set, authored by Arthur Banks, 1800-1996, Center for Comparative Political Research, State University of New York-Binghamton.

^b = Polity IV Update authored by Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr, 1800-1997, Center for International Development & Conflict Management, University of Maryland.

Table C.2 Summary of descriptive statistics of the independent variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Democracy	861	12.07	7.09	0	20
Openness of exec. recruitment	862	3.39	1.37	0	4
Regulation of participation	862	3.29	1.15	2	5
Riots	877	.58	1.78	0	19
General strikes	877	.32	.83	0	7
Anti-govt demonstrations	879	.89	1.90	0	24
Assassinations	877	.45	1.37	0	15
Guerilla warfare	877	.20	.48	0	3
Revolutions	877	.25	.53	0	3
Government crises	877	.20	.46	0	3
Inflation	858	4.1	1.39	-4.6	13.02
Currency exchange rate	803	7.35	2.61	1	15
Economic development	896	9.8	2.11	5.4	15.8
Population	900	9.5	1.5	6.6	14.0
Urbanization	893	50.11	23.12	8.24	100
Literacy	890	19.40	21.31	1	89
Media penetration	889	.09	.98	-2.3	2.6
Newspaper circulation	889	81.5	106.8	0	587
Population of radio sets	889	336	310.7	19	2116
TV set population	889	153.4	175.3	0	806
Telephone lines	889	102.5	150.1	0	661

Table C.3 Correlation matrix of the independent variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Democracy (1)	1.00								
Open exec. recruitment (2)	.51***	1.00							
Regulation of participation (3)	-.21***	-.18***	1.00						
Riots (4)	.04	.04	-.07	1.00					
General strikes (5)	.14***	.06*	-.08*	.32***	1.00				
Antigovt. demonstrations (6)	.08*	.10**	-.15***	.66***	.35***	1.00			
Assassinations (7)	.13***	.10**	-.22***	-.01	.01	.05	1.00		
Guerilla warfare (8)	.08	-.02	-.18***	.08*	.06	.09**	.31***	1.00	
Revolutions (9)	-.03	-.10**	-.14***	.03	-.02	.07*	.22***	.49***	1.00
Government crises (10)	.20***	.11***	-.12***	.16***	.15***	.20***	.15***	.15***	.17***
Inflation (11)	-.01	.03	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.01	.08*	.03	.14***
Currency Exchange Rate (12)	-.16***	-.21***	-.07*	-.01	-.14***	-.01	-.01	-.03	.01
Economic Development (13)	.23***	.11**	.27***	.01	-.04	.04	-.03	-.04	-.08*
Population (14)	-.02	.087*	-.01	.19***	.03	.20***	.01	.23**	.04
Urbanization (15)	.45***	.32***	.08*	.04	.11**	.09**	.09**	-.01	-.08*
Media penetration (16)	.41***	.26***	.06	.12***	.09**	.18***	.12***	.10**	-.01
Literacy (17)	-.38***	-.39***	-.02	-.02	-.06	-.11***	-.09**	-.04	.01
Annual GNP growth rate (18)	.01	-.04	.01	-.02	-.04	.08	-.18***	.01	.01
Annual popl. change (19)	-.23***	-.22***	-.06	-.01	-.07	.12***	-.11***	-.06	-.05
Annual exch. rate change (20)	.03	.02	-.23***	.10**	.10	.06	.11***	.01	-.04

	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Government crises (10)	1.00										
Inflation (11)	.06	1.00									
Currency Exchange Rate (12)	-.10**	-.04	1.00								
Econ. Development (13)	.06	-.01	-.10**	1.00							
Population (14)	.10**	.01	-.12***	.22***	1.00						
Urbanization (15)	.12***	.05	-.17***	.26***	-.11**	1.00					
Media penetration (16)	.17***	.03	-.22***	.48***	.21***	.56***	1.00				
Literacy (17)	-.13***	-.04	.29***	-.19***	-.05	-.60***	-.51***	1.00			
Annual GDP growth rate (18)	-.06	-.14***	.08	.09	.01	-.11***	.01	.11**	1.00		
Annual popul. change (19)	-.09	-.11**	-.09	-.26***	.12***	-.28***	-.28***	.20***	.10*	1.00	
Annual exch. rate change (20)	-.04	-.12**	.04	-.12***	.14***	.01	.01	-.24***	-.05	.06	1.00

Entries are pearson correlation coefficients. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. All are two-tailed tests.

Appendix D
Cross-National Time Series, 1815-2000

Principal Investigator:

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Banks, Arthur S. CROSS-NATIONAL TIME SERIES, 1815-1973 [Computer file]. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1976.

The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive of the Center for Comparative Political Research of the State University of New York (Binghamton) contains data for 167 independent countries for the period 1815-2000. The unit of analysis is nation-years and the dataset contains a variety of variables that report demographic, economic, communications, and domestic political information.

The nations included in the study were commonly recognized members of the international community during the 164-year period (see the appendix). The time series reports data for periods for which information is readily available and appropriate. Much of the data were estimated in order to provide yearly coverage.

An earlier version of the dataset, also distributed by ICPSR (5002), covered 1815-1973 and was published in Arthur Banks, (Binghamton, N.Y.: Center for Comparative Political Research, State University of New York, 1975).

Select variables from the Cross-National Time Series Data set

Official exchange rate: Expressed in local currency per U.S. dollar

Assassinations: Assassinations are defined the number of any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician.

General strikes: The number of general strikes, defined as any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.

Guerrilla warfare: The number of acts of guerrilla warfare, defined as any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.

Major government crises: The number of major government crises, defined as any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.

Purges: The number of purges, defined as any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.

Riots: The number of riots, defined as any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

Revolutions: The number of revolutions, defined as any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government.

Anti-government demonstrations: The number of anti-government demonstrations, defined as any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.

Major constitutional changes: The number of basic alterations in a state's constitutional structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the various branches of government. Examples of the latter might be the substitution.

Telephone lines per capita: Number of telephones lines per 1,000 people in the population.

Newspaper circulation per capita: Number of newspaper sold daily per 1,000 people in the population.

Radio sets: Number of working radio sets per 1,000 people in the population.

Literacy: Percentage proportion of the population that is literate.

Appendix E

Polity IV Variable List

Each Polity IV “country-year” case records institutionalized authority characteristics for the regime that is in place on December 31 of the calendar (case) year.

Democracy Score: general openness of political institutions. The 11-point Democracy scale is constructed additively.

Autocracy Score: general closedness of political institutions. The 11-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively.

Regulation of Executive Recruitment: institutionalized procedures regarding the transfer of executive power.

Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: extent to which executives are chosen through competitive elections.

Openness of Executive Recruitment: opportunity for non-elites to attain executive office.

Executive Constraints: operational (de facto) independence of chief executive.

Regulation of Participation: development of institutional structures for political expression.

Competitiveness of Participation: extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression.

Appendix F

Derivation of panel corrected standard errors (PCSE)

The following algebraic notation is a summary of the expositions of Beck and Katz (1995) and Greene (1997). Beck and Katz (1995) begin from the premise that i units being observed for t time periods are “pooled,” that is, they have the same regression equation for all t . This may be expressed as:

$$y_{i,t} = x_{i,t}\beta + \varepsilon_{i,t} \text{ where } i = 1, \dots, N \text{ and } t = 1, \dots, N \quad (\text{Equation 1})$$

where $x_{i,t}$ is a vector of one or more (k) independent variables and observations are indexed by both unit or groups (i) and time (t). The coefficient vector β is constant over time and for all units or groups. For all observations, the matrix of dependent and independent variables are denoted by Y and X , respectively. The $NT \times NT$ covariance matrix of the errors with typical element $E(\varepsilon_{i,t}\varepsilon_{j,s})$ is denoted by Ω . GLS techniques can estimate Equation 1 provided we know Ω , the covariance matrix. In such circumstances, GLS is fully efficient and yields consistent standard error estimates. Here, GLS employs a general error covariance matrix to transform Equation 1 to a second linear equation for which the error covariance matrix is suitable for OLS estimation. The GLS estimates of β are given by

$$(X'\Omega^{-1}X)^{-1}X'\Omega^{-1}Y \quad (\text{Equation 2})$$

with the estimated covariance matrix

$$(X'\Omega^{-1}X)^{-1} \quad (\text{Equation 3})$$

Since Ω is really not known, an estimate, $\hat{\Omega}$, is used in Equations 2 and 3. Beck and Katz refer to this as the FGLS procedure, and argue that it produces consistent estimates of β if $\hat{\Omega}$ is estimated using residuals computed from consistent estimates of β . Greene (1997:652) reports that with the basic framework of the generalized regression model as $y_{it} = \beta'x_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$ then in general terms,

$$V = E[\varepsilon\varepsilon'] = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{11}\Omega_{11} & \sigma_{12}\Omega_{12} & \cdot & \sigma_{1n}\Omega_{1n} \\ \sigma_{21}\Omega_{21} & \sigma_{22}\Omega_{22} & \cdot & \sigma_{2n}\Omega_{2n} \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \sigma_{n1}\Omega_{n1} & \sigma_{n2}\Omega_{n2} & \cdot & \sigma_{nn}\Omega_{nn} \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{Equation 4})$$

Considering the specifications of classical regression models, then

$$V = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma^2 I & 0 & \cdot & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma^2 I & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ 0 & 0 & \cdot & \sigma^2 I \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{Equation 5})$$

For this model, the GLS estimator reduces to pooled OLS. Beck and Katz (1995) have suggested that the standard errors of the OLS estimates be corrected for possible misspecification arising from Equation 5 (i.e., a special case of $V_{ij} = \sigma_{ij}I$). In this case, Greene (1997:653) points out that the appropriate asymptotic covariance matrix is transformed from its general form

$$\text{Var}[\mathbf{b}] = (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{V}\mathbf{X}(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \quad (\text{Equation 6})$$

to

$$\text{Var}[\mathbf{b}] = (\sum \mathbf{X}_i' \mathbf{X}_i)^{-1} (\sum \sigma \mathbf{X}_i' \mathbf{X}_i) (\sum \mathbf{X}_i' \mathbf{X}_i)^{-1} \quad (\text{Equation 7})$$

This, he argues, is straightforward to compute since we have the estimates of σ . And since the OLS estimates are consistent, a consistent estimator for σ is $\mathbf{e}_i \mathbf{e}_j / T_{ij}$, hence

$$\text{Var}[\mathbf{b}] = (\sum \mathbf{X}_i' \mathbf{X}_j)^{-1} (\sum \sum (\mathbf{e}_i' \mathbf{e}_j / T_{ij}) \mathbf{X}_i' \mathbf{X}_j) (\sum \mathbf{X}_i' \mathbf{X}_j)^{-1} \quad (\text{Equation 8})$$

where \mathbf{e}_i and \mathbf{e}_j are the least squares residual vectors, \mathbf{X}_i and \mathbf{X}_j are the regressor matrices for observation units i and j , and T_{ij} is the number of common observations of the units. Whitten and Palmer (1999) adopt Greene's model in their pooled time-series analyses of economic voting in 19 Western democracies. Palmer and Gabel (1999) a further modification from Greene (1997) that derives estimates with partial-FGLS and evaluates them with a corrected covariance matrix that is robust to cross-section correlation. Their "correction" component of the covariance matrix is denoted by

$$\frac{\hat{\sigma}_{ij}}{\hat{\sigma}_{ii} \hat{\sigma}_{jj}} \text{ where } \sigma_{ii} \text{ and } \sigma_{jj} \text{ are derived with OLS residuals.}$$

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